Personal Criticism Of Presiding Officer Without Impact On Administration Of Justice Not Contempt: Rajasthan High Court

The Court was hearing a criminal contempt reference arising out of statements made by certain police officials during an official inquiry concerning allegations relating to an investigation in a criminal case.

A Division Bench of Justice Farjand Ali and Justice Yogendra Kumar Purohit observed: “The law of criminal contempt is not meant to protect the personal prestige or ego of the Presiding Officer as an individual. Personal criticism or allegations directed against an individual Presiding Officer, without any tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or to scandalise the institution of the Court, would not ordinarily fall within the ambit of criminal contempt”.

Additional Advocate General Sajjan Singh Rathore appeared in the matter.

Background

The contempt proceedings originated from a reference made by a Presiding Officer of a subordinate court alleging that certain police officials had committed criminal contempt by making statements during an inquiry conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police.

The inquiry itself had been initiated pursuant to judicial directions requiring an investigation into alleged lapses by police officials. During the course of such inquiry, statements were recorded from the concerned officials explaining the circumstances and their version of events.

These statements contained certain grievances and allegations regarding the conduct of the Presiding Officer. Based on these statements, a reference was made seeking initiation of contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The central question before the High Court was whether statements made during such an official inquiry, expressing grievances against a Presiding Officer, could amount to criminal contempt.

Court’s Observation

The Court began by delineating the scope of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, emphasising that it is concerned with acts that scandalise the court, interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice.

It observed that “In the context of criminal contempt, the concern of law is not the personal feelings or reputation of the individual officer who happens to be presiding over the Bench. Rather, the law is intended to safeguard the dignity, authority, and orderly functioning of the Court as an institution.”

The Court clarified that contempt jurisdiction is exceptional and must be exercised with restraint, keeping in mind the balance between judicial dignity and freedom of expression.

The Court drew a clear distinction between criticism of an individual judicial officer and an attack on the institution of the judiciary, observing that “an individual may be criticised for his conduct, but that cannot automatically be equated with criticism of the Court or its judgments. The judiciary derives its strength from public confidence. Such confidence is strengthened not by suppressing grievances but by ensuring that genuine complaints are examined in a fair and transparent manner.”

The Court emphasised that the legitimacy of the judiciary is reinforced through accountability and openness, not by suppressing dissent.

A key factor considered by the Court was the context in which the statements were made. It noted that the statements “were not made in a public forum, not in any publication, and not with any intention to scandalise the institution of the judiciary, but rather in response to questions posed by a superior officer during the course of an official inquiry ordered by the Presiding Officer.”

The Court found that the statements were confined to the inquiry process and were not disseminated publicly, thereby lacking the essential element of publication required for criminal contempt.

Recognising the right of individuals to articulate grievances through appropriate channels, the Court held that individuals cannot be expected to remain silent if they perceive improper conduct.

“The statements do not appear to contain any criticism of a judicial order, nor do they cast aspersions upon the majesty of the court or the judicial institution. A person who has faced humiliation or perceives that he has been subjected to improper behaviour cannot be expected to remain silent. The law does not impose a gag order upon truthfully narrating facts, particularly when such narration is made before a competent authority conducting an inquiry”, the Bench remarked.

The Court referred to Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which protects complaints made in good faith against presiding officers of subordinate courts. It held that treating such complaints as contempt would defeat the very purpose of institutional accountability mechanisms.

The Bench further added that “If the mere act of submitting a complaint regarding the conduct of a Presiding Officer were to be treated as criminal contempt, the entire vigilance mechanism would become redundant and ineffective. Such an interpretation would have the chilling effect of discouraging individuals from raising genuine grievances and would ultimately undermine the principles of fairness, transparency, and institutional accountability.”

The Court found that the statements in question did not interfere with judicial proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice. it noted that the statements were explanatory in nature, made during an inquiry, and did not challenge any judicial order or authority of the court.

Reinforcing the limits of contempt jurisdiction, the Court concluded that “criminal contempt jurisdiction is not intended to silence grievances or shield judicial officers from criticism, unless such criticism transgresses into deliberate vilification or an attack on the institution of justice itself.”

The Court emphasised that criticism, when made in good faith and through proper channels, is an integral part of a transparent justice system.

Conclusion

The High Court held that the statements made by the police officials during the course of an official inquiry did not satisfy the ingredients of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It found that the statements were neither published nor intended to scandalise the court, nor did they interfere with the administration of justice. Accordingly, the contempt reference was dismissed.

Cause Title: In Re, Bhilwara (Raj.) (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB)

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