Precautionary Principle Overrides Sectoral Pollution Index: Supreme Court Strikes Down CPCB’s Downgrade Of Cement Grinding Units Near Schools
Regulatory frameworks must err on the side of protection where there is a plausible risk of harm

Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has set aside the Central Pollution Control Board’s (CPCB) downgrading of stand-alone cement grinding units in Sangrur, Punjab without Captive Power Plants (CPP) from the “Red” to the “Orange” category. The Court held that reliance on sector-level Pollution Index methodology cannot justify dilution of siting safeguards near residential areas and educational institutions in the absence of objective evidence demonstrating materially reduced exposure risks.
The Court further held that reliance on generic, sector-level assumptions regarding cleaner technologies was insufficient. Preventive safeguards, it observed, cannot be relaxed on the assumption that mitigation will suffice later, as where credible risk coexists with scientific uncertainty, the precautionary principle mandates regulatory caution. Highlighting that regulatory frameworks must err on the side of protection where there is a plausible risk of harm, the Court said that a sector-level pollution index cannot override constitutional obligations under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
A Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed, “In the present case, the revised categorisation prioritises sectoral differentiation over preventive protection, without adequately addressing exposure risks in sensitive contexts. This Court does not interfere with classification merely because it concerns industrial activity. The present intervention is warranted because the impugned actions have the effect of lowering the constitutional minimum of protection guaranteed to affected communities. Where regulatory action compromises fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, judicial review becomes a constitutional necessity rather than an intrusion into policy”.
“It must be noted that cement grinding units, even without CPP, involve extensive handling and processing of powdered material, which inherently gives rise to particulate emissions and fugitive dust. These emissions have direct public health implications, particularly where units are located near residential areas and schools. The revised categorisation does not demonstrate, on objective and publicly disclosed material, that such exposure risks have diminished to an extent that warrants dilution of the precautionary standards earlier applied. The reliance on adoption of cleaner fuels and technologies is equally unpersuasive. The revised framework proceeds on generic, sector-level assumptions rather than on demonstrated, site specific performance. Preventive environmental regulation does not permit safeguards to be relaxed on the assumption that mitigation will suffice at a later stage. Where the risk to life and health is foreseeable, safeguards must operate at the threshold”, the bench further observed.
Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi, Parthiv Goswami appeared for the appellant and Senior Advocates Harin P Raval, Ruchi Kohli, Rakesh Dwivedi, Anand Chibber appeared for the respondent.
In the matter, the bench was examining the validity of Notifications GSR 84(E) dated 29-01-2025 and GSR 85(E) dated 30-01-2025, by which stand-alone cement grinding units without CPP were shifted from the “Red” category, denoting highly polluting industries, to the comparatively less stringent “Orange” category.
The CPCB had justified the reclassification on the ground that grinding units, in the absence of clinker manufacturing and captive power generation, posed a lower pollution potential than integrated cement plants.
The petitioners contended that the reclassification materially relaxed minimum siting distances, thereby permitting such units to operate closer to habitations despite known particulate emissions and fugitive dust risks.
The High Court had upheld the validity of the CPCB’s revised categorisation and the consequential notifications, holding that industrial classification based on the Pollution Index methodology fell within the domain of expert regulatory bodies and did not warrant judicial interference in the absence of manifest arbitrariness.
In appeal, noting that grinding units inherently involve extensive handling of powdered materials generating particulate emissions, the Bench found no objective, publicly disclosed material demonstrating that exposure risks had materially reduced.
The Court clarified that while expert bodies such as the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) may rely on Pollution Index methodologies for consent management and inspection frequency, such classification cannot justify relaxation of siting norms that protect residential areas and sensitive receptors like schools. The right to a clean and healthy environment, the Court reiterated, forms part of the right to life, and any regulatory dilution must bear a rational and scientifically substantiated nexus to public safety.
“If regulatory dilution of the kind impugned in the present case were to be accepted, it would mark a fundamental shift in environmental governance. Sector-level reclassification, divorced from exposure realities and local sensitivities, would become a ready instrument to justify siting of polluting activities in close proximity to habitations, schools, and other sensitive receptors. Such an approach would not remain confined to the present case. It would operate as a precedent, enabling progressive erosion of preventive safeguards across regions, with cumulative and irreversible consequences. The law does not permit environmental protection to be weakened incrementally until harm becomes inevitable”, the bench noted in the judgment.
Judicial intervention, the Bench observed, was warranted where regulatory action had the direct and foreseeable effect of exposing communities, including school-going children, to environmental harm.
“We believe that the doctrine of sustainable development is not a slogan of compromise but a principle of prioritisation. It requires that when developmental activity poses a credible risk to human health or environmental safety, regulatory frameworks must err on the side of protection. The Constitution does not permit a trade-off where civilian life and health are exposed to foreseeable harm on the assumption that economic benefit or industrial facilitation justifies such exposure. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India do not tolerate a regulatory calculus that treats environmental safety as negotiable”, the bench further observed.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned reclassification insofar as it diluted preventive siting safeguards applicable to stand-alone cement grinding units without CPP, restoring the earlier protective framework.
Cause Title: Harbinder Singh Sekhon & Ors. v. The State Of Punjab & Ors. [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 159]
Appearances:
Appellants: Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Parthiv Goswami, Sr. Adv., Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, AOR, Diksha Rai, Abhishek Tripathi, Amit, Vani Vyas, Keshav Seghal, Ravi Chandra Prakash, Advocates.
Respondents: Harin P Raval, Sr. Adv., Rajat Bhardwaj, A.A.G., Siddhant Sharma, AOR, Shreya Bansal, Adv., Shrestha Narayan, Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv, Apoorv Shukla, AOR, Ishita Farsaiya, Prabhleen A. Shukla, Ayush Acharjee, Anand Chibber, Sr. Adv. (VC), Apoorv Shukla, AOR, Ateevraj Sandhu, Aishwariya Bhati, A.S.G., Ruchi Kohli, Sr. Adv., Shradha Deshmukh, Rajeshwari Shankar, Sherya Jain, Riddhi Jad, Anuradha, Gurmeet Singh Makker, AOR, Sriram P., AOR, Richa Kapoor, AOR, Udipti Chopra, Aditi Rathore, Sudeep Kumar, AOR, Gaurav Dhama, Sushre Sirpa Sahu, Sumit Gaur, Advocates.
Click here to read/download the Judgment

