Preliminary Inquiry Is Not Mandatory In Every Case Under The Prevention Of Corruption Act: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court allowed an Appeal preferred by the State challenging the Order of the High Court which quashed an FIR against the Respondent.
The Supreme Court has held that if a superior officer finds a case prima facie disclosing a cognizable offence, a preliminary inquiry may be avoided under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).
The Court allowed the Appeal preferred by the State challenging the Order of the Karnataka High Court which quashed an FIR against the Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive Engineer (Electrical) at BESCOM (Respondent) who had allegedly acquired assets amounting to over 3 Crores, which were disproportionate to his known sources of income. The Bench held that by mandating elaborate pre-investigation procedures and creating unwarranted procedural check dams, the High Court’s approach had the potential to render the effectiveness of law enforcement nugatory.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that “The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a source information report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be avoided.”
AOR Nishanth Patil appeared for the Appellant, while Senior Advocate Anand Sanjay M Nuli represented the Respondent.
Brief Facts
The case originated from a source information report submitted on November 10, 2023, by a Police Inspector. The Superintendent of Police, upon examination of the report, issued an Order directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register a case under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) and Section 12 of the PC Act. An FIR was subsequently registered on the same day.
Aggrieved by the FIR, the respondent filed a Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court, seeking quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings. The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The State contended that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR since a preliminary inquiry was not mandatory when the source information itself disclosed a cognizable offence under the PC Act. it further submitted that the source information report submitted by the Police Inspector sufficiently served the purpose of a preliminary inquiry.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court pointed out that Section 154 of the CrPC (corresponding Section 173 of the BNSS) empowers an officer in charge to reduce every piece of information, disclosing a cognizable offence, into writing either personally or under his direction. “A conjoint reading of Section 36 with Section 154 would make it clear that if the officer in charge of a police station can direct the registration of an FIR under Section 154, as a natural corollary by virtue of Section 36 CrPC, superior officers, which in the case at hand is the Superintendent of Police, are equally competent to issue such directions for registration of the FIR,” the Bench noted.
“On a harmonious reading of the provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it is manifest that the Superintendent of Police is competent to direct the registration of an FIR if he has information about the commission of a cognizable offence, punishable under the PC Act. The former is also competent to simultaneously direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR for the offences under the PC Act, with the understanding that the subsequent investigation will be subject to the restrictions outlined in Section 17 of the PC Act. A composite order to register the FIR and conduct investigation aligns with the statutory framework of the CrPC and the PC Act,” the Court held.
The Court referred to its decision in Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri (2023), wherein it was held that “there is no reason that there should be any discretion or option left with the Police to register or not to register an FIR when information is given about commission of a cognizable offence. This interpretation in a way keeps a check on the power of the Police, which is required to protect the liberty of individuals and society rights inherent in a democracy.”
The Bench held that “we are convinced that the High Court erred in holding that the Superintendent of Police must first direct the registration of an FIR and only after it is registered, he would be competent to issue an order for investigation under Section 17 of the PC Act. This interpretation could be permissible only if the subordinates of the Superintendent of Police had a discretion to either comply with or disregard the latter’s directive to register the FIR.”
The Bench clarified, “Section 17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the investigation process, and not the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it relies on the provisions of the CrPC. Hence, it places limitations on only the investigation; it does not impede the fundamental duty of the law enforcement agency to record and register an FIR for cognizable offences.”
Consequently, the Court ordered, “For the above reasons, we quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka…and restore the FIR.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal.
Cause Title: State Of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 229)
Appearance:
Appellant: AOR Nishanth Patil; Advocates Nishanth Patil, Ayush P Shah, Arijit Dey, Mehul Kumar Garg and Vineeth Pr
Respondent: Senior Advocate Anand Sanjay M Nuli; Advocates Akhila Wali, Suraj Kaushik, Nanda Kumar K B, Dharam Singh, Samina S, Akash Kukreja and Abhishek Kanyalur
