Accused’s Statement That Weapons Recovered Were Actually Weapons Of Crime Not Admissible U/S. 27 Evidence Act: Supreme Court

The appeal before the Apex Court was filed by the appellants (father, son and son-in-law) who were accused in a case of murder of a man.

Referring to the provisions of the Evidence Act, the Division Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale explained, “We are afraid that the submission of the State counsel, that as the appellants themselves stated that they took the police to the place where they hid the weapons, by which they committed the offence indicates that the appellants admitted to have committed the offence with the above weapons, cannot be accepted. The statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Only that part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime.”

Senior Advocate Rajul Bharagava represented the Appellant, while DAG Kuldeep Parihar represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The incident dates back to the year 2000, when the first appellant and his son (second appellant) started digging the field of Diler Singh, the father of the deceased, for laying down a plinth. Due to the aforesaid action of the appellants, an altercation took place between them and Diler Singh. It was alleged that the appellants exhorted the deceased, who started running, followed by all the three accused persons armed with swords and carrying a sharp edged weapon. The deceased, attempting to save his life, entered the house of one Mukhtyar Singh. The appellants also entered the said premises and inflicted blows with swords and Kanta upon the deceased who ultimately died on the spot. The father of the deceased (PW-1) on the same day lodged an FIR under Section 302 of IPC (Section 103(1) BNS). The police submitted a chargesheet charging all three accused for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

Reasoning

The Bench referred to the primary evidence of Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7), the lady of the house and wife of Mukhtyar Singh. The Bench noted that her testimony clearly reflected that she had seen three unknown persons, assaulting the deceased with weapons like swords and that the deceased fell, whereafter the assailants left without inflicting further injuries upon him. However, her testimony also indicated that she did not know the names of the accused persons and thus, could not disclose their identity. She had only seen three people attacking and assaulting the boy, but could not identify those persons.

Finding her testimony to be trustworthy, the Bench further noted that it was clear from her statement that PW-1 (deceased’s father) had reached the place of the incident after half an hour of the incident. As per the Bench, he was therefore not actually an eyewitness who was present at the time when the appellants allegedly attacked the deceased. “He had come there after about half an hour and as such cannot be an eyewitness to the incident of attack. Secondly, PW-1 categorically stated that when his son fell down on the dewan, he hugged him and, in the process, his clothes were stained with blood”, it added.

As per the Bench, the ocular evidence of the witnesses, if read together, was not sufficient to identify the appellants as the persons who attacked and assaulted the deceased resulting in his death. “This Court, in several decisions, while considering the evidentiary value of a chance witness, has held that the deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident is doubtful should be discarded, or at least be treated with great caution and close scrutiny. Such a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of incident, which has not been satisfactorily done in the instant case”, it added.

The Bench also stated, “A simple reading of all the three provisions conjointly reveals that the first two provisions are substantive, whereas Section 27 is in the nature of an exception. Sections 25 and 26, at one hand, provide that no confession made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of any offence, on the other hand, Section 27 provides an exception to the above provisions. It states that so much of the information, received from an accused person in custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be admissible. This means that not all information disclosed by a person in police custody is required to be proved as against the accused person; only that part which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is admissible and can be proved.”

As per the Bench, the information leading to the recovery of the weapons of crime was admissible, but not the information that the crime was actually committed by the said weapons. “In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the identity of the appellants as the persons involved in the offence has not been established either by any ocular evidence or from the recovery of the weapons of crime”, the Bench said while allowing the appeals and acquitting the appellants of the alleged offence by granting them the benefit of doubt.

Cause Title: Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1193)

Appearance

Appellant: Senior Advocates Rajul Bharagava, Sidharth Agarwal, AOR Vivek Singh

Respondent: DAG Kuldeep Parihar, Advocates Anubha Dhulia, Ikshita Parihar, AOR Akshat Kumar, AOR Amit Pawan

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