The Patna High Court dismissed a revision petition filed by a complainant challenging a Magistrate’s order that declined to summon certain accused in a complaint case, holding that such an order is interlocutory in nature and therefore not amenable to revision under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court was hearing a criminal revision petition filed against an order of the Judicial Magistrate, who had taken cognisance of the offence only against one accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, despite the complaint alleging offences against twenty-three accused persons under multiple provisions.

A Bench comprising Justice Jitendra Kumar, while dismissing the petition, observed that “if the test as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court as discussed above is applied, the impugned order is interlocutory and not intermediate one for the complainant. Hence, the revision petition filed by him is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.PC/438(2) B.N.S.S.”

The petitioner was represented by Advocate Indradeo Prasad, while APP Mithlesh Kumar Khare appeared for the State.

Background

The petitioner had filed a complaint alleging several offences, including criminal conspiracy, house trespass, and assault, against twenty-three persons. Upon inquiry, the Magistrate took cognisance only against one of the accused, issuing summons for offences under Sections 323 and 506/34 of the IPC.

Challenging the order, the petitioner approached the Patna High Court seeking inclusion of the remaining accused and additional charges. The State, however, raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision petition, arguing that under Section 397(2) CrPC, no revision lies against an interlocutory order.

Court’s Observation

The Patna High Court referred extensively to a series of Supreme Court precedents to clarify the distinction between interlocutory, intermediate, and final orders.

Citing Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977), the Court reiterated that “the term ‘interlocutory order’ in Section 397(2) of the Code denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties.”

Referring to Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977), it noted that “an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order.”

The Court further relied on V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (1980), observing that an interlocutory order is to be understood in contrast with a final order and that an intermediate order is one passed between the initiation of proceedings and final judgment.

In K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat (2000), it was laid down that if the objections raised by a party, if upheld, would culminate the entire proceedings, then the order in question cannot be regarded as interlocutory.

The Bench also cited Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI (2017) and Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. (2001), wherein it was held that revision jurisdiction can be invoked not only against final orders but also against intermediate ones.

The Court summarised its position, stating that “it clearly emerges that all orders other than the final orders are not interlocutory ones. Some of them are intermediate or quasi final orders. The intermediate order is one which is passed at intermediate stage, but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.”

In the present case, the Bench noted that since the complainant’s plea, even if allowed, would not terminate the proceedings but merely add more accused persons and charges, the order in question would remain interlocutory for the complainant. “The order may be intermediate for the accused but interlocutory for the complainant/informant/State. The case at hand is one of such situations,” the Court concluded.

Conclusion

Holding that the revision petition was not maintainable under Section 397(2) CrPC, the Court dismissed it as misconceived. However, it clarified that the complainant may pursue appropriate remedies under Section 482 CrPC or seek the summoning of additional accused at a later stage of the trial under Section 319 CrPC.

Cause Title: Laxmi Devi @ Suman Devi v. Laukariya & Others

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocate Indradeo Prasad

Respondents: APP Mithlesh Kumar Khare

Click here to read/download Judgment