Supreme Court: Even If Injunction Order Substantially Set Aside, Consequences For Its Breach When It Subsisted Could Still Befall Upon Violator
The Court reiterated that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence.
Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reiterated that even if an injunction order is subsequently set aside, consequences for breach/violation of the same when it subsisted, could still befall upon the violator.
The Court was hearing Criminal Appeals seeking to challenge the Judgments of the Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench, by which the Petitions of the accused were allowed.
The two-Judge Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah observed, “Arguendo, assuming that accused no.2 might have made some renovations, the same by itself would not serve to absolve accused no.1 of the responsibility cast by the Order dated 03.06.2013 to maintain status quo; further, if she was aware that accused no.2 was violating the terms of the Rent/Lease Agreement, inaction on her part to take appropriate action or steps against/in respect of accused no.2 would make her responsible for any violation of the Order dated 03.06.2013, which she concedes might have been done by accused no.2 on 18.10.2015, i.e., during the period of subsistence of the Order dated 03.06.2013, as the status quo came to be vacated only on 28.03.2016. Examined, additionally, from another lens, even if an injunction order is subsequently set aside, consequences for breach/violation of the same when it subsisted, could still befall upon the violator, as held in Samee Khan v Bindu Khan, (1998).”
The Bench said that the case(s) at hand demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it, which would merit police investigation and, therefore, interdiction of the impugned Orders is necessitated.
Senior Advocate Shailesh Madiyal represented the Appellant, while AAG Prateek Chadha represented the Respondents.
Facts of the Case
The Appellant-Complainant lodged a private complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) against the Respondents under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468, and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Appellant had filed a suit before the Additional Senior Civil Judge, seeking a declaration that he is the owner in possession of the suit property as per oral gift by his father and also to declare the 2009 Sale Deed executed by his father in favour of the accused as illegal, void, and not binding on him. The said suit was dismissed and consequently, the Appellant preferred an Appeal before the High Court, which passed an interim order to maintain status quo regarding title and possession of the property. During the pendency of the Appeal, the Appellant came to know that the accused’s husband along with others, allegedly broke open the lock put to the property without permission and trespassed into the same.
They started renovation/construction in the property and hence, the Appellant issued a notice to them for its stoppage. Few months later, he came to know that they again broke open the lock put to the property and re-started the work. Resultantly, an Application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) was filed, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings. The Appellant alleged that the accused persons executed Rent Agreement and the E-Stamp Paper was fake. Hence, a complaint was lodged and the JMFC felt that the matter was to be referred for investigation. Thereafter, the High Court allowed the Petitions of the accused and being aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Apex Court.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court after hearing the arguments from both sides, noted, “The accused no.1 has also stated that the tenant i.e., accused no.2 might have renovated and cleaned the suit property on 18.10.2015. This is where the Court finds the truth coming out. In the copy of the Rent/Lease Agreement which has been brought on record before the High Court by accused no.1 herself, it is clearly stipulated that accused no.2 will not change the nature of the premises and should not carry out any repairs to the said premises without the written consent of accused no.1. It is not the case of accused no.1 that accused no.2 had sought any permission.”
The Court referred to the position of law enunciated in the case of Madhao v. State of Maharashtra (2013), wherein it was held that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself.
In the background of the factual position, the Court was of the view that the JMFC’s Order cannot be faulted and enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police.
“The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC. … the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over”, it added.
Conclusion and Directions
The Court directed the police to investigate the case expeditiously in accordance with law.
“It goes without saying that the private parties shall be at liberty to produce material to indicate their defence(s)/position during the police investigation as also before the Court concerned, in accordance with law, at the appropriate stage”, it remarked.
The Court, therefore, concluded that the observations made in this Judgment are only for the purposes of considering the issue(s) before it and shall neither prejudice nor aid the parties in any proceedings pending inter-se.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeals, set aside the impugned Judgments, and restored the FIR.
Cause Title- Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1282)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate Shailesh Madiyal, AORs Rohit Kumar Singh, Shweta Priyadarshini, Advocates Divija Mahajan, Nishi Singh, Shikhar Gupta, and Shubham V. Gawande.
Respondents: AAG Prateek Chadha, AORs D. L. Chidananda, M. A. Chinnasamy, Advocates N. D. B. Raju, Barathi Raju, Vasundhara Raju, Raghavendren, and C Rubavathi.
