Contempt Of Courts Act Is A Reasonable Restriction On Free Speech; Does Not Violate Articles 19 Or 20(3): Kerala High Court

The High Court reiterated that the law of contempt is a reasonable restriction on free speech and is essential to safeguard the administration of justice.

The Court was hearing a writ petition seeking declarations that the Sections 2(c)(i), 14, 16 and 17(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, were unconstitutional, void, and liable to be struck down.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Nitin Jamdar and Justice S. Manu, while dismissing the writ petition in its entirety, held: “Article 19(2) makes it clear that nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”.

Thus, the Bench observed that “the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India is subject to reasonable restrictions in relation to the contempt of court”.

Background

The petitioner, appearing in person, challenged the constitutional validity of provisions dealing with criminal contempt, procedure for taking cognizance, and the liability of judges under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The principal challenge was directed against Section 2(c)(i), which defines criminal contempt to include acts that scandalise or tend to scandalise the authority of courts.

It was contended that the said provision, along with Sections 14, 16 and 17(5), violated the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner further argued that Section 17(5), which enables a contemner to file an affidavit in defence, violated the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3).

The petitioner also sought a declaration that Section 16 of the Act applies to judges of superior courts, and that contempt proceedings offend the principle that no person can be a judge in his own cause.

The Union of India, the State of Kerala, the Bar Council of India, the Kerala High Court Advocates’ Association, and other respondents opposed the petition and defended the constitutional validity of the statute.

Court’s Observation

The High Court first examined the challenge under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. It noted that while the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, Article 19(2) expressly permits reasonable restrictions in relation to contempt of court. The Court observed that the constitutional scheme itself recognises contempt of court as a permissible ground for restricting speech.

Referring to binding precedents of the Supreme Court, including E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar and Arundhati Roy, In Re, the Bench reaffirmed that the constitutional validity of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, had long been settled and that the law of contempt has consistently been held to be a reasonable restriction on free speech.

The Court noted that the Act itself contains multiple safeguards and exceptions. It referred to Sections 3 to 8 of the Act, which exclude innocent publication, fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings, fair criticism of judicial acts, and other specified categories from the scope of contempt. These provisions, the Court held, demonstrate that the Act does not impose an absolute or arbitrary restraint on speech.

"The spirit underlying Article 19(1)(a) must have due play, but the provisions of the second clause of Article 19 cannot be overlooked, as while it is intended that there should be freedom of speech and expression, it is also intended that in the exercise of the right, contempt of court shall not be committed", the Bench reiterated.

Turning to the challenge under Article 20(3), the Court examined Section 17(5) of the Act, which permits a person charged with contempt to file an affidavit in support of his defence. The Bench held that the provision is enabling and not mandatory, and merely provides an opportunity to the alleged contemner to place material in defence.

The Court observed that proceedings for contempt are quasi-criminal and sui generis, and that a contemner is not an “accused of an offence” within the meaning of Article 20(3). Relying on the Supreme Court decision in J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan and a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, the Court held that filing an affidavit under Section 17(5) does not amount to compelled self-incrimination.

The Bench rejected the contention that contempt proceedings violate the principle that no person can be a judge in his own cause. It held that contempt jurisdiction is exercised not to protect individual judges, but to preserve the authority of courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. The power, the Court noted, is institutional in character and essential to the rule of law.

On the issue of the applicability of Section 16 of the Act to judges of superior courts, the Court held that the provision does not apply to judges of the High Courts or the Supreme Court. Relying on decisions of the Patna High Court and the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, the Bench held that judges of superior courts enjoy constitutional protection and immunity, and that Section 16 applies only to judges of subordinate courts.

Conclusion

The Kerala High Court held that none of the grounds raised by the petitioner warranted interference. It upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 2(c)(i), 14, 16 and 17(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, holding that the law of contempt constitutes a reasonable restriction on freedom of speech, that contempt proceedings are sui generis in nature, and that procedural provisions under the Act do not violate the protection against self-incrimination.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

Cause Title: Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Union of India & Others (Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:97826)

Appearances

Petitioner: Mathews J. Nedumpara, Advocate (Party-in-Person)

Respondents: S. Biju, Senior Panel Counsel for the Union of India, Dr K. P. Pradeep, Advocate for the Kerala High Court Advocates’ Association, B. Vinitha, Senior Government Pleader for the State of Kerala, Rajit, Standing Counsel for the Bar Council of India

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