Violates Constitutional Principles Of Separation Of Powers & Judicial Independence: Supreme Court Strikes Down Provisions Of Tribunals Reforms Act
The Supreme Court granted the Union of India a period of four months from the date of the Judgment to establish a National Tribunals Commission (NTC).
CJI B.R. Gavai, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has struck down some of the provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, saying that they violate the Constitutional principles of Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence.
The Court was deciding a Writ Petition preferred by the Madras Bar Association (MBA), challenging Sections 3(1), 3(7), 4, 5, 6, 7(1), and 33 of the Tribunals Reforms Act.
The two-Judge Bench of Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran held, “… the provisions of the Impugned Act cannot be sustained. They violate the constitutional principles of separation of powers and judicial independence, which are firmly embedded in the text, structure, and spirit of the Constitution. The Impugned Act directly contradicts binding judicial pronouncements that have repeatedly clarified the standards governing the appointment, tenure, and functioning of tribunal members. Instead of curing the defects identified by this Court, the Impugned Act merely reproduces, in slightly altered form, the very provisions earlier struck down. This amounts to a legislative override in the strictest sense: an attempt to nullify binding judicial directions without addressing the underlying constitutional infirmities. Such an approach is impermissible under our constitutional scheme.”
The Bench added that as the impugned Act fails to remove the defects identified in prior Judgments and instead reenacts them under a new label, it falls afoul of the Doctrine of Constitutional supremacy.
Senior Advocates Arvind P. Datar and C.S. Vaidyanathan appeared for the Petitioners, while Attorney General of India (AGI) R. Venkataramani and Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Aishwarya Bhati appeared for the Respondents. Senior Advocates Sidharth Luthra, P. S. Patwalia, Sanjay Jain, Porus F. Kaka, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Balbir Singh, Gagan Gupta, Puneet Mittal, Sachit Jolly, B.M. Chatterji, and Advocate Ninad Laud appeared for the Applicants.
Case Background
The following provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act were challenged in this case –
• Section 3 which empowers the Central Government to frame rules on the qualifications, appointments, salaries, allowances, and service conditions of the Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, notwithstanding anything in prior Judgments or existing laws.
• Section 4 which provides that the Central Government may remove a Chairperson or Member of a Tribunal on the recommendation of the prescribed Committee and in the manner laid down by rules.
• Section 5 which stipulates that, despite anything contained in earlier Judgments or existing laws, the Chairperson of a Tribunal shall serve for a tenure of four years or until attaining the age of seventy years, whichever occurs earlier.
• Section 6 which provides that the Chairperson and Members of a Tribunal may be considered for re-appointment in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.
• Section 7 which empowers the Central Government, notwithstanding any prior Judgments or existing laws, to frame rules prescribing the salary of the Chairperson and Members of a Tribunal.
• Section 33 which provides that, despite anything contained in existing laws, all persons serving as Chairpersons, Presidents, Presiding Officers, Vice Chairpersons, Vice-Presidents, or Members of the Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals, and other authorities listed in the Second Schedule shall cease to hold office from the notified date.
Court’s Observations
The Supreme Court after hearing the contentions of the counsel, observed, “… the Indian constitutional framework does not subscribe to parliamentary sovereignty, nor does it vest unqualified supremacy in the judiciary. The architecture of our Constitution is firmly rooted in the principle of constitutional supremacy.”
The Court said that once the Court has struck down a provision or issued binding directions after identifying a constitutional defect, Parliament cannot simply override or contradict that judicial decision by reenacting the very same measure in a different form.
“Parliament, like every other institution under our constitutional scheme, must operate within the bounds of the Constitution. Its discretion is broad but not absolute. It must respect the principles of separation of powers, the guarantees of fundamental rights, and the structural values (such as judicial independence) that are part of the basic framework of our constitutional order”, it emphasised.
The Court noted that where a legislative measure attempts to nullify or circumvent a binding constitutional Judgment without curing the underlying defect, it not only exceeds Parliament’s authority but also violates the doctrine of constitutional supremacy itself.
