When Victim Survived For Some Months & Later Died Due To Complications, Is It Murder Or Attempt To Murder?: Supreme Court Explains
The Supreme Court said that an attempt to murder requires that the act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of murder will emerge.
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that where death was delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.
The apex court considered the question when an offence is said to be made under Section 307 of the IPC.
The Bench of Justice J.B Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan observed, “If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.”
Case Brief
An appeal was filed against the order of the High Court by which the High Court partly allowed the Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant and altered the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code into one under Section 307 of the IPC.
The case of the prosecution was that appellant along with three other co-accused trespassed into the house of the deceased and dragged him up to the terrace of the house and flung him down. After the deceased was thrown down from the terrace, the appellant and other co accused assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs. The injured was shifted to the hospital in a very critical condition. The deceased was in hospital for nine months from the date of the alleged incident. Ultimately, he died on account of septicaemia and pneumonia leading to cardiorespiratory arrest.
Court’s Observation
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court committed any error in bringing the case within the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” punishable under Section 307 IPC on the ground that the deceased died after a period of nine months from the date of the incident.
After considering the medical examination by doctors, the Supreme Court noted that it was ultimately the septic shock resulting from infected pressure sores which in turn arose from the spinal injury sustained in the incident that proved to be fatal. “The deceased also suffered from pneumonia. According to the medical experts, this pneumonia was the direct result of the long drawn medical treatment which was given to the deceased over a period of nine months”, the Court added.
Further, the Bench discussed the issue of when an offence was said to be made under Section 307 of the IPC.
The Supreme Court underscored the the following essential ingredients under Section 307 IPC:
(i) The death of a human was attempted;
(ii) That the death was attempted to be caused, or caused in the consequence of the act of the accused; and
(iii) That the act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so dangerous that it must in all probability cause: death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
“Thus, from the above, the most important ingredient to constitute the offence of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is the intention or knowledge. To bring home guilt against an accused under this provision, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that the intention of the accused was one of the three kinds mentioned in Section 300 of the IPC”, the Court said.
The Apex Court further clarified that causing an injury that would endanger life is not an essential condition for the applicability of Section 307 of the IPC. Even if the injuries inflicted are simple in nature, that by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal, if the offence otherwise falls under Section 307 of the IPC.
The Court also discussed the word “intent” and suggested relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered: the nature of the weapon used; the manner in which the weapon was used; the part of the body where the injuries were inflicted; the nature of the injuries caused; the opportunity available which the accused gets.
“To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted…The provision makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any…What the courts have to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof”, the Court observed.
Thereafter, the Court interpreted the application of the Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay.
“In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors referred to above, the cause of death of deceased Rekhchand was cardiorespiratory failure. The injuries suffered by him at the time of assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic dysfunction. The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries. The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view, alter the culpability”, the Court held.
The Court laid down the broad principles to be kept in mind, inter alia:
a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.
b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.
c. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.
d. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.
The Court said that the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events.
“Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased”, the Apex Court observed.
Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court committed an error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC on the ground that the victim survived for almost nine months from the date of the incident, and died on account of pneumonia and other complications during the course of treatment and not due to the injuries suffered at the time of assault.
Cause Title: Maniklal Sahu V. State of Chhattisgarh (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1107)
