Relevant Date For Computation Of Limitation Period U/S. 468 CrPC Is Date Of Filing Of Complaint Or Institution Of Prosecution: Supreme Court
The Appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the impugned judgment whereby the order discharging the Appellant for the offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was set aside.
Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Supreme Court
While quashing a case of matrimonial cruelty, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the relevant date for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.
The Appeal before the Apex Court challenged the impugned judgment passed by the Delhi High Court whereby the Order passed by the Sessions Court discharging the Appellant for the offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was set aside.
The Division Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma said, “It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC.”
AOR Yusuf represented the Appellant while ASG Vikramjeet Banerjee represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
A complaint was filed by the Complainant, wife/Respondent, culminating in the FIR against the Appellant husband and her in-laws for commission of offences under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC. It was alleged in the FIR that the marriage was solemnized in 1998, and at the time, both parties were serving as Sub-Inspectors with the Delhi Police. It was alleged that the Appellant-husband and her mother-in-law had beaten up the Complainant with fists, blows for not fulfilling their needs. It was the complainant’s case that the Appellant did not bother to visit her own daughter, assaulted the Complainant-wife during the advanced stage of pregnancy and did not incur any expenditure towards the birth of the child. Thereafter, a chargesheet came to be filed and the Magistrate framed charges under section 498A read with Section 34 IPC and dropped the charge under section 406 IPC.
The Sessions Court, within its powers of revision, discharged the Appellant, his mother and her five sisters for the offences under section 498A & 34 IPC. It was observed that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of a time-barred case, as the cognizance was taken in 2004 of the alleged incidents of cruelty pertaining to the year 1999. The High Court allowed the complainant’s Petition and set aside the aforesaid Order. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Apex Court.
Reasoning
The Bench found the evidence on record to be inconsistent with the accusations and the version of the Complainant to be implausible and unreliable. “Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC…”, it said.
The Bench also found no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family, and the investigative agencies in their own prudence had not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.
On the issue of limitation, the Bench held that the complaint was not time-barred and was filed within the ascribed period of three years from the date of the commission of the offence. There was no material change from the first Complaint made in 1999 and the final Complaint made in the year 2002, and it couldn’t be construed that the same was not within the time frame of limitation simply because cognizance was taken by the Magistrate two years later.
The Bench was of the view that the observations made by the High Court in respect of computation of the limitation period was the correct appreciation of facts, and it was right in holding that “considering the date of commission of offence as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a period of two years and ten months from the date of commission of alleged offence, which is within. the period of limitation of three years as per Section 468 of CrPC.”
The Bench thus held, “Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint or the issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offence under section 498A and the question of applicability or exercise of powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not be delved into at this stage.”
Thus, allowing the appeals, the Apex Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and quashed the impugned FIR as well as the Chargesheet.
Cause Title: ABC v. State (Govt. Of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 803)
Appearance
Appellant: AOR Yusuf
Respondent: ASG Vikramjeet Banerjee, AOR Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advocates Anita Sahani, Vanshaja Shukla, B K Satija, Kamlendra Mishra, Udai Khanna, Siddharth Sinha, Tathagat Sharma, Raman Yadav, Sunanda Shukla, AOR Jasmeet Singh, Advocates Saif Ali, Pushpendra Singh Bhadoriya, Vijay Sharma, Pranav Menon, Saurav