“… we do not find merit in the argument of the learned Attorney General that Parliament has discretion to ignore the decisions of this Court. … This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the institutional limits of judicial power and has cautioned against intruding into the prerogative of the legislature by dictating the precise contents of a statute. The constitutional scheme does not permit the judiciary to prescribe the text of a law or to mandate that Parliament adopt a specific policy choice”, it remarked.
The Court reiterated that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and if a legislative measure infringes fundamental rights, violates structural principles such as separation of powers or judicial independence, exceeds legislative competence, or frustrates binding constitutional directions, the Court may strike it down.
“Thus, a clear distinction must be maintained between directing legislation and reviewing legislation. The former is forbidden, because the Court cannot function as a law-maker. The latter is indispensable to preserving the supremacy of the Constitution. … Thus, while the judiciary cannot dictate policy, it can and must ensure that legislative choices conform to the Constitution. Judicial restraint in law-making does not imply judicial abdication in constitutional adjudication”, it elucidated.
The Court further observed that the principles of separation of powers and judicial independence are not vague, free-floating ideals and they are structural pillars of the constitutional order and integral components of constitutionalism worldwide.
“Legislative measures concerning the structure, composition, and functioning of tribunals necessarily implicate these constitutional principles because tribunals discharge judicial functions and form part of the larger system of justice administration. When Parliament designs or alters the tribunal system, it must do so in a manner consistent with the constitutional requirements of independence, impartiality, and effective adjudication. A law that undermines these foundational values, such as by enabling executive control over appointments, curtailing tenure arbitrarily, or weakening institutional autonomy, does not merely offend an “abstract principle”. It strikes at the core of the constitutional arrangement”, it enunciated.
The Court was of the view that the Court’s interpretative authority to expand upon and define the scope of constitutional provisions is neither novel nor exceptional.
“… the norms laid down in the tribunal cases, regarding tenure, age limits, selection processes, qualifications, and independence from executive control, are not abstract judicial preferences. They are constitutional requirements distilled from Articles 323-A and 323-B read with the doctrines of separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, and the guarantee of equality under Article 14”, it added.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the validity of legislation may, and must, be tested against structural principles such as separation of powers and judicial independence when the legislation in question directly implicates the constitutional design of the justice system and judicial enforcement of these principles is an essential feature of constitutional adjudication, not an overreach.
Conclusion and Directions
The Court remarked that merely shifting the same content from the amended Section 184 of the Finance Act into Sections 3, 5 and 7 of a stand-alone statute, while using the non obstante formula “notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment or order”, does not cure the constitutional defects.
“It simply re-enacts them in another avatar. The Impugned Act, therefore, does not “cure” the law declared earlier, but consciously defies it. … Stability of tenure and protection of vested rights are essential components of judicial independence, and the Court’s earlier directions on this subject cannot be lightly departed from”, it added.
The Court granted the Union of India a period of four months from the date of the Judgment to establish a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) and clarified that the said Commission must adhere to the principles articulated by the Court, particularly concerning independence from executive control, professional expertise, transparent processes, and oversight mechanisms that reinforce public confidence in the system.
“… the service conditions of all such Members of ITAT who were appointed by orders dated 11th September 2021 and 1st October 2021 shall be governed by the old Act and the old Rules”, it directed.
The Court, therefore, concluded by clarifying that all appointments of Members and Chairpersons whose selection or recommendation by the Search-cum-Selection Committee was completed before the commencement of the Tribunal Reforms Act, but whose formal appointment notifications were issued after the Act came into force, shall be protected and such appointments will continue to be governed by the parent statutes and by the conditions of service, rather than by the truncated tenure and altered service conditions introduced by the Tribunal Reforms Act.
Justice Vinod Chandran in his concurring opinion said, “I respectfully concur with the reasoning and directions. The Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 is a replica of the struck down Ordinance; old wine in a new bottle, the wine whets not the judicial palette, but the bottle merely dazzle.”
Accordingly, the Apex Court disposed of the Writ Petition and struck down the provisions of the impugned Act.
Cause Title- Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1330)
