Merely Because Casual Adjudication Took Place, It Doesn’t Mean That A Plea Of Juvenility Can’t Be Raised Subsequently: SC
The Supreme Court observed that, merely because a casual adjudication has taken place, it does not mean that a plea of juvenility cannot be raised subsequently.
The Court observed thus in a Criminal Appeal filed by a person who was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder in 1994.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Aravind Kumar held, “Merely because a casual adjudication has taken place, it does not mean that a plea of juvenility cannot be raised subsequently. This is for the simple reason that the plea of juvenility has not attained finality. So long as the right of a party subsists, one can never say that finality has been attained. In a case where a plea has been raised, but not adjudicated upon, the decision rendered thereunder would not amount to attaining finality. Likewise, when such a plea is not treated as one under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act in compliance with the procedural mandate specified thereunder, an order rejecting such a plea would not be termed as a final one.”
The Bench clarified that if an adjudication is based on due determination, then there may not be any room for another round of litigation.
Senior Advocate S. Muralidhar appeared on behalf of the Appellant while Additional Solicitor General (ASG) K.M. Nataraj and AOR Vanshaja Shukla appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Brief Facts -
In 1994, the Appellant was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. On recording of the statements, he mentioned his age as 20 years as on March 7, 2001. After his conviction, he raised the plea of juvenility during the hearing on sentence by stating that he was about 17 years of age at the time of occurrence of the incident. He was illiterate and the Trial Court presumed that he was a major and sentenced him to death. On an Appeal to the High Court, an attempt was again made to raise the plea of juvenility by stating that the Appellant was required to be tried by a Juvenile Court and be given benefit of being a juvenile. The High Court was also persuaded by the offence committed and therefore, the case reach to the Apex Court.
However, the Apex Court also dismissed the Appeal and resultantly, the Appellant filed a Review Petition, reiterating the fact that he was a minor at the time of the offence. But the Review Petition was also dismissed and thereafter, a Writ Petition was preferred by the Appellant’s parents along with a social worker. It was also dismissed and accordingly, a Curative Petition was filed and it also got dismissed. Then the Appellant’s mother filed a Mercy Petition before the President of India and hence, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, with a caveat that he shall not be released until the attainment of 60 years of age. In 2019, the Appellant approached the High Court, laying a challenge to the Presidential Order but his Petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved, he was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in the above regard, noted, “We are dealing with a case where grave injustice has been perpetrated, on account of the consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility. … Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action. The primary duty of a Court is to make a single-minded endeavour to unearth the truth hidden beneath the facts. Thus, the Court is a search engine of truth, with procedural and substantive laws as its tools.”
The Court said that, when procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it and similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos and such an exercise is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation.
“In its journey, the Court must discern the truth, primarily from the material available on record in the form of pleadings, and arguments duly supported by documents. It must be kept in mind that the entire judicial system is meant for the discovery of the truth, it being the soul of a decision. For doing so, a Presiding Officer is expected to play an active role, rather than a passive one”, it emphasised.
The Court remarked that a child is a product of the present, in need of being moulded, to thrive in the future and therefore, deviant behaviour of a child in conflict with law should be a concern of the society as a whole.
“One must not lose sight of the fact that the child is not responsible for an act of crime, but is rather victimized by it. Such a child is nothing but an inheritor of crime, a legacy which it does not wish to imbibe. The behaviour of a child can be attributed, possibly to two counts, namely, the environment that the child grows in, and genetics”, it added.
The Court was of the view that a child who lives in such a discriminatory environment, requires equitable treatment on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
“… the Court is expected to play the role of parens patriae by treating a child not as a delinquent, but as a victim, viewed through the lens of reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration into the society. … Thus, a Juvenile Court is a species of a parent. A delinquent, who appears before the Court, is to be protected and re-educated, rather than be judged and punished. It is for this purpose, that the Court will have to press into service the benevolent provisions for rehabilitation introduced by the Legislature. A Juvenile Court assumes the role of an institution rendering psychological services. It must forget that it is acting as a Court, and must don the robes of a correction home for a deviant child”, it enunciated.
The Court further observed that, even assuming a plea of juvenility was raised but not considered appropriately at the time of disposal of a Special Leave Petition/Statutory Criminal Appeal, a Review Petition, or a Curative Petition thereafter, it would not bar a competent Court from deciding the said issue by following due procedure.
“There is a subtle difference between an unequivocal admission as against a statement which could be construed to be so. It must be seen contextually. While the former can be the basis for a relief, the latter is one meant for adjudication vis-a-vis the facts of the case”, it noted.
The Court said that, no one shall be prejudiced by an act of the Court and a mistake committed by the Court cannot stand in the way of one’s rightful benefit. It added that the party does not commit a mistake, but rather the Court itself.
“… such a mistake cannot act as a barrier for the party to get its due relief. However, we make it clear that the mistake must be so apparent that it does not brook any adjudication on the foundational facts”, it also said.
Moreover, the Court elucidated that power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is not appellate or revisional in nature and it is an executive power travelling on a different channel, which cannot be termed as a power of appeal or review.
“A challenge to the exercise of power under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution would involve limited judicial review on grounds such as inadequate application of mind, amongst others. … Courts will have to exercise adequate caution and circumspection while dealing with an executive order passed in exercise of the power conferred under Article 72 or 161 of the Constitution”, it explained.
The Court also clarified that, when a challenge is made to an executive order, with an independent prayer for exercising the power under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (JJ Act), they being distinct and independent, refusal of judicial review of the former will not obliterate the mandatory duty pertaining to the latter.
Coming to the facts of the case, the Court noted, “The statement given by the Appellant at the time of the hearing on his sentence, would also pale into insignificance, as even then he would have been a minor at the time of commission of the offence, under both the 2000 and the 2015 Acts.”
The Court observed that, when the plea of juvenility was raised, it should have been dealt with under the existing laws at the relevant point of time, especially when there exists a tacit and clear admission as to the age of the Appellant.
“… this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts. We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored”, it added.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the impugned Judgment, and directed the authorities to facilitate the Appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release.
Cause Title- Om Prakash @Israel @Raju @Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 43)
Appearance:
Appellant: Senior Advocate S. Muralidhar, AOR Prateek K Chadha, Advocates Maitreya Subramaniam, Sreekar Aechuri, Yash S. Vijay, Ninni Susan Thomas, M.A. Karthik, Pallak Bhagat, Sakshi Jain, Pooja B Mehta, and Arjun Nayyar.
Respondents: ASG K.M. Nataraj, AORs Vanshaja Shukla, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Vanshaja Shukla, Advocates Shailesh Madiyal, Digvijay Dam, Raghav Sharma, Mrinal Elker Mazumdar, Vinayak Sharma, Ankeeta Appanna, and Siddhant Yadav.
