POCSO Case Cannot Be Quashed Merely On The Ground That Its Pendency Would Hinder Victim From Finding Suitable Match: Delhi High Court
The Petitioner approached the Delhi High Court seeking quashing of an FIR registered under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, based on a compromise entered between the parties.

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has refused to quash a POCSO case on the basis of a settlement where the victim had stated that its pendency would hinder her from finding a suitable match. The High Court held that a constitutional Court must remain ever faithful to the Constitution and uphold the protection established for victims of sexual assault.
By way of the present petition, the petitioner sought quashing of the FIR registered under Sections 363,366, 376(2)(n), 506, 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC] and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [POCSO Act] based on a compromise entered between the parties.
The Single Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma held, “Taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the opinion that quashing the FIR on the ground that its pendency would hinder the victim from finding a suitable match would set a dangerous precedent. Such an order would contribute to the perception that victims of sexual assault remain vulnerable in their personal lives while criminal proceedings are ongoing, whereas the accused, despite facing serious allegations, could exploit this societal bias to seek quashing of the FIR and evade accountability.”
“However, a constitutional Court must remain ever faithful to the Constitution and the community it serves, carefully considering the legislative intent and the work undertaken by Parliament while passing its judgment. It must uphold the values and protections that Parliament, and hard-won jurisprudence, has established for victims of sexual assault, including the accountability of those accused of such crimes”, it added.
Advocate K.M. Gautam represented the Petitioner while APP Naresh Kumar Chahar represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The FIR in this case had been registered on the allegations that the petitioner had forcibly taken the victim (respondent 2) to various hotels, where he had made inappropriate and obscene videos of her. There were specific allegations that he had also burnt her private parts with a cigarette and had forced her to consume liquor and smoke. It was also alleged that he had mercilessly beaten her and had sexually assaulted her. Subsequently, he had posted obscene videos of the victim on Instagram, following which her family members had begun receiving phone calls from friends and relatives regarding the said content. Thereafter, the petitioner had demanded a sum of Rs 5 lakhs from the victim. It was also specifically alleged that he had threatened to throw acid on her face and disfigure her.
Arguments
It was the petitioner’s case that the respondent victim had voluntarily agreed to cooperate in quashing the FIR, and both parties, along with their families, had mutually agreed not to initiate any future proceedings against each other.
On the contrary, the Counsel for the State contended that cases involving serious and heinous allegations, such as those of sexual assault and physical brutality, should not be quashed merely based on a compromise between the parties.
Reasoning
Referring to the precedents of the Supreme Court, the Bench said, “A perusal of the above-referred precedents reveal that the consistent view taken by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments is that FIRs registered for commission of serious offences, including the offence of rape, ought not to be quashed merely on the basis of a settlement or compromise arrived at between the victim and the accused. At the same time, it is equally well-recognized that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that there is no absolute bar on quashing an FIR registered for commission of offence under Section 376 of IPC; however, such relief is generally granted in exceptional circumstances.”
“...this Court reiterates that in cases involving grave and heinous offences, especially those which shock the conscience of the Court, proceedings/FIRs cannot be quashed merely on the strength of a private settlement”, it said while also adding, “...the allegations in the present case reveal serious acts of sexual assault and physical abuse upon a minor. Such offences affect the collective conscience of society and, by their very nature, preclude the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. on the basis of a compromise.”
The Bench took note of the victim’s statement that she wishes to marry someone else and fears that the pendency of these proceedings – arising from her complaint against the accused, which details brutal rape, repeated threats of acid attack, and merciless burning with cigarettes on her private parts and other parts of the body – would hinder her prospects of marriage to someone else.
“This Court, therefore, is of the firm view that it would not be in the interest of justice or of society at large to quash the present FIR. To do so, given the facts, the nature of allegations, and the ground on which quashing is sought, would gravely compromise the protected interests of society and pose a serious risk to the dignity and safety of sexual assault survivors. It may foster a dangerous perception that after committing such heinous crimes, an accused can coerce the victim, directly or indirectly, into dropping the case, and evade the legal consequences of his actions. In such circumstances, the victim continues to be a victim – not only when the offence is committed but even thereafter, until she is able to live a life free from the shadow of that crime”, it said.
Dismissing the Petition, the Bench said, “Heinous crimes, especially those involving minors, must be allowed to proceed to their logical and lawful conclusion, irrespective of any subsequent compromise or reluctance to pursue prosecution.”
Cause Title: Shavej Rahil v. Govt. Of NCT Delhi & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4911)
Appearance
Petitioner: Advocate K.M. Gautam, Petitioner In Person
Respondent: APP Naresh Kumar Chahar, Advocate Priyaranjan Kumar