Supreme Court: S. 27 Evidence Act Doesn't Operate Once Disclosure Is Not Contemporaneously Proved & Prior Knowledge Is Established
The Supreme Court remarked that intervention ex debito justitiae is not an act of discretion but a Constitutional duty.
CJI B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) ceases to operate once the disclosure is not contemporaneously proved and prior knowledge is established.
The Court held thus while allowing a Curative Petition filed by Surendra Koli challenging his conviction and death sentence in one of the Nithari murder cases.
The three-Judge Bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, and Justice Vikram Nath observed, “The evidence also showed that the police and members of the public already knew that bones and articles lay in the open strip and that excavation had begun before the petitioner arrived. These features negate the essential element of discovery by the accused and reduce the exercise to a seizure from an already known place. Those findings were upheld when the State’s appeals were dismissed on 30.07.2025. The present conviction rests on the same recovery architecture. Once the disclosure is not contemporaneously proved, once prior knowledge is established, and once contradictions infect the record, Section 27 of the Evidence Act ceases to operate. The legal conclusion cannot change from case to case when the premise is identical.”
The Bench remarked that intervention ex debito justitiae is not an act of discretion but a Constitutional duty.
AOR N. Sai Vinod represented the Petitioner, while ASG Raja Thakare and Senior Advocate Nachiketa Joshi represented the Respondents.
Brief Facts
The Curative Petition arose from the Criminal Appeal decided in 2011, by which the Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner-accused’s conviction and death sentence in the Rimpa Haldar case. The Review Petition against this Order was dismissed in 2014 and the High Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life. In 12 companion prosecutions founded on the same confession and recoveries, the High Court acquitted the accused and dismissed the State Appeals. The accused was employed as a domestic help at House D5, Sector 31, Noida. The house was owned and occupied by one Moninder Singh Pandher, the employer of the Petitioner. From early 2005, residents of Nithari began reporting that women and children were missing.
In March 2005, children in the neighbourhood playing cricket noticed a human hand in the narrow open strip between Houses D5 and D6 and the Jal Board residential quarters. In 2006, a human hand was again noticed during drain cleaning on the main road in front of the row of bungalows D1 to D6. Thereafter, the accused was taken into custody by the local police in connection with the FIR concerning the disappearance of one of the victims. Multiple skulls and bones with footwear and clothes were recovered after digging was done in the open strip between D5, D6 and the Jal Board compound. Subsequently, further human remains and articles were taken out from the covered storm water drain in front of Houses D1 to D6. In 2007, the State transferred investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Reasoning
The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, noted, “There was no credible chain of custody or expert testimony establishing that a domestic help with no medical training could perform the precise dismemberment described. These gaps were central to the acquittals in the twelve cases. They are equally present here.”
The Court said that the High Court’s critique of the investigation was not rhetorical excess and it was anchored in record-based deficiencies that bear directly on fairness and reliability.
“The failure to secure prompt and independent medical documentation during the long spell of police custody, the perfunctory legal-aid arrangement at the moment of confession, the presence and influence of the Investigating Officer during the Section 164 procedure, the contradictions in remand and recovery papers, and the neglect of material avenues of inquiry, including the organ-trade angle flagged by a governmental committee, cumulatively undermine confidence in the prosecution’s case theory”, it added.
The Court emphasised that Article 21 of the Constitution insists on a fair, just and reasonable procedure and that insistence is at its acutest where capital punishment is imposed.
“To allow a conviction to stand on evidentiary basis that this Court has since rejected as involuntary or inadmissible in the very same fact matrix offends Article 21 of the Constitution. It also violates Article 14 of the Constitution, since like cases must be treated alike. Arbitrary disparity in outcomes on an identical record is inimical to equality before the law. The curative jurisdiction exists to prevent precisely such anomalies from hardening into precedent”, it observed.
The Court remarked that curative relief is exceptional and proceeds on narrow grounds and the present case crosses that exacting threshold.
“The conviction cannot be sustained without departing from principles that now stand authoritatively applied to indistinguishable prosecutions arising out of the same occurrence. For these reasons, we hold that the petitioner has established a fundamental defect that impeaches the integrity of the adjudicatory process and that relief is warranted ex debito justitiae within the parameters of Rupa Ashok Hurra (Supra)”, it held.
The Court further remarked that when its final Orders speak with discordant voices on an identical record, the integrity of adjudication is imperilled, and public confidence is shaken.
“We therefore entertain this petition to preserve the purity of this Court’s process and to vindicate the rule of law. … Moreover, we must emphasize that Rupa Ashok Hurra (Supra) makes it clear that a curative petition is not a second review. Finality remains the rule and intervention is reserved only for very strong reasons that strike at the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process”, it noted.
The Court elucidated that guiding principle for the exercise of curative jurisdiction is the duty of the Court to avert manifest injustice.
Conclusion
Furthermore, the Court observed that criminal law does not permit conviction on conjecture or on a hunch.
“Suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. Courts cannot prefer expediency over legality. The presumption of innocence endures until guilt is proved through admissible and reliable evidence, and when the proof fails the only lawful outcome is to set aside the conviction even in a case involving horrific crimes”, it added.
The Court said that it is a matter of deep regret that despite prolonged investigation, the identity of the actual perpetrator has not been established in a manner that meets the legal standards.
“When investigations are timely, professional and constitutionally compliant, even the most difficult mysteries can be solved and many crimes can be prevented by early intervention. It is, therefore, genuinely unfortunate that in the present matter negligence and delay corroded the fact-finding process and foreclosed avenues that might have identified the true offender”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Curative Petition and acquitted the accused of the charges under Sections 302, 364, 376, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
Cause Title- Surendra Koli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1308)
Appearance:
Petitioner: AOR N. Sai Vinod, Advocates Yug Mohit Chaudhary, Payoshi Roy, Siddhartha Sharma, Prabhu Ramasubramaniam, Bharatimohan M, and Kanu Garg.
Respondents: ASG Raja Thakare, Senior Advocate Nachiketa Joshi, AOR Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advocates K. Parameshwar, Praneet Pranav, Rajendra Singh Rana, Vaishali Verma, Rohit Khare, Astha Singh, Rishikesh Haridas, and Kritagya Kumar Kait.
