Ingredients Of Offence Of Dowry Death U/S. 304-B IPC Repeatedly Explained; But Trial Courts Are Committing Same Mistakes: Supreme Court
The Apex Court was considering an appeal challenging the judgment confirming the conviction of the Appellant-accused under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC.
The Supreme Court acquitted a man in a case of cruelty and dowry death and highlighted that it has explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC repeatedly but the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes. The Apex Court suggested that the State Judicial Academies should step in.
The Apex Court was considering an appeal challenging the judgment confirming the conviction of the Appellant under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC. For the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and he was sentenced to undergo one year of rigorous imprisonment under Section 498-A.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan asserted, “Not a single incident of cruelty covered by Section 498-A was proved by the prosecution.”
Factual Background
The Appellant got married to the deceased in the year 1996. In 1998, the deceased committed suicide. After the postmortem, the doctors opined that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of hanging. The mother, brother & maternal uncle of the deceased were the three main witnesses. The appellant and his parents were tried for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. While his parents were acquitted, the Sessions Court convicted the appellant.
Reasoning
At the outset, the Bench explained the essential ingredients of Section 304-B which includes that the death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage. Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband and cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
It was further explained by the Bench that if the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death. The dowry must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. “The term valuable security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30 of IPC”, it added
It was undisputed that the death of the appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the marriage. “The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked”, the Bench said.
Coming to the facts of the case, the Bench held that the statement given by the mother of the deceased regarding providing dowry and regarding demands of dowry were omissions. It was further observed that the version of the brother of the deceased in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry was a significant and relevant omission. Moreover, the father of the deceased had no personal knowledge of whether the appellant had subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment. As per the Bench, none of the statements of the witnesses contained any specific instances of cruelty or harassment and the prosecution did not prove the material ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-B.“ Section 304-B of the IPC was brought on the statute book in 1986. This Court has repeatedly laid down and explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B. But, the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes repeatedly. It is for the State Judicial Academies to step in. Perhaps this is a case of moral conviction”, the Bench observed.
Considering the fact that both the offences alleged against the appellant were not proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, the Bench allowed the appeal, quashed the impugned judgment and acquitted the appellant of the offences alleged against him.
Cause Title: Karan Singh v. State of Haryana (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 133)
