The Delhi High Court has allowed the Appeal filed by Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. against Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. in a trademark dispute relating to selling of cotton hybrid seeds.

The Appeal challenged the Order of the Single Judge by which the plaint was directed to be returned to the Kohinoor Seed Fields for presentation before the appropriate Court.

A Division Bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla observed, “As the plaint of the appellant was premised on the ground that the use, by the respondent, of the allegedly infringing marks breached the Marketing Agreement between them, the Marketing Agreement constituted part of the cause of action on which the suit was based and, therefore, this Court, being the Court within whose jurisdiction the Marketing Agreement was admittedly executed, would be possessed of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and adjudicate on the lis.”

The Bench said that once the Marketing Agreement and its covenants constitute a part of the cause of action on which the plaint is based, Courts having jurisdiction over the place of execution of the Marketing Agreement would ipso facto have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit.

Advocate Saurav Agarwal appeared for the Appellant, while Senior Advocate Rajshekhar Rao appeared for the Respondent.


Facts of the Case

A Suit was instituted by the Appellant-Kohinoor Seed Fields against the Respondent-Veda Seed Sciences, alleging infringement by the Respondent of the Appellant’s registered trademarks. The Respondent filed an Application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), contending that the High Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Single Judge allowed the said Application and directed return of the Plaint to the Appellant for presentation before the appropriate Court. Hence, the Appellant challenged this in the Appeal before the High Court.

The Appellant had alleged in its plaint that by selling hybrid seeds, under the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”, the Respondent was infringing the registered trademarks TADAAKHA and SADANAND of the Appellant and was also passing off its products as the products of the Appellant. The marks TADAAKHA, SADANAND and BASANT of the Appellant, and the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD” were used for cotton hybrid seeds.

Court’s Observations

The High Court in the above regard, noted, “Where the learned Single Judge has erred, in our opinion, is in his failing to note that the appellant was not invoking the jurisdiction of this Court because its application for registration of the asserted marks, was filed within the jurisdiction of this Court, but because the asserted marks were registered within such jurisdiction.”

The Court was of the view that the Single Judge, in holding that the registration of the asserted trademarks of the Appellant in Delhi did not constitute part of the cause of action to institute the suit has ruled contrary to Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (TM Act).

“The appellant, in the present case, never sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that the application for registration of the asserted trade marks was advertised within the jurisdiction of this Court, but that the registrations were granted by the Trade Mark Office at Delhi”, it said.

The Court held that the fact that the marks asserted by the Appellant in this case were registered within the jurisdiction of the High Court was by itself a factor which entitled the Appellant to institute the suit before the Court and hence, the Single Judge is not correct in having held otherwise.

“The finding, of the learned Single Judge, that the Marketing Agreement dated 1 January 2022 executed between the appellant and the respondent did not form part of cause of action in the suit is, to our mind, clearly fallacious”, it observed.

The Court further said that the Single Judge was correct in his view that the mere existence of an interactive website of the Defendant, accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, would not be sufficient for the suit to be maintainable here.

“It would additionally have to be shown that some commercial transaction was concluded within the jurisdiction of this Court”, it added.

The Court clarified that the issue of whether the Respondent had anything to do with the listing of the allegedly infringing goods over the IndiaMart or Kalgudi websites would be a matter of trial.

“Arguendo, if the appellant were able to establish, in trial, that the entities who placed the respondent’s goods for sale and purchase on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites did so at the instance of the respondent, or with its knowledge, the respondent might still be answerable therefor”, it also said.

The Court remarked that the Single Judge could not have held that the Appellant could not sue the Respondent in the High Court, even when the allegedly infringing goods could be purchased, across the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, within its jurisdiction, on the premise that the Respondent was innocent of the listings.

“There is no dispute about the fact that the allegedly infringing products of the respondent were available on IndiaMart and Kalgudi. It was specifically asserted, in the plaint, that the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites were accessible in Delhi. In paras 49 and 50 of the plaint, it was further specifically pleaded that, as orders could be placed across these websites, the dynamic effect of the availability of the respondent’s goods on the said e-market platforms was felt within the jurisdiction of this Court”, it noted.

Conclusion

The Court held that the findings of the Single Judge with respect to the listing of the products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi platforms is not sustainable in law.

“In our view, therefore, the appellant’s right to sue the respondent before this Court does not stand divested by the law declared in Ultra Home Construction. We are constrained to hold that the learned Single Judge was in error in deciding otherwise”, it further observed.

The Court explained that Section 134 of the TM Act confers an absolute right on a Plaintiff to sue the Defendant at the place where the Plaintiff has its principal office of business and to hold that, even if the Plaintiff has its principal office of business at place A, it has to sue the Defendant at place B where it has its subordinate office of business, because the cause of action has arisen at place B, would be re-writing Section 134, which a Court cannot do.

“For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the plaint, as instituted by the appellant, was maintainable before this Court. The learned Single Judge has, in our considered opinion, erred in holding otherwise”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Appeal, quashed the impugned Judgment, and restored the Suit.

Cause Title- Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10789-DB)

Appearance:

Appellant: Advocates Saurav Agarwal, Shantanu Agarwal, Adarsh Ramanujan, Kapil Rustagi, Saurabh Seth, Chandreyee Maitra, Allaka M, Manas Arora, Raghav Thareja, Parth Singh, and Ajay.

Respondent: Senior Advocate Rajshekhar Rao, Advocates Kapil Wadhwa, Sindoora, Vishakha Gupta, Wamic Wasim, Thithiksha Padmam, and Anish Jandial.

Click here to read/download the Judgment