Recognised School Cannot Claim Closure Without Prior Approval; Stoppage Of Functioning Not Closure In Law: Delhi High Court

The Court was dealing with a batch of petitions concerning service and salary dues of teaching and non-teaching staff, arising from the stoppage of functioning of a recognised school without the formal approval of closure by the Directorate of Education.

A Single Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula observed: “Rule 46 then states the matter in direct terms. No managing committee can close a recognised school, or even an existing class in such a school, without full justification and without prior approval of the Director, who must consult the Advisory Board before granting that approval. The insistence on prior approval is mandatory. It is the legal control through which the law protects students, staff, and the integrity of the regulatory framework. A recognised school is not permitted to decide for itself that it will stop functioning today and seek legal validation later, still less to claim that physical shutdown is enough”.

“The law, therefore, does not proceed on the footing that once a school becomes financially weak, the management may simply stop operating it and then invite the Court to accept the stoppage as closure. Financial weakness is itself one of the matters regulated by the statute”, the Bench added.

Advocates Dr Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva and Arindam Gupta appeared for the petitioners, while the respondents were represented by Yeeshu Jain (ASC for DoE) and others.

Background

The dispute arose from a recognised private school which had stopped its academic activities from a particular date, citing financial unviability and declining student strength. The management contended that it had applied for closure and had, in effect, ceased to operate the institution, having stopped admissions and discontinued classes.

The petitioners, comprising members of the teaching and non-teaching staff, contended that salaries had been stopped and service dues remained unpaid despite there being no formal order approving closure. They argued that unilateral stoppage of functioning could not extinguish their service rights or absolve the management of its obligations.

The Directorate of Education, on the other hand, maintained that the request for closure was still under consideration and that the school had ceased operations without obtaining prior approval as required under the statutory framework.

Court’s Observation

The Court began by identifying the central issue as whether mere stoppage of functioning could be treated as a lawful closure in the absence of compliance with the statutory framework. It held that this distinction was determinative of the rights of employees and liabilities of the management.

Examining the scheme of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, the Court reiterated that closure of a recognised school is strictly regulated and cannot be left to the unilateral discretion of the management. It emphasised that “financial weakness is itself one of the matters regulated by the statute,” and therefore cannot be invoked to bypass statutory safeguards.

Referring specifically to Rule 46, the Court observed that “no managing committee can close a recognised school… without full justification and without prior approval of the Director,” and held that the requirement of prior approval is mandatory and not directory. It clarified that the absence of such approval renders the so-called closure legally non-existent.

The Court drew a clear distinction between “closure in fact” and “closure in law,” holding that unilateral cessation of activities does not amount to legal closure. It observed that “a recognised school is not permitted to decide for itself that it will stop functioning today and seek legal validation later,” as such an approach would defeat the statutory scheme.

The Court further examined the interplay between Rule 46 and Rule 55, holding that consequences such as withdrawal of recognition may follow unlawful cessation, but such consequences do not validate the act of closure itself. It reiterated that a party cannot take advantage of its own breach of statutory requirements.

Relying on precedents including Manju Tomar v. NCT of Delhi (2009) and NDMC v. Manju Tomar (2024), the Court held that closure without prior approval is illegal and cannot be used to defeat employee entitlements. It emphasised that statutory protections relating to salary and service conditions continue to operate so long as closure is not effected in accordance with law.

On the issue of employee rights, the Court held that the unilateral stoppage of functioning cannot extinguish accrued service benefits. It observed that the statutory framework is designed to protect employees against arbitrary action and that financial incapacity does not absolve the management of its obligations.

The Court then addressed the question of liability, holding that the statute does not treat the school, its managing committee, and the parent society as watertight compartments. It was observed that liability must be determined based on actual control over management and finances, including who constituted the managing committee and made decisions relating to the school.

At the same time, the Court clarified that such liability cannot be imposed merely based on association or affiliation. It held that the decisive test is one of effective control, which must be ascertained from the record. In fact, the Court found that the material on record was inconclusive as to which entity exercised control over the school at the relevant time. It noted competing claims and the absence of clear evidence of lawful transfer of management.

"Liability cannot be avoided altogether. The statutory scheme, read with the decisions in Anjna Sharma and Manju Tomar, makes it plain that the obligation to satisfy salary and service dues rests not merely on the school as a nominal unit, but extends to the society or management which in fact ran the school and took the decision to cease its functioning", the Bench remarked.

In these circumstances, the Court directed the Directorate of Education to undertake a factual determination regarding management and financial control, and to identify the entity responsible for discharging liabilities arising from the unlawful cessation of functioning. The Court also clarified that contempt proceedings cannot be used to adjudicate substantive claims relating to salary and service benefits, which must be determined in appropriate proceedings.

Finally, the Court reiterated that unlawful cessation cannot be equated with closure in law, and that until closure is approved in accordance with statutory procedure, the school continues to exist in the eyes of law and remains bound by its obligations towards employees.

Conclusion

The High Court held that the school had not been lawfully closed and that stoppage of its functioning without prior approval under Rule 46 amounted only to unilateral cessation, which could not defeat the service and salary claims of employees.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petitions in part and issued directions for computation and payment of salary and service dues, while directing the Directorate of Education to determine the entities responsible for management and to take a final decision on closure in accordance with law.

Cause Title: Vishwajyoti v. Virender Kumar Sardana & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2697)

Appearances

Petitioners: Advocates Dr Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Arindam Gupta

Respondents: Advocate Manish Gupta, Manaswee, Vivek Chandrasekar, Jigyasa, Jyoti Tyagi, Vishruti Pandey, Sachin Garg, Hitendra Kr. M.; Yeeshu Jain, ASC

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