Supreme Court: Registration Of Document Gives Notice To World About Its Execution; But Doesn't Confer Unimpeachable Validity
The Supreme Court emphasised that the power of absolute right over lands is on the State and the person in occupation, is only there, by virtue of the grants.
Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that the registration of a document gives notice to the world about its execution but does not confer an unimpeachable validity.
The Court held thus in Civil Appeals filed against the Order of the Telangana High Court’s Division Bench in a Writ Appeal filed from the Judgment in a batch of Writ Petitions dismissed by a common Order.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice K. Vinod Chandran observed, “The observation that registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed is not to confer an unimpeachable validity on all such registered documents. Even the respondents/writ petitioners accept that the presumption coming forth from a registered deed of conveyance is rebuttable.”
The Bench emphasised that the power of absolute right over lands is on the State and the person in occupation, is only there, by virtue of the grants, which can be brought to an end by the State which has the power of eminent domain.
Senior Advocate Nidhesh Gupta appeared on behalf of the Appellants while Senior Advocate Hiren P. Raval, Senior Advocate S. Niranjan Reddy, and AOR P. Mohith Rao appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Brief Facts
The Writ Appeal before the High Court was only against the Judgment in a Writ Petition which essentially prayed for restraining the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (TSIICL) from attempting to enter into the land of the Writ Petitioners having an extent of 53 acres, with prayers also against demolition of the fencing and structures without any notice or without any right or authority. The connected Writ Petitions also claimed similar reliefs as against the TSIICL, but with respect to smaller extents of property, said to have been purchased from the original owners.
The Appellants before the Division Bench claimed that they are in possession of the subject property on the strength of registered Title Deeds in which the vendor obtained possession of the land under an agreement of sale in 1982. In the Appeal, the Division Bench found that the State was concerned with only 470 acres of land out of the total 525.31 acres, as per the Advocate General and hence the 53 acres stood distinct and separate. The Appeals before the Apex Court were filed by the party Respondents in the Writ Petition who were the legal heirs of the original owners and one, by individuals claiming smaller extents of property.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts noted, “When dispossession by the State is alleged on the strength of possession, mere reliance on interim orders passed in writ petitions earlier filed cannot establish such actual and physical possession. We have also noticed that the validated agreement of 19.03.1982, based on which conveyance is claimed by the writ petitioners, cannot be sustained on the clear terms in the two agreements.”
The Court said that here there is a statutory vesting of property and prima facie, guile employed in making conflicting claims before the authorities under the Land Reforms Act and the Land Ceiling Act as also entering into multiple transactions to defeat the statutory vesting with successive litigations, all in vain, which travelled up to the Supreme Court twice earlier.
“We noticed on a comparison of the actual agreement on which a suit for specific performance was filed and the latter agreement, which stood validated but not registered even now that the original declarants and the writ petitioners have been approbating and reprobating”, it also remarked.
The Court further observed that the cloud on title and the doubts raised on possession by the Single Judge, as affirmed by the Apex Court are merely prima facie observations to deny discretion to invoke the extra ordinary power under Article 226.
“So are the misgivings expressed on the claim of repossession by the original declarants through their GPA and the skepticism regarding their very right to obtain repossession of property already vested in the State, under a Statute, which Statute also does not provide for any review of the notification issued under the Act; the notification having merely affirmed the statutory vesting”, it added.
The Court concluded that the parties would be entitled to agitate their respective causes, in the appropriate civil forum or if statutorily prohibited, avail of the remedies made available under the statute which proceedings will not be governed by the findings in this Judgment.
Accordingly, the Apex Court disposed of the Appeals and restored the Judgment of the Single Judge.
Cause Title- Mahnoor Fatima Imran & Ors. v. M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 646)
