No Provision Must Be Rendered Nugatory; Statute Must Be Construed As A Coherent Whole Ensuring That Each Part Has Meaningful Content: SC
The Supreme Court emphasized that no provision of a statute should be rendered nugatory or superfluous and a statute must be construed as a coherent whole, ensuring that each part has meaningful content.
The Court emphasised thus in a Civil Appeal filed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) and its officers against the Judgment of the Bombay High Court which allowed a Writ Petition.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale remarked, “Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation demand that no provision of a statute should be rendered nugatory or superfluous. A statute must be construed as a coherent whole, ensuring that each part has meaningful content and that the legislative scheme remains workable. Where two provisions appear to be in tension, the proper course is to adopt a construction that reconciles them, allowing both to operate and giving effect to the underlying legislative intent.”
The Bench said that it is neither necessary nor desirable to treat Section 51(2) of the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925 (BITTA) as an absolute mandate that would override or negate Section 48(a) thereof and instead, they must be read harmoniously so that the duty to restore the premises at the end of the lease remains intact, unless a clear contrary intention emerges, and the right to conveyance under Section 51(2) thereof is recognized as contingent, not automatic.
Senior Advocates Dhruv Mehta and Neeraj Kishan Kaul appeared on behalf of the Appellants while Senior Advocates Darius J. Khambatta, Ranjit Kumar, and Shyam Divan appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Brief Facts -
The Respondent company was running a cotton mill and under the provisions of the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, it applied to the Improvement Trust under Section 32B thereof under the Poorer Classes Accommodation Scheme (PCAS) to provide dwellings to the poorer class workers. The said Application was filed in 1918. The Improvement Trust Board (ITB) approved the PCAS which provided for construction of 44 Blocks of poorer class dwellings containing a total of 980 rooms and 20 shops as a pre-condition for execution of the lease under Section 32G of the Act, with other consequences to follow. The Special Collector handed over the charge of the property/plot to the Improvement Trust and its possession was later handed over to the Respondent, whereupon they constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops till the year 1925, as a part of the pre-condition for execution of lease under Section 32G.
In 1925, the 1898 Act was repealed by the BITTA, 1925. In 1927, the Respondent applied to the Improvement Trust for alteration of the notified Scheme and thereafter, again through Solicitors, it applied to the Improvements Committee making the same request. The same was granted and Block B was conveyed to the Respondent on a sale consideration of Rs. 1.2 lakhs. Thereafter, lease was granted by the Board and for a period of 51 years, neither the Appellant nor the Respondent initiated any proceedings against each other. However, after the expiry of lease period, the Respondent served a legal notice. It also called upon the Appellant to execute a formal deed of conveyance but when no action was taken by the Appellant, it filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The same was allowed and being aggrieved, the Appellant was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, observed, “If Section 48(a) and Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act are to be interpreted harmoniously, the net result is that under general provisions, the lessee has to leave the premise on completion of the period of lease, however, it will have a right to get the conveyance executed at the end of the lease, provided there has been no default, after paying the cost of the said premise.”
The Court noted that, interpreting Section 51(2) in a calibrated manner ensures that no non-obstante clause or hierarchical superiority is artificially read into the statute and nothing in the language of Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act suggests that it must prevail to the exclusion of other provisions, nor does Section 48(a) thereof state that its conditions are subject to displacement by Section 51(2) of the said Act.
“Each provision, on a proper reading, retains its respective field of operation. The terms and intentions underlying the lease itself become the primary determinant of whether the eventual conveyance is warranted or not. Thus, rather than insisting that “shall convey” invariably means an unconditional obligation, it is more appropriate to understand that it calls for conveyance only where the arrangement and compliance align with the statutory prerequisites”, it added.
The Court further explained that the interplay between Sections 48(a) and 51(2) of the 1925 Act is resolved through a construction that acknowledges the necessity of leaving the premises in good condition at the expiration of lease, while recognizing that a conveyance can be contemplated only where such a course is unequivocally aligned with the lease terms and the statutory framework as a whole.
