Sexual Intercourse By Man With His Wife Can’t Be Termed As Rape: Supreme Court Quashes FIR
The Apex Court was considering an Appeal preferred against a Punjab and Haryana High Court order dismissing a quashing Petition filed by the accused-appellant.

The Supreme Court quashed an FIR in a marital rape case after taking note of the appellant-husband’s argument that as per Exception 2 under Section 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape.
The Apex Court was considering an Appeal preferred against the order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court wherein the accused-appellant’s petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking quashing of the FIR registered under Section 366, 376 and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 was dismissed.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale asserted, “Further, the conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant.”
AOR Aanchal Jain represented the Appellant while AOR Karan Sharma represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The FIR was lodged by the complainant and cousin of the respondent victim stating that the victim working at National Insurance Company did not return, from the office one day. The complainant feared that she had been abducted by the appellant herein who was alleged to be harassing her for the past few days. Thus, the said FIR was lodged under Section 366 of IPC against the appellant.
It was the case of the appellant that the appellant and the respondent-victim had married each other in the year 2022 as per Sikh rites and ceremonies against the wishes of the relatives. The appellant had also stated that after their marriage given the opposition by the family members of the victim and complainant, the couple had also filed a protection petition. The said relief was granted by the High Court. However, the Respondent-victim allegedly returned to her parental home which also led to the appellant filing a Petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court seeking restitution of conjugal rights with his legally wedded wife.
Meanwhile, the victim recorded a statement under section 164 of the Cr.P.C raising allegations of rape against the appellant and also alleged that the marriage was solemnised forcibly by the appellant. It was further alleged that the mother and brother of the appellant had also assisted the appellant in the commission of said crimes. Accordingly, Sections 363, 120B and 376 of IPC were added to the FIR. However, after finding no offence to be made out under section 363, the said offence was deleted and only Sections 376 and 506 of IPC survived against the appellant.
Arguments
It was the case of the appellant that he is the legally wedded husband of Respondent-victim and therefore no offence under Section 376 of IPC is made out against him since he is covered under Exception No. 2 appended to Section 375 of IPC. The appellant has also brought to the Court’s notice the written statement filed by victim in the matter of restitution of conjugal rights and highlighted that she had nowhere made any allegations about rape against the appellant in the said written statement.
Reasoning
The Bench took note of the fact that the protection petition had been jointly filed by the appellant and Respondent-victim seeking protection from the family members of the victim as she had married the appellant of her own free will and volition against the wishes of her family members. Moreover, in the reply filed by her to the appellant’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights, she had not made any allegation of rape or marriage by force against the appellant.
“In this regard, it has been rightly pointed out by the appellant that as per Exception 2 under Section 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant”, the Bench said.
As per the Bench, the conduct of the complainant and the victim in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice was reflective of the fact that it was a dead case.Thus, finding that no prima facie case constituting any offence was made out against the appellant, the Bench allowed the appeal and quashed the impugned FIR against the appellant and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
Cause Title: Kuldeep Singh v. The State of Punjab & Ors (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 130)
Appearance:
Appellant: AOR Aanchal Jain, Advocate Karan Dewan
Respondent: AOR Karan Sharma