Refusing Wife To Accompany In-Laws To Temple Not Cruelty: Gujarat High Court Upholds Acquittal In 498A IPC & Dowry Death Case

The Gujarat High Court held that mere refusal to the wife to accompany the in-laws to a temple cannot be construed as cruelty under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

The Court held thus in a Criminal Appeal preferred by the State against the Judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ).

A Division Bench comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R.T. Vachhani observed, “The substance of the complaint and the dying declaration (Exh.68) itself reveals that on the fateful day the mother-in law and husband of the deceased were proceeding to Santram Mandir at Nadiad for darshan. The deceased insisted on accompanying them, but was not permitted. Hurt by this refusal, she consumed poisonous substance (Celphos). A mere refusal to allow the wife to accompany the in-laws to a temple cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as wilful conduct of such nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide within the meaning of the Explanation (a) to Section 498-A IPC, nor does it constitute harassment with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable security under clause (b) thereof.”

The Bench said that stray domestic quarrels and perfunctory abuses by husband or in laws are common in Indian society and crude and uncultered behaviour by the husband towards his wife being mundane would not form and constitute abetment unless these acts or conduct singly or cumulatively are found to be of such formidable and compelling nature as may lead to commission of suicide.

APP Maithili Mehta appeared for the Appellant, while Advocate Nitin M. Amin appeared for the Respondents.

Factual Background

The Complainant lodged a complaint stating that her daughter (deceased) was married to the Respondent on or about two years prior to the incident and out of the said wedlock, the deceased was blessed with a child. In 1999, at the matrimonial home, the deceased was allegedly subjected to physical and mental cruelty by the accused persons over a quarrel regarding feeding her minor daughter. As per the complaint, the Respondents-accused were giving constant torture and cruelty to the deceased on account of dowry demands.

It was alleged that the deceased, unable to bear the harassment, consumed Celphos poison leading to her death during treatment at the Civil Hospital. It was further alleged that the accused persons, knowing the unnatural death, failed to inform the police as required under Section 176 of IPC and buried the body without post-mortem examination to destroy evidence. Hence, an FIR was registered against the accused Respondents. The Trial Court acquitted them under Sections 498A, 306, 201, 176, 304B read with Section 114 of IPC. This was under challenge before the High Court.

Court’s Observations

The High Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, noted, “The cruelty therefore has to be understood in its ordinary sense of the matrimonial terms, yet general wear and tear of matrimonial life or vague allegations having no mentioning of specific incident of demand of dowry by the accused or hostile attitude of husband and/or his relatives cannot be termed as cruelty. Differences arising, momentarily between husband and wife also cannot be construed as cruelty or harassment. In order to establish and prove cruelty as stated in section 498A of the IPC, it must be in nature that it is arising from wilful conduct and it is intended to harm, harass or hurt the victim.”

The Court said that neither direct nor inferential evidence regarding cruelty appears or proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

“Abetment is mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, accused cannot be convicted under section 306 of IPC”, it added.

The Court further reiterated that cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence behold that in an acquittal appeal, even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Trial Court cannot be substituted by reversing the acquittal into the conviction unless finding of the Trial Court found to be perverse, or could to have been said contrary to the material on record or demonstrably wrong or unsustainable and manifestly erroneous.

“No evidence whatsoever has been brought on record to show that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry as required under Section 304-B IPC. The allegation of demand of additional dowry is conspicuously absent from the First Information Report (Exh.66) lodged by the mother of the deceased (PW-4, Pushpaben). This allegation surfaces for the first time during the evidence of the complainant and her other daughter (PW-7, Ilaben). Such subsequent embellishment and improvement renders the prosecution case on the question of dowry demand wholly unreliable”, it observed.

The Court elucidated that in the absence of proof of “dowry demand soon before death”, the mandatory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) cannot be drawn, and the offence under Section 304-B IPC is not established.

“The prosecution has utterly failed to prove cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. Apart from the solitary incident of refusal to take the deceased to the temple, no specific instance of physical or mental cruelty has been established through any independent or corroborative evidence. There is no evidence of recurring ill-treatment, beating, starvation or persistent harassment. The contradictions between the testimony of the mother (PW-4) and the sister (PW-7) on vital aspects of alleged dowry demand and the manner of harassment further erode the credibility of the prosecution case”, it also noted.

The Court was of the view that in the absence of proof of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC, the discretionary presumption of abetment of suicide under Section 113-A of the IEA cannot be pressed into service.

“Even otherwise, the material on record does not disclose any active instigation, intentional aiding or engagement in a conspiracy by any of the accused that directly led the deceased to commit suicide (Section 107 IPC). The act of the deceased in consuming poison appears to be a spontaneous reaction born out of her own sensitivity rather than any positive act of abetment on the part of the accused persons”, it remarked.

Conclusion

Moreover, the Court said that mere hurt feelings arising from a trivial domestic disagreement do not constitute abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC.

“The conduct of accused No.1 (husband) in immediately rushing the deceased to the hospital after she consumed poison clearly negatives any intention on his part to cause her death or to abet the extreme step. This act is wholly inconsistent with the theory of abetment”, it added.

The Court observed that there is no evidence to show that the accused caused disappearance of evidence with the specific intention of screening themselves from legal punishment knowing or having reason to believe that an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life had been committed.

“The charge under Section 176 read with Section 114 IPC also fails for want of proof that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that an enquiry under Chapter XII CrPC was likely or obligatory and yet intentionally omitted to give information to the nearest police station. … no case is made out by the appellant State warranting interference with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the Appeal and upheld the acquittal.

Cause Title- State of Gujarat v. Rajeshbhai Pitamerbhai Parmar & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:66323-DB)

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