Plea Of Guilt Cannot Confer Jurisdiction Where Bar Of Double Jeopardy Applies: Delhi High Court
The High Court held that once the statutory and constitutional bar against double jeopardy is attracted, the conviction is a nullity irrespective of the voluntariness of the plea. A second prosecution based on the same incident, evidence, and offence cannot be sustained.
Justice Sanjeev Narula, Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court clarified that the bar under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 CrPC operates irrespective of whether the accused enters a plea of guilt before the trial court. A voluntary plea, the Court said, cannot confer jurisdiction where the law itself prohibits a second prosecution.
The Court was hearing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of the conviction and sentence imposed, arguing that he had already been convicted for the same incident.
A Bench comprising Justice Sanjeev Narula, while deciding the matter, noted that “a plea of guilt cannot confer jurisdiction. Once the bar under Section 300 CrPC or the rule against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) applies, the conviction is a nullity, irrespective of the voluntariness of the plea or the sufficiency of evidence.”
Advocate Aman Gaur represented the petitioner, while Advocate Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC, appeared on behalf of the respondents.
Background
FIR No. 23/2013 was registered after a raiding team intercepted an ‘Ertiga’ vehicle bearing forged plates in Dwarka on 11 February 2013. The vehicle, which turned out to be the same one allegedly robbed in another case, was seized along with a firearm and forged identity card. The petitioner and his associates were arrested on the spot and subsequently convicted on 26 November 2014 under Section 411/34 IPC.
Subsequently, based on the same seizure and identical facts, a supplementary chargesheet was filed in the earlier FIR No. 306/2012. The petitioner was again prosecuted for offences under Sections 411, 482, and 34 of the IPC. On 16 September 2015, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to the period already undergone.
Later, when his case was placed before the Sentence Review Board for premature release, this conviction was treated as an additional adverse antecedent. Aggrieved, he approached the High Court.
Court’s Observations
The Delhi High Court, while analysing the scope of judicial review under Article 226, held that ordinarily the High Court does not function as an appellate court over a criminal conviction. However, where a conviction itself is passed in violation of a constitutional or statutory bar, the writ court is competent to correct the illegality.
The Court examined Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 CrPC, citing precedents such as Kolla Veera Raghav Rao, T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and T.P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala. The Bench reiterated that a person cannot be tried or punished twice for the same offence on the same facts.
The Bench explained that a second FIR regarding the same incident is impermissible unless it concerns a counter-case and that if the second charge could have been included in the first trial, Section 300(2) CrPC bars a subsequent prosecution.
In the matter at hand, the Court noted that both prosecutions rested entirely on the same recovery of the same vehicle. The earlier conviction under Section 411 IPC, the Bench noted, had already adjudicated the offence of possessing stolen property. In such circumstances, trying and convicting the petitioner again for Section 411 IPC was impermissible.
The Bench further held that the additional charge under Section 482 IPC also could have been included in the earlier trial, and therefore, the second prosecution was barred under Section 300(2) CrPC. It was also observed that the trial court had not adjudicated the pending application under Section 300 CrPC before recording the plea, and therefore, the conviction was vitiated even procedurally.
Conclusion
Allowing the appeal partly, the High Court set aside the conviction. Necessary corrections were directed to be made to police, jail and NCRB records. The Sentence Review Board was also directed to reconsider the petitioner’s case for premature release, treating both FIRs as a single antecedent as they arose from the same occurrence.
Cause Title: Subhash Pahwa @ Subhash Chander v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9423)
Appearances
Petitioner: Advocates Aman Gaur, Kumar Balram
Respondents: Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC, with Advocates Arjit Sharma and Sakshi Jha.
