Armed Forces Tribunal Empowered To Substitute Conviction For Cognate Offences: Supreme Court Upholds Conviction Of Army Officer For Act Prejudicial To Discipline
The Apex Court upheld the Armed Forces Tribunal’s decision substituting a conviction under the Arms Act with a finding of guilt for an act prejudicial to good order and discipline, stating the Tribunal is empowered to modify a conviction provided such substitution is lawful and proportionate.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Army officer under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950, for an act prejudicial to good order and discipline, affirming that the Armed Forces Tribunal’s (AFT) authority under Section 15(6) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, to substitute a conviction for a cognate offence.
The Court was hearing an appeal filed by the Army officer challenging the Tribunal’s order, which substituted his conviction under the Arms Act, 1959, with one under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950.
A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Alok Aradhe, while adjudicating the matter observed that “Section 15(6) of the 2007 Act is in pari materia with Section 162 of the 1950 Act and is akin to Section 222 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which permits conviction for a lesser or cognate offence on the same set of facts”, while clarifying that “where the evidence sustains a different, though related offence, the appellate forum is not denuded of power to render a lawful finding merely because the chargesheet mentions another provision.”
Background
The appellant, an officer in the Army Ordnance Corps, faced a General Court Martial (GCM) on three charges, including demand of illegal gratification from a civilian contractor, unlawful possession of ammunition under the Arms Act, 1959, and possession of unexplained cash.
The General Court Martial convicted him on two counts and sentenced him to dismissal from service. His pre-confirmation petition was rejected by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, while the post-confirmation petition remained pending beyond the statutory period, leading him to approach the Armed Forces Tribunal.
The AFT found that the evidence on record did not establish demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. It also held that the possession of ammunition was not shown to be unauthorised within the meaning of the Arms Act.
However, invoking Section 15(6) of the 2007 Act and Rule 62(4) of the Army Rules, 1954, the Tribunal substituted the finding to one under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950, holding the appellant guilty of conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. The Tribunal reduced the sentence from dismissal to compulsory retirement with pensionary benefits.
Both the Officer and the Union of India challenged the order before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observation
The Supreme Court, at the outset, examined whether the Armed Forces Tribunal had the authority to substitute the finding of a Court Martial for a cognate offence and modify the sentence accordingly. It was noted that “The Tribunal under Section 15(6) of the 2007 Act, which contains a non-obstante clause, has power to substitute the finding of Court Martial, a finding of guilty of any other offence for which offender could have been lawfully found guilty by Court Martial and may pass a sentence afresh.”
Referring to Union of India v. R. Karthik (2020), the Bench reiterated that interference under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited to cases where the Tribunal’s decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, or perverse”. It emphasised that the Tribunal had “exercised its discretion under Section 15(6) of the 2007 Act in a manner which is both just and proportionate, balancing the disciplinary needs of service with fairness to the individual”, and that “the aforesaid exercise of discretion, therefore, does not call for any interference in this appeal.”
Furthermore, the Apex Court upheld the AFT’s finding that the recovery of ammunition from the appellant’s office, even if not linked to criminal intent, was “indicative of neglect and failure to adhere to standing instructions governing disposal of surplus or aged ammunition,” stating that “the factual foundation brought on record at the trial, clearly discloses an act or omission on the part of the appellant which is prejudicial to good order and military discipline.”
Conclusion
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the Armed Forces Tribunal had lawfully exercised its power under Section 15(6) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, and that the substitution of conviction for a cognate offence was valid and justified.
Finding no infirmity in the Tribunal’s findings or its modification of punishment, the Apex Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Cause Title: S.K. Jain v. Union of India & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1215)
