Court Is Bound To Seek Explanation From Investigating Agency If There Is Large Gap Between FIR & Chargesheet: Supreme Court Issues Directions
The Supreme Court emphasised that statutory recognition of prompt investigation is a pre-constitutional stipulation.
Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has issued certain important directions with regard to the investigations in criminal cases.
The Court was hearing a Criminal Appeal filed by an accused aggrieved by the Patna High Court’s refusal in exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh issued the following directions –
(i) ‘Leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the Court must perform.
(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.
The direction above does not come based on this case alone. The Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. The Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.
(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this Judgment, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.
(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion.
Senior Advocate Maninder Singh represented the Appellant/Accused, while AOR Manish Kumar represented the Respondent/State.
Brief Facts
The Appellant was an officer of the Indian Administrative Services (IAS), Bihar Cadre. He was posted as District Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Sahasra, Bihar, on December 24, 2002 and remained in the possession till his transfer to Banka on April 11, 2005. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India passed an order vide letter and directed further streamlining of the procedure of issuance of arms licences. During gathering of information, it was found that 7 persons to whom arms licences had been issued were unverified. The statement in the FIR was that some of these licences had been issued to persons who were not physically capable; the same had been issued in violation of Section 13(2) of the Arms Act, 1959, with intent to give undue benefit to the applicants, by the Appellant, who, at the relevant point in time was District Magistrate-cum-licensing Authority. As such, ‘the then licensing authority’ was also named as an accused therein. It was stated that the same had been done in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and abetment at a large scale.
After investigation, chargesheet was entered wherein one of the accused persons was sent up for trial, whereas investigation against other persons continued. A supplementary chargesheet was then filed wherein qua the Appellant it was observed that no offence was made out under the Arms Act against him and the allegations levelled were termed ‘false’. The Complainant recorded his ‘no objection’ to such closure report. Thereafter, a request for re-investigation was re-submitted in 2008 and the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) observed that an order for re-investigation could not be granted but further investigation was permitted in law under Section 173(8) of CrPC. In 2015, the General Administration Department asked the Appellant to show cause regarding the issuance of arms licenses to a total of 16 accused persons. The explanation was accepted and the Appellant was discharged. The State granted sanction under Section 197 of CrPC and cognizance of the chargesheet was taken. This was challenged before the High Court, which rejected his application. Being aggrieved, he approached the Apex Court.
Court’s Observations
The Supreme Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, observed, “It is a generally understood position in law that when a legislation or a rule does not provide for limitation/time limit for a particular aspect, the same is to be governed by the standard of reasonable time. … The sanction awarded against the appellant which we have extracted in toto (supra) can in our considered view, in no way be said to be reflecting application of mind by the authorities.”
The Court said that if sanction is based on what can at best be described as vague statements such as “on perusal of the documents and evidences mentioned in Case Diary available”, this protection would be obliterated.
“The remainder of the sanction order touches upon the essence of Section 197 CrPC and the fact that the appellant is a public servant who would be covered thereby. The substance of why a sanction is required was however entirely missed by the sanctioning authority. The same is bad in law and must be, set aside. All consequential actions including the order taking cognizance, therefore would be quashed”, it added.
The Court emphasised that statutory recognition of prompt investigation is a pre-constitutional stipulation. It noted that during the colonial period, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, and its immediate successor, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, conceived the process of criminal investigation as a domain of exclusive police competence, characterized by minimal judicial supervision.
“These early procedural frameworks vested extensive autonomy in the police establishment, leaving investigations largely beyond the reach of magisterial control, and notably omitted any statutory timelines for their completion. The institutional foundation for this arrangement lay in the Police Act, 1861, which served as the principal legal instrument governing investigative powers and responsibilities. Although the police operated nominally under the “general control and direction” of the District Magistrate, in practice, the investigation of offences was conducted independently within the police hierarchy, reflecting the colonial state’s preference for an executive, rather than judicially mediated, model of law enforcement”, it remarked.
The Court further observed that there has been an evolution in legislative wisdom over the years and the criminal procedure have moved from a period of no timelines and minimal judicial interventions/oversight to progressively more oversight and recognition of the need to conclude investigations in time.
“It may be true that no strict timelines are provided in the CrPC, but it is equally so that investigations are to be completed in reasonable time. … Strict timelines, if laid down would be in ignorance of ground realities”, it also noted.
Coming back to the facts of the case, the Court remarked that why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us.
“When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years”, it added.
Conclusion
Moreover, the Court said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close and this is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefor, can be granted even after commencement of trial.
“Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence”, it enunciated.
The Court, therefore, concluded that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the Appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal and issued necessary directions.
Cause Title- Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1339)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate Maninder Singh, AOR Santosh Kumar, Advocates Richa Singh, Abhishekh Tripathi, and Shravanth Paruchuri.
Respondent: AOR Manish Kumar, Advocates Sivam Singh, Divyansh Mishra, Kumar Saurav, Ishwar Singh, Shubham Jhanghu, and Yoshit Jain.
