Breach Of Promise To Marry Not Cheating Unless Dishonest Intention At Inception Is Established: Karnataka High Court
The High Court held that a breach of a promise to marry, though morally questionable, does not by itself amount to cheating or rape in the criminal sense unless it is shown that the accused had a dishonest intention at the very inception of the relationship.
Justice M. Nagaprasanna, Karnataka High Court
The Karnataka High Court has held that mere breach of a promise to marry cannot, by itself, constitute an offence of cheating or rape unless it is established that the promise was false from the very beginning and was made with a dishonest intention to deceive.
The Court was hearing petitions seeking the quashing of an FIR and criminal proceedings registered on allegations of sexual offences on the pretext of marriage.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna, while allowing the petitions, observed that Section 318(2) of the BNS (Section 420 of IPC), “cannot be invoked merely because a relationship did not culminate in marriage”, while further stating that “the settle position of law is that, breach of a marriage to marry, howsoever morally questionable, is not per se cheating in the criminal sense, unless dishonest intention at the inception is established”.
Background
The complainant alleged that she had developed a relationship with the accused after coming into contact with him in connection with legal proceedings. It was alleged that the accused had promised to marry her and, on that assurance, established a physical relationship over a period of time.
It was further alleged that the accused later rescinded from the promise of marriage, ignored the complainant, and sought to marry someone else, leading to the registration of an FIR alleging sexual offences and cheating.
The accused, on the other hand, contended that the relationship was consensual, that there was no false promise at inception, and that the complainant was already married earlier and had a complex marital history. It was urged that the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
Court’s Observation
The High Court examined whether the allegations in the complaint/FIR, even if accepted in toto, disclosed the essential ingredients of the invoked offences to justify continuation of the criminal process, and reiterated the settled distinction between consensual intimacy and offences premised on “misconception of fact” arising from a promise to marry.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s exposition that a “false promise” must be shown to have been made in bad faith at the inception, with no intention of being honoured, and that such promise must have a direct nexus with the complainant’s decision to engage in the sexual act, the Court noted that a mere breach of promise or a relationship not culminating in marriage would not, by itself, attract criminal culpability.
On the facts as presented, the Court found the relationship and physical intimacy alleged to be consensual in nature, and held that the material did not prima facie disclose the requisite intention/knowledge necessary to attract the sexual-offence provisions invoked in the case.
The Court underscored that where the allegation of sexual intercourse is founded solely on a promise of marriage in circumstances that render such inducement legally unsustainable, the offence provisions pertaining to sexual assault/rape under the new penal regime (and their IPC equivalents) would not be attracted.
Addressing the cheating allegation as well, the Court underscored the “settled proposition” that breach of a marriage to marry, however morally questionable, is not per se cheating in the criminal sense, unless dishonest intention at the inception is established, and held that such dishonest intention was “conspicuously absent” on the case record.
In that view, the Court reasoned that the criminal law cannot be permitted to be invoked to give a consensual relationship a colour of criminality merely because the relationship did not fructify into marriage, absent the foundational ingredients of deception/false promise at the inception.
Invoking the inherent-powers framework under Section 482 CrPC, the Court reiterated that it may quash proceedings where continuation would amount to abuse of process or where no offence is disclosed even on a plain reading of the complaint and accompanying material.
Finally, on the question of interference at the FIR/registration stage, the Court noted that the parameters for quashing at the threshold are well-settled and include situations where, even on face value, the allegations do not constitute any offence or are so inherently improbable that no prudent person could proceed.
Conclusion
Concluding that continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law and would not serve the ends of justice, the Karnataka High Court allowed the petitions and quashed the FIR and criminal proceedings.
Cause Title: XXX v. State of Karnataka
Appearances
Petitioners: Advocate Abhishek Kumar
Respondents: Asma Kouser, Additional Special Public Prosecutor