“This reconciliation preserves the intention of the legislature, avoids destructive interpretations, and provides a coherent, just, and practical reading of the statute. … The view taken by the High Court in treating the petition to be not suffering from any delay and laches cannot be sustained”, it also said.
The Court was of the view that the Writ Petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone.
“We find no merit in the conduct of the Respondent No. 1 where it deliberately chose to sit still on its rights for a long period of fifty-one years. Even after such a belated delay and sending a notice to the appellant in 2006, the Respondent No.1 again failed to exhibit any diligence and chose not to file a suit within the period of limitation under the 1888 Act”, it remarked.
The Court added that, instead, the Respondent showed utmost craftiness and lack of bona fide in preferring the Writ Petition before the High Court in 2016 as it is clearly a route adopted to subvert the long delay of sixty-one years, which is not condonable, given the conduct of the Respondent throughout.
“It is clear that the protective and welfare-oriented character of the arrangement is integral to the statutory objective. The inclusion of Clause 2(VIII) in the lease deed was not a casual insertion; it was intended to ensure that the property would serve as an instrument of social betterment by housing those who are economically vulnerable. This provision, coupled with the Preamble’s emphasis on “constructing new sanitary dwellings for certain classes of the inhabitants,” reflects a deliberate legislative policy to secure tangible benefits for the poorer sections of society”, it elucidated.
Moreover, the Court observed that the statutory and contractual framework is not merely concerned with property rights and transactions in the abstract but also aims to harness urban development to serve the pressing social needs of the community.
“The contractual language and statutory purpose are both premised on ensuring that the “demised premises” remain dedicated to providing adequate housing to those otherwise struggling to find decent living conditions in a rapidly expanding metropolis. To ignore or circumvent these conditions would nullify the intended social function of the property and transform a carefully crafted scheme of public welfare into a mere instrument of private profit”, it added.
The Court also noted that the legislation and the contract work in tandem to ensure that urban improvement aligns with the welfare of weaker segments and when land allocated under a special scheme, particularly one centred on “poorer classes” accommodation, is sought to be commercially exploited, it represents a direct affront to the spirit of the enactment.
“Rather than addressing housing inadequacies and improving urban life for those in need, the resource would be diverted to profit-making ventures that do nothing to alleviate the conditions of the underserved. … This conduct amounts to an abuse of beneficial legislation. The 1925 Act was clearly intended to secure broader societal goals—better sanitation, improved living standards, and well-planned urban growth that includes and benefits marginalized communities”, it said.
The Court further said that allowing the Respondent to disregard the obligations would open the door to hollowing out the protections and advantages established by the statute and it would set a precedent where statutory schemes designed to uplift vulnerable groups could be co-opted for purely commercial ends, undermining the trust and faith that must exist between public authorities, private actors, and the most vulnerable segments of the population.
“In essence, the entire arrangement is anchored on a quid pro quo: the property is leased on special terms, with minimal rent and under carefully prescribed conditions, to ensure that the less-privileged receive tangible benefits. When the lessee attempts to convert this arrangement into a vehicle for commercial gain, it repudiates the fundamental bargain. The public trust reposed in the private entity to serve a greater good is thus betrayed. This not only harms the class of beneficiaries whom the legislation and agreement were designed to protect, but also imperils the broader public interest by allowing beneficial legislative frameworks to be distorted and exploited contrary to their genuine purpose”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal and set aside the High Court’s Judgment.
Cause Title- The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Century Textiles and Industries Limited & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 36)
Appearance:
Appellants: Senior Advocates Dhruv Mehta, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Advocates Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Akriti Arya, Swati Arya, Mohammed Hadi, Sandeep Mohan Patil, Keith Verghese, and Ira Mahajan.
Respondents: Senior Advocates Darius J. Khambatta, Ranjit Kumar, Shyam Divan, AORs Saswat Pattnaik, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advocates Nina Nariman, Aditya Panda, Akshay Sinha, Aniruddha Deshmukh, and Siddharth Dharmadhikari.
