Supreme Court: No Relief Can Be Granted On A Case Not Founded In Pleadings; Can’t Entertain Entirely New Case At Appellate Stage

The Supreme Court reiterated that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings and it cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage.

The Court reiterated thus in a batch of Civil Appeals preferred against the common Judgment of the Bombay High Court in an issue pertaining to the recission of land grants relating to properties situated in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

The three-Judge Bench comprising Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta, and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed, “… we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties.”

The Bench added that this rule has been consistently affirmed across time and is rooted in the very purpose of pleadings namely, to define the scope of the dispute and enable the Court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Senior Advocates Aryama Sundaram, Gopal Subramaniam, and Advocate Shivaji Jadhav appeared for the Appellants while Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta and Additional Solicitor General of India Aishwarya Bhati appeared for the Respondents.

Brief Facts

In this case, the subject properties were parcels of land originally vested in the erstwhile Portuguese Government and were granted to the Appellants’ predecessors-in title between 1923 and 1930, subject to certain conditions for agricultural cultivation. These grants were subsequently rescinded by the Collector, Dadra and Nagar Haveli vide an Order, thereby setting in motion a protracted legal wrangle between the State and the Appellants that spanned several decades. The said issue arose in several Second Appeals before the High Court. The Appellants’ land rights were conferred under the erstwhile Portuguese legal regime.

Under Portuguese law, the contract of ‘emphyteusis’ involved the transfer of beneficial ownership (possessory rights) by the owner of a property to another individual, subject to the latter’s obligation to pay an annual sum referred to as the ‘emphyteutic’ pension or canon to the former. The Appellants were the descendants of original ‘Alvara’ holders who had been granted land by the erstwhile Portuguese Government. The High Court allowed Second Appeals of the Respondents, holding that mere inordinate delay does not give rise to an inference of ‘implied consent’ or ‘acquiescence’, and that such a plea could not have been entertained for the first time at the appellate stage. Being aggrieved, the Appellants approached the Apex Court.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, said, “Pleadings, together with the issues framed thereon, serve to crystallise the points of conflict, ensure that each side is apprised of the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair opportunity to lead evidence and advance submissions. To allow a party to depart from this framework at a belated stage would not only prejudice the opposite side but also undermine the principles of predictability and consistency that the adjudicatory process seeks to avow.”

The Court enunciated that in exceptional circumstances contemplated under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), an Appellate Court may permit the production of additional evidence such as where the Trial Court has wrongly refused to admit evidence, or where, despite the exercise of due diligence, the party concerned was genuinely unaware of the existence of such evidence and therefore could not produce it earlier.

“In the present case, however, no such impediment or hindrance is discernible which would justify permitting the Appellants to raise fresh pleas or grounds at this belated stage. Having regard to the prolonged history of these proceedings, it is inconceivable that any circumstance beyond the Appellants’ control could have prevented them from advancing these submissions or from leading evidence in support thereof before the courts below. The Appellants, in their application seeking to incorporate these additional grounds, have also failed to make out a case to entertain such a plea at this belated stage. Further, there is nothing on record to suggest that the Appellants had in fact produced this before the courts below, and the same was not allowed to be admitted”, it remarked.

The Court was of the view that a situation cannot arise where, after such an extended passage of time, the Appellants beckon to return to the drawing board, reappraise evidence long since concluded, and attempt, in effect, to put the proverbial genie back into the bottle.

“Courts ought to curb such fishing/roving inquiries on the mere asking of a party. … After all, the law assists only the wakeful and not those who sleep on their rights: vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”, it added.

The Court noted that the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (a specific law overrides a general law) becomes immediately applicable, namely where a special enactment has been framed to deal with a defined subject matter, its provisions must prevail over those of the general law to the extent of any overlap.

Section 100 of CPC (Second Appeal)

The Court further elucidated, “… as a general rule, the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, would not be justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in a civil suit. Such interference is permissible, however, in the exceptional circumstances carved out in Hero Vinoth (supra), including where the findings on material aspects suffer from perversity, are founded on no evidence, or are vitiated by reliance on considerations wholly irrelevant to the matter in issue.”

The Court observed that the course adopted by the High Court, viewed against the reasons recorded in the impugned Judgment, cannot be questioned in this case, and consequently, the contention of the Appellants on this score is devoid of merit.

Doctrine of Waiver

The Court also noted that the term waiver connotes the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known legal right or advantage, and necessarily presupposes full knowledge of such right by the person waiving it.

“The doctrine of waiver, firmly rooted in the principles of contract law, operates to enable parties to a transaction to abandon rights that inhere in them. However, this doctrine is not without bounds. It is well settled in Indian jurisprudence that waiver cannot be invoked so as to efface statutory obligations or to defeat matters grounded in public policy”, it reiterated.

The Court said that the High Court is correct in holding that the inference drawn by the First Appellate Court pertaining to long inaction by the authorities amounting to abandonment of the right is untenable in law.

“Acquiescence cannot be presumed solely on the basis of delay, and no such conclusion can be sustained without clear and unequivocal conduct amounting to voluntary relinquishment”, it enunciated.

Hence, the Court remarked that the assertions advanced by the Appellants on the grounds of waiver and acquiescence stand devoid of merit and are accordingly liable to fall.

“… the decision of the Overseas Council of Lisbon cannot serve as a sheet anchor to advance the plea of waiver or postulate that recission could only be carried out within seven years from the date of grant. Given its own findings, its ratio does not bind the Indian Courts, nor is it directly applicable to the facts of the instant case. In any event, such decisions carry mere persuasive value only. The plea founded on the concept of reasonable time is therefore also rejected”, it said.

Moreover, the Court noted that Doctrine of Repeal and Savings of a Statute, within the confines of Indian jurisprudence, is primarily governed by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

“The settled principle in this regard is that the effect of repeal is to efface the repealed law altogether, as if it had never existed, save for the limited purpose of preserving actions that were initiated, prosecuted, and concluded while the law was in force. At the same time, it is equally well settled that repeal does not imply that the deleted provisions never existed to begin with, so as to preclude the continuance of proceedings that had already been instituted under the repealed statute”, it reiterated.

Conclusion

The Court observed that the governing law for determining the nature and extent of the rights in the lands granted to the Appellants is the OA, and the inquiry must be confined to its provisions.

“The High Court’s reversal of the concurrent findings of the courts below does not transgress the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. … The Appellants’ pleas of waiver, acquiescence, delay, impossibility, and condonation have no legal or factual basis, and none of these principles render the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974 unsustainable”, it held.

The Court added that the Collector’s Order was not tainted by mala fides and cannot be construed as having been passed with the intent to disentitle the Appellants from the statutory benefits under the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation.

“… we hold that the findings of the High Court in the Impugned Judgment suffer from no infirmity, legal or factual, warranting interference under our appellate jurisdiction”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the Apex Court dismissed the Appeals.

Cause Title- Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar and Others v. Union of India and Others (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1145)

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