Segregating MLA’s Trial Solely On Account Of His Political Office Undermines Integrity Of Criminal Justice Process: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court also said that the right to equal access to justice is an essential facet of the rule of law, and no person – whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary citizen – can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment without express legal justification.
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that segregating the Appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.
The Supreme Court was hearing the Appeal to quash the order of the Trial Court directing prosecution to file a separate charge sheet against the Appellant and ordered segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused.
The Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan observed, “While expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is undoubtedly desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Cr.P.C. or the constitutional mandate of equality. Segregating the appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.”
Case Brief
An Appeal was filed to quash the order of the Trial Court directing prosecution to file a separate charge sheet against the Appellant and ordered segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused at the High Court. However, the same was dismissed by the High Court.
The Appellant was an MLA and was arrayed as one of the accused persons , in connection with large-scale communal violence that took place in the Nuh District, Haryana.
The Appellant contended that he has been falsely implicated in the FIRs and the investigation itself revealed that the Appellant was not present at the location of the incident, and that there is no material evidence linking him to the alleged offences. It was also submitted that the trial Court directed segregation of the Appellant’s trial solely on the ground that he was a sitting MLA, which reasoning was arbitrary and amounts to a miscarriage of justice as Section 223(d) Cr.P.C. provides that persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction shall be tried jointly.
While the Respondents contended that the segregation of the Appellant’s trial was necessitated to ensure judicial efficiency, as the presence of 43 accused in first FIR and 28 accused in second FIR had rendered the conduct of a joint trial logistically and procedurally cumbersome. It was further argued that under Section 218 Cr.P.C., the general rule is that each offence shall be tried separately. While Section 223 enables joint trials, it is couched in discretionary terms and must be applied only in appropriate cases depending on the circumstances.
Court’s Observation
The principal issue that arose for determination in was whether the orders of the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court, directing segregation of the Appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused and requiring the filing of a separate charge sheet solely on the ground that the Appellant was a sitting MLA, were legally sustainable.
The Court noted that the charge sheet reflected a consolidated investigative approach, founded upon common evidence, such as call detail records, electronic communications, video footage, witness statements, and forensic reports. Thus, the prosecution relied largely upon common witnesses and interlinked evidence against all the accused.
The Supreme Court opined that as per Section 223 Cr.P.C., a joint trial ought to be conducted as it was not the prosecution’s case that the acts attributed to the Appellant were distinct or severable.
While referring to the order of the Trial Court, the Court emphasised that the segregation was directed solely on account of the Appellant’s status as an MLA, so as to facilitate a day-to-day trial in purported compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay V. Union of India (2021) . “Significantly, the record discloses that no notice was issued to the Appellant prior to passing of the segregation order, nor was there any application filed by the prosecution seeking such a course of action. The segregation was thus ordered suo motu, without affording the Appellant an opportunity of hearing”, the Supreme Court said.
The Supreme Court underscored that the object behind the joint trials was three-fold: (i) to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, (ii) to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments on the same evidence, and (iii) to promote judicial economy while ensuring fairness to the accused.
The Court held, “Segregation was ordered not on any legally recognized ground – such as distinct facts, severable evidence, or demonstrated prejudice – but solely on account of the Appellant’s political office, by misapplying the directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay.”
The Bench clarified that it is no doubt correct that the said judgment emphasises the need for expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving MPs / MLAs. However, it lays down that it is the responsibility of the Principal District Judge to allocate, as considered appropriate and effective, criminal cases involving MPs and MLAs to the designated courts. Further, they do not confer any procedural disadvantage upon an accused legislator, nor do they authorise deviation from the mandatory legal norms governing joint trials.
Resultantly, the Court held that the order of the trial Court directing segregation of the Appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused, cannot be sustained.
“The only ground recorded was the delay occasioned by the non-appearance of certain co-accused. The proper course in such a situation would have been to segregate the absconding or defaulting accused, not the Appellant who was regularly before the court. By doing so, the trial court inverted the settled principle and thereby committed a manifest error. No finding was recorded that a joint trial would delay proceedings or cause prejudice to the Appellant”, the Court observed.
The Court also observed that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the Appellant. The discretion to file a charge-sheet lies solely with the investigating agency. Even where multiple charge-sheets were filed, if the offences arise out of the same transaction, they must be tried together.
Pertinently, the Court opined that the Appellant’s status as a sitting MLA cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial. All accused stand equal before the law, and preferential segregation militates against the equality principle enshrined in Article 14.
Further, the Court said, “The right to equal access to justice is an essential facet of the rule of law, and no person – whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary citizen – can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment without express legal justification.”
Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the direction to file a separate charge sheet against the Appellant and the consequential segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused.
Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed.
Cause Title: Mamman Khan V. State of Haryana (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1113)
