The Supreme Court quashed an FIR and related criminal proceedings setting aside the order of Allahabad High Court that had rejected the petitioner's request to quash the FIR, stating that the FIR prima facie indicated a cognizable offense and that the accuracy of the allegations should be determined during the investigation.

The two-Judge Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice J.B. Pardiwala held that,

“Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.”

The appeal was related to a criminal case involving the Indian Penal Code (IPC) Section 506 and a First Information Report (FIR) filed against the accused. The accused had filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, seeking to quash the FIR. The FIR was lodged by a person named Husna against multiple individuals, including the appellant, for allegedly threatening her and her family members in connection with a previous FIR for various offenses under the IPC and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

Senior Advocate Siddhartha Dave appeared for the Appellant and Advocate Garima Prasad (A.A.G.) apperead for the Respondents.

Counsel representing the appellant pointed out that the appellant's name was added to the FIR after being initially omitted, based on a statement from an alleged eyewitness which raises concerns about the accuracy of this statement and its role in implicating the appellant. That the FIR itself lacks crucial details like the date and time of the incident and contains vague allegations against the accused, including the appellant, casting doubt on their accuracy. Additionally, political motivations were alleged, suggesting that the complainant might be using the FIR to settle political scores.

Counsel representing the Respondent rebutted the appellant's contentions asserting that the petitioner has association with a criminal gang and anti-social activities, which is shared by other members. The petitioner's inclusion in the FIR, initially absent, occurred during the investigation, coupled with charges under IPC sections 147, 148, 149, 195A, 386, 504, and 506. The petitioner's lack of cooperation, evidenced by ignoring notices under section 41A Cr.P.C., was pointed out, with his status as an absconding suspect.

The Court noted that the appellant's name was conspicuously absent among the accused individuals in the FIR, with no allegations implicating the appellant anywhere within its contents. However, through a subsequent statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant's name emerged in connection with the case.

The Court found that the initial complaint and subsequent statements contradicted each other. Although the appellant's name was not in the original FIR, it emerged later in the victim's statement. The Court acknowledged this wasn't sufficient grounds alone to quash the FIR. However, it found other circumstances suggesting false implication due to the appellant's relation to a criminal. The Court discussed Sections 195A and 386 of the IPC. Section 195A pertaines to threatening someone to give false evidence, but the Court found its elements weren't met in this case.

“The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice. Thus, even if we believe the allegations levelled in the FIR to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 195A are disclosed. To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC.”

Section 386 involves extortion by inducing fear of death or injury to obtain property. The Court clarified that extortion requires the victim's consent due to fear. In this situation, no actual delivery of property was indicated.

“nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put it in other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.”

Ultimately, the Court evaluated the case under parameters for quashing set by State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, concluding that the FIR was frivolous and malicious, possibly stemming from private grudges.

“In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

As a result, the Court allowed the appeal, quashing the criminal proceedings based on the FIR.

Cause Title: Salib v. State of U.P. & Ors.

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