The Bombay High Court held that an FIR relating to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be quashed merely because the complainant and the accused have entered into a compromise, and refused to quash criminal proceedings against an advocate accused of demanding gratification on behalf of police officers for providing better facilities in jail to the complainant’s son.

The Court was hearing an application seeking the quashing of a First Information Report registered for offences under Sections 7, 12 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the consequential proceedings pending before the Special Court.

A Bench of Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke noted that “even though Section 7 of the PC Act deals with acts by public servants, and that the applicant, who is a lawyer by profession, is not a public servant”, after going through the definition of ‘abetment’ and essential ingredients, held that, “the act of the present applicant covers under Explanation-1 to Section 107 of the IPC and, therefore, the application of Section 12 of the P C Act against the applicant sustains”.

The Court accordingly held that “the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court for the purpose of quashing of FIRs, if applied to the present case, admittedly, there is a prima facie case against the present applicant as far as the ‘abetment' is concerned and, therefore, the application deserves to be rejected”.

Background

The FIR arose from a complaint lodged before the Anti-Corruption Bureau by the father of an accused person who had been arrested in a criminal case and was being held in police custody.

According to the complaint, police officers demanded money through the applicant's advocate in exchange for providing better facilities to the complainant’s son in jail. The demand was initially alleged to be ₹5 lakh and was later negotiated to ₹1.25 lakh.

After receiving the complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau conducted verification proceedings in the presence of panch witnesses. During this process, the communication between the complainant and the advocate was recorded, which allegedly revealed that the advocate conveyed the demand of the police officers for payment of the gratification amount.

Based on this report, a criminal case was registered, and an investigation was undertaken. During the investigation, statements of witnesses were recorded, and voice samples of the applicant and other accused were collected and sent for analysis. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the Special Court.

During the pendency of the quashing petition before the High Court, the complainant filed an affidavit stating that the complaint had been lodged due to a misunderstanding and that a settlement had been reached between the parties.

The applicant advocate, therefore, sought quashing of the FIR primarily on the ground of compromise and also contended that the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act were not attracted.

Court’s Observation

The High Court first examined whether criminal proceedings alleging corruption could be quashed based on a compromise between the complainant and the accused.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, the Court noted that offences under special statutes such as the Prevention of Corruption Act are not to be quashed merely because the parties have settled the dispute. The Court observed that the power to quash criminal proceedings based on compromise is generally exercised in matters having overwhelmingly civil character, such as matrimonial disputes or commercial transactions.

The Court emphasised that corruption offences stand on a different footing as they affect public administration and public trust. Therefore, quashing such proceedings merely based on a settlement between the complainant and the accused would not be in the interest of justice.

The Court also referred to observations of the Supreme Court highlighting corruption as a serious social evil and noting that constitutional courts must show “zero tolerance” toward such offences.

The Bench then examined the material collected during the investigation. The Court noted that during the verification proceedings, the communication between the complainant and the advocate indicated that the advocate had conveyed the demand of police officers for payment of money in exchange for providing better facilities in custody.

The verification panchanama recorded conversations suggesting that the advocate attempted to persuade the complainant to make the payment.

The Court further observed that voice samples of the applicant were collected, and the forensic report indicated that the recorded conversation matched the applicant’s voice. The complainant had also specifically alleged that the advocate communicated the demand on behalf of the investigating officer.

The Court then considered whether the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act were made out. It was observed that Section 7 of the Act applies to public servants accepting gratification in respect of official acts and therefore would not apply to the applicant advocate, who is not a public servant.

However, the Court held that the material on record disclosed prima facie elements of abetment within the meaning of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court noted that a person who intentionally aids or instigates the commission of an offence may be liable for abetment.

The Court held that the communication between the advocate and the complainant, coupled with the verification panchanama and voice analysis report, provided sufficient material indicating that the advocate had facilitated or communicated the demand for illegal gratification on behalf of the police officers.

The Court also made observations regarding the duties of members of the legal profession, noting that advocates are expected to maintain the highest standards of honesty, integrity and fairness as officers of the court and members of a noble profession.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court concluded that the allegations and material on record disclosed a prima facie case of abetment of corruption under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the applicant advocate.

Accordingly, the application seeking quashing of the FIR and criminal proceedings was rejected.

Cause Title: Sachin Chandramani Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Neutral Citation:2026:BHC-NAG:4062-DB)

Appearances

Applicant: Shri Parvez Mirza, Advocate

Respondents: M.A. Barabde, APP; M. Hussain, Advocate

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