Second Application U/S 28A Land Acquisition Act Maintainable On Basis Of Appellate Award; Prior Re-Determination No Bar: Supreme Court
The Apex Court held that the doctrine of merger and the beneficial object of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act require that similarly placed landowners be granted parity in compensation, even based on appellate court awards.
Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice N. Kotishwar Singh , Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court has held that a second application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is maintainable where re-determination of compensation is sought based on an award passed by an appellate court.
The Court was hearing civil appeals filed by landowners challenging the rejection of their second application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, which had been dismissed by the authorities and upheld by the High Court.
A Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed: “… a second application made under Section 28-A of the Act after the award passed by the High Court is maintainable and entitled to be considered by the Collector/LAO. We are of the view that, entertaining an earlier application filed under Section 28-A of the Act on the basis of the award of the Reference Court followed by the receipt of money, shall not act as a bar for the same applicant to seek further re-determination of compensation on the basis of the award passed by the High Court or this Court”.
Background
The dispute arose from the acquisition of lands for the construction of a railway line, where compensation was initially fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer at ₹40,000 per acre.
Certain landowners sought reference under Section 18 of the Act, resulting in enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court to ₹2,00,000 per acre.
The appellants, who had not sought reference, invoked Section 28-A and secured re-determination of compensation based on the Reference Court award. However, subsequently, the High Court further enhanced compensation to ₹3,50,000 per acre in appeals filed by other landowners.
Upon becoming aware of this enhancement, the appellants filed a second application under Section 28-A seeking parity with the High Court award. This application was rejected by the Collector on the ground that the appellants had already availed re-determination earlier.
While the Single Judge allowed the appellants’ plea, the Division Bench reversed it, holding that Section 28-A applies only to awards of the Reference Court and not appellate courts. This led to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observation
The Court began by emphasising that the Land Acquisition Act is both expropriatory and beneficial in nature, and Section 28-A was introduced specifically to address inequality in compensation among similarly situated landowners.
The Court observed that “Section 28-A has been inserted into the Act… to give equal compensation to all the similarly placed landowners, and that procedural technicalities will have to be avoided for the same.”
The Court stressed that the interpretation of such a provision must advance its object rather than restrict it.
Rejecting the interpretation adopted by the High Court that re-determination under Section 28-A is confined only to awards passed by the Reference Court (Court of original jurisdiction) and does not extend to appellate court judgments, the Court held that the expression “Court” in Section 28-A cannot be so narrowly construed.
It observed that “… the term ‘Court’ used in Section 28-A would include under its ambit the High Court and this Court as well. Any interpretation to the contrary would militate against the very objective of the Act, making Section 28-A of the Act redundant.”
The Court further clarified that an appellate court award is a continuation of the original proceedings and therefore cannot be excluded from the scope of re-determination.
The Court placed significant reliance on the doctrine of merger to hold that once an appellate court passes an award, the earlier award merges into it.
It observed that “once an Appellate Court renders a decision… the earlier decree or order passed by the forum below ceases to exist, on becoming subsumed or merged with the one passed by the appellate forum.”
Thus, the operative award for purposes of Section 28-A, the Court held, is the final award as determined by the appellate forum.
Addressing the issue of maintainability, the Court categorically held that the filing of an earlier application does not bar a subsequent application based on a later appellate award.
It held that entertaining an earlier application filed under Section 28-A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court, followed by the receipt of money, shall not act as a bar for the same applicant to seek further re-determination of compensation based on the award passed by the High Court or this Court.
The Court clarified that the principle limiting applicants to “one application” applies only in cases involving multiple awards of the Reference Court, and not where a subsequent appellate award is involved.
The Court declined to follow the view taken in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat (2018), holding that it was rendered without considering earlier binding precedent and key legal principles.
It observed: “The aforesaid decision… has been rendered without taking note of the one rendered earlier… and thus… cannot be termed as a binding precedent.”
Instead, the Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995), emphasising a liberal and purposive interpretation of Section 28-A.
The Court underscored that the core objective of Section 28-A is to ensure parity in compensation among similarly placed landowners, holding that “ultimately, the object of Section 28-A of the Act is to maintain parity and equality between the similarly placed landowners in the payment of compensation.”
It further clarified that principles such as estoppel, waiver, or acquiescence cannot be used to defeat statutory entitlement under Section 28-A.
The Court found that the authorities erred in deciding the first application without awaiting the outcome of pending appeals. It was observed that such action was contrary to settled law requiring the Collector to await final adjudication before re-determination.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the order of rejection passed by the Collector. It directed the respondents to re-determine the compensation payable to the appellants based on the enhanced award passed by the High Court, within eight weeks.
Cause Title: Andanayya & Ors. v. Deputy Chief Engineer & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 293)
