Statutory Prescription Concerning Punishment For Minimum Period, Unless Challenged, Can’t Be Reduced Under Article 142 Of Constitution: Supreme Court
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the order of the Bombay High Court upholding the order of conviction imposed upon the accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Justice Dipankar Datta & Justice Manmohan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that the statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the order of the Bombay High Court upholding the order of conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The punishment of R.I. of two years and a fine of Rs 2,000 for the offence under Section 7, and R.I. of a year and a fine of Rs 1,000 under Section 13 had been imposed on the appellant
On the issue of alteration of sentence, the Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan said, “Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.”
Arguments
The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the incident being more than 25 years old and the appellant, by passage of time having become a septuagenarian, the Court may consider altering the sentence, if it were not inclined to disturb the conviction, so that the appellant was not made to suffer any imprisonment. Reliance was placed by the appellant on the judgment in H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka (2017).
Reasoning
The Bench noted that although a proved offence under Section 7 of the PC Act (as it stood on the date of the offence committed by the appellant) carried a minimum punishment of six months and maximum of seven years imprisonment, with fine, and a proved offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, at the time of commission of offence by the appellant, carried a minimum sentence of a year and a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment, with fine, the appellant was not sentenced to the maximum terms of punishment but R.I. for two years’ for each count of offence, to run concurrently. The Bench also observed that the statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
However, mentioning that the offences under the PC Act stand on a completely different footing, the Bench said, “Obviously, no court, far less this Court, ought to tolerate corruption by public servants while discharging official duty attracting provisions of the PC Act. In exceptional cases, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, a court may, in judicious exercise of discretion and for reasons to be recorded, alter the sentence to serve justice for both the society and the offender. However, to reduce the sentence to a term of imprisonment which is not provided in the statute and below the minimum period, as prescribed, could be seen as usurpation of the function of the legislature by this Court.”
The Bench expressed its inability follow H.P. Venkatesh (supra) as this was not a rare or extraordinary case where justice called for being tempered with mercy. The Apex Court took note of the statutory provisions contained in the PC Act, relating to prison terms that could be imposed by way of sentence at the time the appellant indulged in committing the offences.
Thus, the Bench affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), PC Act. However, having regard to the date of the incident of offence, the advanced age of the appellant, the mental anxiety and continued stress that he must have experienced all these years induced by the pendency of proceedings, the Bench held that imposition of sentence of prison term for the minimum period would serve the interests of justice.
The Apex Court partly allowed the appeal and ordered, “Accordingly, we alter the sentence of 2 years R. I. for the offence under Section 7 to a term of S.I. for a year without, however, altering the sentence of imprisonment ordered for the offence under Section 13(1)(d). Both sentences shall run concurrently.”
Cause Title: Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 654)
