In Execution Petition, Primary Onus Lies On Decree-holder To Show That Judgment Debtor Willfully Disobeyed Conditions Of Decree: Supreme Court
The Appeals before the Supreme Court arose from a dispute between two religious sects of the Kuruba community in Anantapur District of Andhra Pradesh.
Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, Supreme Court
While considering a civil dispute revolving around a compromise decree entered into between two religious sections of Kuruba community of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court has reiterated that in an execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has willfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree.
The Appeals before the Apex Court arose from a dispute between two sections of Kuruba community in Anantapur District of Andhra Pradesh i.e., the Kapadam families of Gungulakunta village and the Kamatam families of Yerrayapalli village. The controversy revolved around the performance of religious rituals and the custody of idols and paraphernalia associated with the deity Lord Sangalappa Swamy, who is the common deity worshipped by both sects.
The Division Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi held, “It is a trite law that in execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has willfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree. However, to the contrary, in the present case, no evidence has been led by the appellants to show that possession of the idols ever passed to the respondents.”
Factual Background
A suit was filed before the District Munsif Court, Anantapur by members of the Kamatam (respondents) sect of Yerrayapalli, seeking custody of pooja articles and religious paraphernalia relating to Lord Sangalappa Swamy. The Kapadam (appellants) sect of Gungulakunta village resisted the claim. The suit was dismissed, and an appeal preferred before the District Judge met with the same fate. While dismissing the appeal, the District Judge observed that a fresh suit could be filed in a representative capacity under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the proper management of the endowment.
The respondents’ family instituted a suit before the Court of the District Judge, Anantapur, in a representative capacity seeking to establish the rights of the respective sects over the religious endowment, the performance of pooja, and the custody of the idols and paraphernalia. During the pendency of the suit, the parties arrived at a compromise, and it was agreed in the compromise decree dated November 1, 1993 that the respondents would pay a sum of Rs 2,000 towards their half-share of the pooja expenses. However, decades later, the dispute re-emerged. The appellants alleged that in 1999, the respondents refused to rotate the idols and paraphernalia as required by the terms of the 1933 decree. Consequently, the appellants’ family filed an Execution Petition seeking execution of the 1993 compromise.
The respondents, arrayed as judgment-debtors, filed a counter and subsequently sought to amend the same by filing an application. Upon dismissal of that application, they preferred a petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The High Court allowed that revision, permitting amendment of the counter and remitting the matter to the Executing Court with a specific direction to frame and decide a preliminary issue on the maintainability of the execution. Later, the matter was again remanded to the Executing Court and an execution order was passed. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents filed a Civil Revision Petition, and the High Court held that the appellants had locus standi and the execution petition was not barred by limitation. A review preferred against the same was also dismissed. Being aggrieved, the appellants approached the Apex Court assailing the judgment passed by the High Court, which had set aside the execution of the compromise decree.
Reasoning
On a perusal of the judgment passed by the Executing Court, the Bench found that there was no convincing evidence before the Executing Court to establish that the respondents were in possession of the idols or had violated the compromise decree of 1933. “The Executing Court appears to have assumed that, since no quarrel was raised for several decades, the arrangement must have been in operation and that the respondents must, therefore, be in possession. Such inference, based merely on the absence of earlier dispute, is impermissible. Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof”, it stated.
It was further noticed that the testimonies of two witnesses merely consisted of bare assertions, unsupported by any independent witnesses or documentary proof. Moreover, none of these witnesses was party to the original suit of 1933. The Bench found the case of the respondents/judgment-debtors that the compromise was never acted upon and the articles always remained with the appellants/decree-holders upon failure of the respondents to pay Rs 2,000 to the appellants, to be highly probable. The non-payment of Rs 2,000 by the respondents/judgment debtors was proved from the admission of the first witness, where he admitted that he was not aware of the payment of Rs 2,000 to his ancestors, if any.
The Bench found that there had been no evidence of compliance with Clause (2) of the compromise decree, which required the appointment of two trustees from each sect to supervise and manage rituals and maintain accounts. “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him and no one else. We find that no material has been produced by the appellants to show that any trustees were ever appointed or that accounts were maintained. The High Court was right in observing that had the scheme of appointment of trustees been implemented, such a dispute between the parties might not have arisen”, it held.
The Bench thus concluded that the appellants had failed to establish a violation of the compromise decree by the respondents. “The burden of proving violation of the decree rests squarely on the decree-holders. In the absence of cogent proof of such violation, the execution cannot be sustained. The burden of proof, which lay upon the appellants, had not been discharged”, it stated.
Finding that the Executing Court fell into an error in allowing the execution of the compromise decree on mere presumption without any proof, and the High Court rightly set aside the Executing Court’s order, the Bench dismissed the Appeals.
Cause Title: Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1307)