Supreme Court Summarizes Principles On Power Of Police To Seize Property U/S 102 CrPC
The Supreme Court held that the power of seizure and attachment are separate and distinct, even if, to the naked eye it may so appear, that the effect is same/similar which is, that the property is taken into custody of, by the authority, either investigative or judicial.
Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has summarized the principles on the power of police to seize property under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).
The Court was hearing a Criminal Appeal in which the question that arose was whether, when proceedings initiated against a person are only under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (PC Act), would it be open for the investigating authorities (police) to freeze the accounts of the accused persons under Section 102 of CrPC.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra summarized the following principles –
• Under this Section, property that is alleged/suspected to be stolen; is the object of crime; has a direct link to the commission of the offence, can be seized.
• The police have the power to seize passports and bank accounts under this Section.
• Orders of freezing issued under this Section, can only be in effect to aid investigation. Once the investigation is complete, that ipso facto, does not entitle the person whose bank accounts have been frozen, to have them released. It shall, however, be open to them to apply to the concerned authority for the same, and the authority shall consider the same in accordance with law.
• The police do not have the power to seize any immovable property. It cannot dispossess someone who is in possession of the immovable property.
• It is not an enabling provision under which the police may, to do justice, seize the property and hand it over to whom they believe to be the rightful owner thereof.
Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat appeared for the Appellant, while Senior Advocate Siddharth Agarwal appeared for the Respondent.
Brief Facts
The Sub-Inspector of Police (SP) posted at the Directorate of Anti-Corruption Branch, West Bengal, conducted a preliminary enquiry against the Respondent’s son and asked vide complaint addressed to the SP that a case be registered under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(b) of the PC Act. Pursuant to the complaint, an FIR was registered and during investigation, certain fixed deposits (FDs) held by the Respondent were frozen. An application was filed before the City Sessions Court, Calcutta seeking de-freezing of the said accounts.
The same was rejected and the Home and Hill Affairs Department, Government of West Bengal granted sanction for prosecution against the Respondent’s son. Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet was presented which named a total of 4 accused persons including the Respondent, his son, his son’s wife, and his brother’s son. The City Sessions Court took cognizance based on the chargesheet by an Order against the said persons. Such an Order was challenged before the High Court, which set aside the same. Hence, the State was before the Apex Court.
Court’s Observations
The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, observed, “While it is undoubted that in ordinary circumstances, information is to be sent to the Magistrate, in certain circumstances, if that is not done, even then the seizure will not be vitiated. This indicates the width of the power granted to the police with the sole aim of smooth facilitation of the investigation. As evidenced by the procedure given in the Ordinance, it is sequential and has to be compliant with principles of natural justice, for it to survive scrutiny. It is necessarily time consuming and deliberative. The difference between the two processes is, therefore, clearly exhibited.”
The Court held that the power of seizure and attachment are separate and distinct, even if, to the naked eye it may so appear, that the effect is same/similar which is, that the property is taken into custody of, by the authority, either investigative or judicial.
“Consequentially, the conclusion to be drawn is that the powers under Section 18A of the PC Act and Section 102, CrP.C. are not mutually exclusive. Mr Farasat’s submission to this extent merits acceptance and is so done accordingly”, it added.
The Court took note of the following factors deduced as essentials of a code being self-contained or complete in all respects –
I. A Code should be comprehensive, dealing with all aspects arising directly out of or, ancillary to, the main issue addressed in the statute.
II. It should lay down, clearly, when dealing with criminal laws, the offence, its punishment, and when dealing with civil laws, the rights and liabilities of the parties.
III. Addressing the above, the procedure provided therein should be all-encompassing. This includes, for instance, adjudication of grievances, and appeals from findings recorded by authorities. In other words, the reliance of the statute upon general laws with reference to the offences/ punishments or, rights/liabilities should be limited as far as possible.
“With utmost respect to the learned Judges and the conclusion in Ratan Babulal Lath (supra), we would state that in the absence of a detailed discussion made of the scheme of the Act, its provisions and its interactions with other substantive or procedural laws, as far as they may be applicable, it cannot be stated that the conclusion arrived at therein constitutes ratio decidendi and, therefore, would be binding on all Courts as per the effect of Article 141 of the Constitution of India”, it said.
The Court emphasised that the Courts ought not to be expected to follow Judgments and Orders of Supreme Court as binding precedents when, the facts, in light of which the conclusion arrived at, are not properly disclosed and discussed, for law is not always applicable as the black letter of the law and is instead applied to the facts of each case.
“It may be clarified here that our observations regarding the PC Act do not hold, either way, as to its status as a code. They are only confined to the precedential value of Ratan Babulal Lath (supra)”, it clarified.
Conclusion
The Court took note of the fact that the release of the funds so seized was rejected by the Trial Court but later accepted by the High Court on the premise that the same had been carried out on an erroneous interpretation of the law.
“We do not agree. We have held as above that Section 102, Cr.P.C., being distinct from the powers and procedures as detailed under Section 18-A of the PC Act, would apply to the case. Generally, with the setting aside of the order of the High Court, the matter would have ended there, but since the investigation has been completed and the final report already stands presented in the case, the freezing of the accounts, of which fixed deposits are undoubtedly a part, may or may not be required”, it added.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal.
Cause Title- The State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1413)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat, AOR Kunal Mimani, Advocates Kartikey Bhatt, Shraddha Chirania, and Abhishek Babbar.
Respondent: Senior Advocate Siddharth Agarwal, AOR Robin Khokhar, Advocates Anjan Datta, Arshiya Ghose, Ram Bhadauria, Sumon Pathak, Ishita Srivastava, Adarsh Verma, Prithwish Chakraborty, and Debajit Gope.
