Section 106 Evidence Act Does Not Shift Prosecution’s Primary Burden; Adverse Inference Arises Only After Case Is Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Supreme Court
The Apex Court held that any adverse inference against an accused under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act can be drawn only after the prosecution establishes its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has reiterated that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not relieve the prosecution of its primary obligation to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial.
The Court clarified that while Section 106 places a burden on an accused to explain facts that lie especially within his knowledge, such burden arises only after the prosecution has successfully established the foundational facts forming the chain of circumstances.
A Bench Comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra while stating that “Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 clearly provides that when a fact lies especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact rests upon him”, however cautioned that “Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which in a criminal trial always remains on the prosecution”.
Advocate Md. Farman, AOR, represented the appellant, while Praneet Pranav, D.A.G., represented the respondents.
Background
The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution alleged that the appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased before the recovery of the dead body.
The Trial Court acquitted the co-accused but convicted the appellant, holding that his failure to explain how he parted company with the deceased attracted an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court.
Aggrieved by the concurrent findings, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, contending that the prosecution had failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances and that Section 106 had been misapplied to compensate for evidentiary gaps.
Court’s Observation
The Supreme Court, at the outset, reiterated the settled principle that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applies only when a fact lies especially within the knowledge of a person, and in such a situation, the burden of proving that fact rests upon him.
At the same time, the Court emphatically clarified that Section 106 does not shift the primary burden of proof, which in a criminal trial always remains on the prosecution. The provision is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court accordingly held that “any adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is to be drawn against the accused person when the prosecution has been able to establish the case beyond a reasonable doubt”.
Relying on a consistent line of precedents, the Court further observed that the “evidence on last seen together is a weak evidence and conviction only on the basis of last seen together without there being any other corroborative evidence against the accused will not be sufficient to convict the accused for an offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC”.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that, except for the circumstance of last seen together, there was no corroborative evidence establishing motive, recovery, or conduct pointing conclusively towards the guilt of the appellant.
The Court therefore concluded that “the nature of circumstantial evidence available against the appellant, though, raises a doubt that he may have committed the offence, but the same is not so conclusive that he can be convicted only on the evidence of the last seen together”.
Conclusion
In the absence of a complete chain of circumstantial evidence and with the prosecution having failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court held that no adverse inference could be drawn against the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, and acquitted the appellant of all charges.
Cause Title: Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1466)
Appearances
Appellant: Md. Farman, AOR
Respondent: Praneet Pranav, D.A.G.; Vinayak Sharma, Standing Counsel; Ravinder Kumar Yadav, AOR; Kshitiz Agarwal, Advocate; Yashvardhan Shah, Advocate
