Sufferance Of Incarceration For A Particular Period Cannot Be The Sole Reason To Suspend Sentence U/S 389 CrPC: SC Allows Acid Attack Victim's Appeal
The Supreme Court, in an acid attack case, observed that the mere factum of sufferance of incarceration in a case where life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for invoking power under Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) without referring to the relevant factors.
Section 389 of CrPC deals with the suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal against conviction and release of accused on bail.
The Court observed thus in criminal appeals filed by the acid attack victim against the suspension of sentence of life imprisonment of the convicted persons and their consequential enlargement on bail.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Rajesh Bindal was dealing with this case and Justice Bindal gave his concurrent opinion.
The Court held, “It is also relevant to state that the mere factum of sufferance of incarceration for a particular period, in a case where life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for invocation of power under Section 389 Cr.PC without referring to the relevant factors. We say so because there cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that disposal of appeals against conviction, (especially in cases where life imprisonment is imposed for serious offences), within a short span of time may not be possible in view of the number of pending cases.”
The Court added that in such circumstances if it is said that disregarding the other relevant factors and parameters for the exercise of power under Section 389 of CrPC, likelihood of delay and incarceration for a particular period can be taken as a ground for suspension of sentence and to enlarge a convict on bail, then, in almost every such case, favourable invocation of said power would become inevitable. It said that this cannot be the legislative intention as such interpretation would also go against public interest and social security.
AOR Niranjan Sahu represented the appellant/victim while Senior Advocate Vinay Navare and AOR Rajat Singh represented the respondents.
In this case, the private respondents (accused persons), five in numbers, were convicted as they were found guilty of offences under Sections 307, 149, and 326A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellant/victim was then aged about 31 years and in the incident, she suffered attack with sulfuric acid and her body was burnt 30 to 40 percent. She suffered deep burn on the face, chest and both hands and injuries on her were grievous in nature.
The Apex Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case noted, “In the decision in State of Haryana v. Hasmat5 , this Court held that in an appeal against conviction involving serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail should be considered with reference to the relevant factors mentioned thereunder, though not exhaustively. On its perusal, we are of the opinion that factors like nature of the offence held to have committed, the manner of their commission, the gravity of the offence, and also the desirability of releasing the convict on bail are to be considered objectively and such consideration should reflect in the consequential order passed under Section 389, Cr.PC.”
The Court said that in such cases giving preference over appeals where sentence is suspended, in the matter of hearing or adopting such other methods making an early hearing possible could be resorted.
“We shall not be understood to have held that irrespective of inordinate delay in consideration of appeal and long incarceration undergone the power under the said provision cannot be invoked. In short, we are of the view that each case has to be examined on its own merits and based on the parameters, to find out whether the sentence imposed on the appellant(s) concerned should be suspended during the pendency of the appeal and the appellant(s) should be released on bail”, it further observed.
The Court also said that the impugned order is infected with non-application of mind and non-consideration of the relevant factors required for invocation of power under Section 389 in the light of the settled position of law.
“An acid attack may completely strip off the victim of her basic human right to live a decent human life owing to permanent disfiguration. We have no hesitation to hold that in appeals involving such serious offence(s), serious consideration of all parameters should be made. Even a cursory glance of the impugned order would reveal the consideration thereunder was made ineptly. The serious nature of the offence involved was not taken into account besides the other relevant parameters for the exercise of power under Section 389, Cr. PC”, it remarked.
Justice Binal in his concurrent opinion noted, “I would like to touch upon the issue of offer of money to the victim for suspension of sentence in a heinous crime of acid attack, where the victim suffered burn injuries to the extent of 30 to 40% resulting in total disfigurement of her face. As is evident from the record, despite spending ₹ 21 lakhs (Rupees Twenty-One Lakhs only) on the treatment, she still has not been cured.”
He observed that one of the principles of sentencing in criminal law is proportionality and if the appropriate punishment is not awarded or if, after conviction for a heinous crime, the court directs the suspension of the sentence without valid reasons, the very purpose for which the criminal justice system exists will fail.
“From the facts it can safely be noticed that there is no question of acceptance of money by the victim as she has challenged the order of suspension of sentence of the private respondents. … This court had been taking the offence of acid attacks, which are on increase, seriously. It is even to the extent of regulating the sale of the acid with stringent action so that the same is not easily available to the people with perverse mind”, he added.
He said that the High Court’s order does not suggest that there was any consideration of the parameters laid down by the Apex Court for grant of bail or suspension of sentence.
“Instead, the High Court had noticed and directed that the convicts have offered to pay compensation to the victim for grant of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to accept, was directed to be deposited in the court. It was in a way kind of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to the victim for which there is no acceptability in our criminal justice system”, he added.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s order, and directed judicial custody of accused persons.
Cause Title- Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 343)
Appearance:
Appellant: AOR Niranjan Sahu
Respondents: Senior Advocate Vinay Navare, AOR Rajat Singh, Advocates Divyanshu Sahay, Sarthak Chandra, Akhand Pratap Singh Chauhan, Anil Verma, AORs Tungesh, Nagendra Kasana, Advocates Rajesh Rathod, Palak Munjal, Aditya Sharma, and Arun Kumar Arunachal.
