Possibility Of Rashness & Negligence By Driver Can’t Be Negated On Mere Account Of Low Speed: Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court was considering a Petition whereby the petitioner State sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate (MM) in a case of a road accident which caused the death of the victim.

Justice Amit Mahajan, Delhi High Court
While allowing the State’s leave Petition, the Delhi High Court has held that the possibility of rashness and negligence by a driver cannot be negated on the mere account of low speed, especially when it is alleged that the accused was driving a heavy vehicle, carrying material over the permissible weight limit, in a zig-zag manner before the accident.
The High Court was considering a Petition whereby the petitioner State sought leave to appeal against the judgment (impugned judgment) of the Metropolitan Magistrate (MM) in a case of a road accident which caused the death of the victim.
The Single Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan held, “Prima facie, possibility of rashness and negligence by a driver cannot be negated on mere account of low speed, especially when it is alleged that the respondent was driving a heavy vehicle, carrying material over the permissible weight limit, in a zig-zag manner prior to the accident.”
Additional Public Prosecutor Ritesh Kumar Bahri represented the Petitioner, while Advocate Vrinda Bhandari represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The case dates back to the year 2016 when the respondent was driving a truck on a public road, allegedly in a rash and negligent manner. It was alleged that while driving the said truck, the respondent struck a motorcycle from behind and caused the death of the victim, who was driving the motorcycle. The MM acquitted the respondent for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC and convicted the respondent for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC. The Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the Magistrate failed to appreciate that the witnesses had explicitly stated that the truck was being driven rashly in a zig-zag manner.
Reasoning
The Bench, at the outset, reaffirmed that the Court must exercise caution and should only interfere in an appeal against acquittal where there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. At the stage of grant of leave to appeal, the High Court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out in favour of the appellant or if arguable points have been raised which would merit interference.
The Bench noted that the Magistrate found that the respondent had caused the death of the victim by hitting the rear side of his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner to warrant his conviction for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC, however, the respondent was acquitted for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC as it was unclear as to how or in what manner the accused acted by driving the truck before the incident. The only factor which weighed with the Magistrate was that the speed of the vehicle, as per both the witnesses, was not too high or excessive.
Considering that the Magistrate laid much emphasis on the absence of material prior to the incident, the Bench noted that the prosecution didn’t seek to distinguish between the rashness and negligence before the accident and during the accident. “Even otherwise, once it is found that the accused rashly and negligently caused death of the victim while driving on a public way, the requisite ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 279 of the IPC are met as it is the act of endangerment which is criminalized in the aforesaid provision”, it held.
The Bench held, “The only specific observation made by the learned Magistrate is in reference to the speed of the vehicle as per the witnesses. Undisputably, high speed is not a sine qua non to constitute the offence under Section 279 of the IPC.”
Noting that the State was able to make out a case for the grant of leave, the Bench granted the leave to appeal.
Considering that the respondent’s petition against his conviction for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC was still pending before the Court of Sessions, the Bench held, “In the opinion of this Court, it would be expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the appeal filed by the respondent against the impugned judgment, pending before the Sessions Court, to this Court, in order to ascertain that both the appeals can be heard and decided together.”
Cause Title: State v. Sabu (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1518)
Appearance
Petitioner: Additional Public Prosecutor Ritesh Kumar Bahri, Advocates Divya Yadav, SI Pavan Kumar Yadav
Respondent: Advocate Vrinda Bhandari, Nitya Jain

