The Rajasthan High Court has held that a judicial order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority cannot be quashed and set aside by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its administrative powers under Section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The High Court also affirmed that the power of the Board under Section 221 is not akin to the power of the High Court, as provided under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The writ petition was preferred against the impugned judgment passed by the Board of Revenue by which the application filed by one Sughad Singh (husband and father of the respondent 1,2 & 3 respectively) under Section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 against the judgment passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA), had been quashed and set aside.

The Single Bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand said, “In the instant case also, by exercising the powers contained under Section 221 of the Act of 1955, a judicial order dated 26.07.1978 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority has been quashed and set-aside by the Board in exercise of its administrative powers vide order dated 20.04.2001 and the same could not have been done in the light of the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Surendra Singh (supra).

Advocate Sanjay Mehrishi represented the Petitioner while GC Neeraj Batra represented the Respondents.

Factual Background

The Petitioner in this case was claiming to be the khatedar of the land in question. For the declaration of his khatedari right, he approached the Court of the Assistant Collector by filing a suit. However, the same was rejected. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner approached the RAA by way of filing an appeal and the same was allowed.

While quashing the aforesaid order passed by the Assistant Collector, the petitioner was declared as khatedar of the land in question, and the defendants-respondents as well as the State were restrained from interfering with the cultivation and khatedari of the petitioner.

Reasoning

The Bench noted that the Board has inherent powers to call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate revenue court and pass such orders as it thinks fit. These powers, which are in addition to the powers of appeal and revision, have been provided by Section 230 of the Act.

The Bench also explained that the object of Article 227 of the Constitution is to make the High Court responsible for the entire administration of justice in the State and to vest in the High Court, with a reserve of judicial and superintending power, which could be brought into play, at any time, by the High Court whenever it considers it necessary to draw upon the same. “The power of Board of Revenue under Section 221 of the Act of 1955 is not akin to the power of the High Court, as provided under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the scheme of the Act of 1955, there is a clear demarcation of the judicial and the administrative powers of the Board. While Section 230 of the Act of 1955 provides for the judicial power, Section 221 of the Act of 1955 confers only administrative power and in exercise of administrative power, no decree or judicial order could be set aside. ”, it said.

Reference was made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Devi Singh vs. Board of Revenue (1994) wherein it was also indicated that in the face of the provisions under Sections 222 to 229 of the Act of 1955, the power of general superintendence under Section 221 of the Act of 1955 could not be exercised.

The Bench also referred to the judgment in Surendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Kisturi & Ors. (2009) wherein it has been categorically held that the power of superintendence of the Board, contained under Section 221 of the Act is not akin to the power of the High Court, as provided under Article 227 of the Constitution. Such power of the Board is an administrative power over the subordinate revenue courts. By exercising the administrative power, the judicial order passed by any administrative authority cannot be quashed.

Thus, allowing the writ petition, the Bench set aside the impugned order passed by the Board.

Cause Title: Mordhawaj v. Ramwati w/o Sughadsingh & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:RJ-JP:20425)

Appearance:

Petitioner: Advocates Sanjay Mehrishi, Rakesh Saini, R. M. Sharma

Respondent: GC Neeraj Batra, Advocates Gunjan Chawla, Priyamvada Singh, Mukesh Kumar, Ram Singh Bhati

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Tulip Kanth

Assistant Editor

Tulip Kanth is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum having over 5 years of experience in the field of legal journalism and editing. She extensively covers judgments of the Supreme Court, High Courts as well as Tribunals. She has previously worked with a legal publishing website where she oversaw the work of other editors and has also created updates on notifications of different Government Ministries. She holds an English Honours Degree from SGTB Khalsa College, Delhi University and has completed her LLB course with specialisation in Corporate Law from Amity University.