While remarking that the role performed by a licensed stamp vendor is a “highly important public duty essential for ensuring the efficient collection of revenue on behalf of the State,” the Supreme Court held that a licensed stamp vendor falls within the ambit of a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Court set aside the conviction of a stamp vendor (Appellant) in a bribery case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), which the Delhi High Court earlier upheld. The Court held that the Appellant was eligible to receive a discount on the purchase of stamp papers owing to the license that he was holding.

A Bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan held that “the Government desires that the holder of the instrument pays appropriate stamp duty. To fulfil this objective, the Government ensures there is sufficient availability of stamps through licensed stamp vendors. It is for this reason the Government remunerates a stamp vendor as he is facilitating the accessibility of stamps on behalf of the Government, and thus the role being performed by licensed stamp vendor is nothing short of a highly important public duty, essential for ensuring the efficient collection of revenue on behalf of the State.

Senior Advocate SK Rungta represented the Appellant, while ASG Aishwarya Bhati appeared for the Respondent.

Brief Facts

A complaint was lodged by an individual who alleged that the Appellant, a licensed stamp vendor at the Office of the Sub-Registrar demanded Rs. 12 for a Rs. 10 stamp paper, an excess of Rs. 2. Following this complaint, a trap was laid by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), during which the complainant was provided with GC notes smeared with phenolphthalein powder. The Appellant allegedly accepted the smeared notes, and subsequently, a hand wash of the Appellant turned the solution pink, and the notes were reportedly recovered from a register maintained by the Appellant.

A chargesheet was filed, and the Trial Court framed charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The Trial Court, accordingly, convicted and sentenced the Appellant.

Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court emphasised the legislative intent behind the PC Act, which repealed the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, to effectively prevent bribery and corruption. The PC Act introduced a very wide and comprehensive definition of ‘public servant’ under Section 2(c), with the legislative intent shifting emphasis from remunerating authority to the performance of a public duty. The Court held that the definition deserves a wide and purposive construction to “purify public administration.

In order to assess whether a stamp vendor comes within the purview of a ‘public servant’ as defined under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, the Bench stated that a person would be a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act if he is: “1. in the service of the Government; or 2. in the pay of the Government; 3. remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty.

The case of the appellant has tested positive on both aspects of the definition of a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. The 1934 Rules envisage that the nascent discount eventually matures into a form of remuneration. Further, the purpose of securing stamp duty fortifies the motive behind the efforts of the Government to remunerate stamp vendors. Thus, the appellant, at the relevant time, was being remunerated by the Government. Undoubtedly, the appellant was discharging a duty in which both the State and the public have an interest, which, nonetheless, brings him within the ambit of a public servant as defined under the PC Act,” the Court held.

However, the Bench also pointed out that “mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

The Court further clarified, “The present case is not one of an ‘offer to pay by the bribe-giver’ where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

Consequently, the Court ordered, “Further, the prosecution has failed in establishing the allegation of demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act cannot be sustained and is, thus, liable to be set aside.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal.

Cause Title: Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi) [Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 618]

Appearance:

Appellant: Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta; AOR Rameshwar Prasad Goyal; Advocates Abhishek Garg, Prashant Singh and Pratiti Rungta

Respondent: ASG Aishwarya Bhati; AOR Mukesh Kumar Maroria; Advocates Chitrangda Rashtaravara, Shagun Thakur, Aaditya Shankar Dixit, Satvika Thakur and Ishaan Sharma

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