The Bombay High Court held that, under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (JJ Act), there is no necessity for the Accused to produce a birth certificate from their first school to establish their juvenility.

The Court allowed a Writ Petition challenging the order of the Trial Court that ordered the Accused to produce a birth certificate from the first school.

The Bench of Justice S. M. Modak observed, “If we see that it only talks about birth certificate from the school, it does not say about the first school”.

Advocate Saugata Hazra appeared for the Petitioner and Additional Public Prosecutor S.R. Agarkar appeared for the State.

The petitioner faced charges under sections 363, 376(A and B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). Arrested at the age of 17, the Petitioner sought the transfer of proceedings to a Juvenile Court through an application. However, the Trial Court instructed the petitioner to provide a birth certificate from the first school. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Petitioner approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition seeking relief against the Trial Court's order.

The Court noted the requirement of an inquiry under Rule 12(3) of Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 (JJ Rules), to determine the juvenile's age. While the rule mentions considering various documents, it specifically refers to a birth certificate from the school without specifying it must be from the first school.

It is true that as per Rule 12(3) of Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, an inquiry has to be conducted to determine the age of the Juvenile. There are various documents which can be considered in the alternative. It consists of matriculation certificate and in absence of the same, birth certificate”, the Bench added.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the Trial Court considered Rule 12(3) of the JJ Rules, which no longer exists as the JJ Act of 2015 and JJ Rules of 2016 have replaced them.

Additionally, the Bench noted that Section 9(2) of the JJ Act mandates an inquiry conducted by the court, and Section 94(2) of the JJ Act specifies a date of birth certificate from the school without specifying it must be from the second school.

Therefore, the Court deemed it necessary to remand the case back to the Trial Court for inquiry.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the Petition and set aside the impugned order.

Cause Title: Tohid Rehman Shaikh v The State of Maharashtra (2023:BHC-AS:39561-DB)

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