Exclusion Of Court’s Jurisdiction In Dispute Due To Limitation Imposed By Statute Can Be Raised At Any Stage Of Proceedings: Karnataka HC
The Karnataka High Court observed that an exclusion of jurisdiction of a Court in a dispute due to limitation imposed by a statute can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence have no application in the same.
The Court observed thus in a batch of various Appeals challenging the Judgment of the Additional Civil Judge (Trial Court) by which it dismissed a Suit seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction.
A Single Bench of Justice M.G.S. Kamal held, “Exclusion of jurisdiction of a Court as to the `Subject Matter’ of the dispute by reason of limitation imposed by a statute can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence have no application.”
The Bench further clarified that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and even the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal is impliedly ousted and is vested with the Waqf Board so far as the subject matter pertaining to the appointment and removal of Mutawalli, which includes Sajjadanashin, is concerned.
Advocates Raghu Prasad B.S. and Syed Akmal Hasan represented the Appellants while Advocates S.A.H Razvi, M. Syed Roohulla, Subhash Srinivas Rangachar, and Swathi Ashok represented the Respondents.
Brief Facts -
A Suit was filed before the Trial Court by the Plaintiff seeking relief of declaration, declaring him to be the Sajjadanashin of Hazarat Akhil Shah Quadri Dargah, Channapattana (Suit Dargah) and for consequential relief of permanent injunction against the Defendants and the Karnataka State Board of Waqf in which the Plaintiff’s nephew got himself impleaded as Defendant No. 8 and while denying the case of the Plaintiff, he made a counter claim to declare him as Sajjadanashin of the Suit Dargah. Thereafter, another person got himself impleaded as Defendant No. 9, also claiming to have been appointed as Sajjadanashin of the Suit Dargah.
However, the Trial Court while dismissing the Plaintiff’s Suit, decreed the counter claim made by Defendant No. 8 with cost. Against such a dismissal of Suit, Plaintiff preferred a Regular Appeal and against the grant of counter claim in favour of the Defendant No. 8, he filed another Appeal. Similarly, Defendant No.3 filed an Appeal and the legal representatives of Defendant No. 9 filed Appeal on the file of Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Channapatna (First Appellate Court). The First Appellate Court by its common Judgment and Decree, dismissed the aforesaid Regular Appeals and consequently confirmed the aforesaid Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved by such Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court, the Plaintiff was before the High Court.
The High Court in view of the above facts, noted, “… objections that are required to be raised at the earliest opportunity are with respect to ‘territorial’ or ‘local jurisdiction’ and ‘pecuniary jurisdiction’ and not with regard to ‘jurisdiction over the subject matter’. In the instant case what needs to be seen is whether the objection to the jurisdiction raised by the appellants is with regard to ‘jurisdiction of the trial Court over the subject matter of the dispute’ or with respect to ‘territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction’ if it is with regard to the jurisdiction over the substantial matter same can be raised in the second appeal.”
The Court reiterated that a statute may expressly exclude the Jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of certain matters which otherwise are within its jurisdiction and an implied ouster may have to be inferred from the scheme of the statute where even without any express provision, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been excluded.
“Intention of legislature to vest exclusive powers of appointment as well as removal of mutawalli with Waqf Board is discernible. In that, it is the Waqf Board which is vested with the statutory powers to manage, supervise, control and administrate all affairs of Waqf institutions and their properties coming within its jurisdiction. The term “Waqf” as defined under section 3(r) of the Act 1995 means the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by Muslim Law as pious, religious, or charitable and includes waqfs, grants and properties mentioned thereunder. Invariably it includes Dargah and its properties as well. Status of Mutawalli qua the Waqf is akin to a Trustee. The Mutawalli is made directly answerable and accountable to the Waqf Board”, it explained.
The Court further said that, even if a person obtains as declaration with regard to his claim to the Office of Mutawalli or Sajjadanashin as the case may be from a Civil Court as an alternate forum, such declaration of his status cannot eternally bind either the Waqf institution in respect of which such declaration is obtained or the Waqf Board which is vested with powers and duties of supervision, control, management, and administration of Waqf institutions, inasmuch as the office of the Mutawalli or the Sajjadanashin is susceptible of periodical changes and alterations depending upon various factors as envisaged under Chapter VI of the Waqf Act, 1995.
“Thus the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and for that matter even the jurisdiction of the Waqf tribunal constituted under section 83 the Act 1995 is impliedly ousted by the statute as far as the `subject matter’ pertaining to the appointment and removal of Mutawalli, which includes Sajjadanashin, is concerned. Consequently reliance placed on by the learned counsel for defendant No.8 on the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chand (Supra) is of no avail”, it held.
The Court observed that the claim to the office of Sajjadanashin can neither be made as a matter of right, nor on the rule primogeniture and it is purely on the basis of merit, qualification, experience, recognition, adherence, and followings. It added that the qualifications are implicit under the scheme of the Act 1954 as well as Act 1995 and neither the Act, 1954 nor the Act, 1995 make any distinction between the term ‘Mutawalli’ and ‘Sajjadanashin’, which is because a person may hold both the Offices.
“Therefore the contentions of the learned counsel for defendant No.8 that the Act, 1994 does not provide for the appointment of Sajjadanashin and that therefore the same requires to be adjudicated by the civil court cannot be accepted”, it also said.
The Court was of the view that, there exists no circumstances or the requirement to have recourse to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to the facts of the case and thus, the repeal of the Act 1954 did not alter the position. Moreover, it remarked that it is not the case of taking away any vested right or creating any new right by the repealing Act to be made applicable prospectively and therefore, arguments advanced by counsel for Respondents to contend that the Act 1995 has no retrospective application cannot be countenanced.
“The office of Mutawalli is temporal in nature and office of Sajjadanashin is spiritual in nature. Both the offices can be held by a single person. Office of Sajjadanashin however carries with it higher and greater spiritual status and the qualification to hold and occupy the said office is implicit to nature of the office, as such Waqf Board being the Competent Authority is empowered to deal with the same”, it also noted.
The Court said that the provisions of the Act 1995 are applicable even to the pending proceedings concerning the dispute with regard to the appointment and removal of the Mutawalli and Sajjadanashin which were initiated under the repealed Act 1954 and the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court were therefore not justified in assuming the jurisdiction and deciding the matter pertaining to the Office of Sajjadanashin of Suit Dargah and same is required to be dealt with and adjudicated by the Karnataka State Board of Waqf.
“… the trial Court and First Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and adjudicate the dispute, the decree passed therefore is held as one without jurisdiction and a nullity”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Appeals and set aside the impugned Judgment.
Cause Title- Syed Adil Basha Quadri & Ors. v. Syed Azadullah & Ors.
