Recording Or Sharing Office Calls Does Not Constitute Spying U/S 3 Official Secrets Act Absent Threat To Sovereignty & Security Of State: Bombay High Court

The Court clarified that for the invocation of Section 3, the act must relate to a “prohibited place” or involve information affecting the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State.

The Court was hearing a criminal application seeking quashing of FIR registered under Section 66(B) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 3(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923.

A Bench of Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke observed: “The word spying has a different meaning. Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act provides punishment for acts, prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State; acts done affecting the sovereignty and integrity of India and so on, i.e. for the acts stipulated therein.”

“Section 3 could have been invoked in the facts of the present case when there is any apprehension due to the act of the present applicant to the sovereignty or integrity of India, …in view of that, the offence under Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act is not made out”, the Bench added.

Advocate S.P. Bhandarkar appeared for the applicant, while the State was represented by APP Nikhil Joshi, and Advocate G.A. Kunte appeared for the complainant.

Background

The case arose from an FIR registered against the applicant, an employee of Maharashtra Metro Rail Corporation Limited, alleging that he had recorded conference calls between senior officials and shared the same with another employee.

The applicant was assigned duties relating to connecting conference calls between officials through the intercom system. It was alleged that he recorded such calls on his mobile device and transferred the recordings to a third party, leading to the registration of an FIR.

During the investigation, mobile devices were seized, and forensic analysis revealed recorded conversations and communication between the applicant and the co-accused.

Based on these allegations, offences under Section 66(B) of the Information Technology Act and Section 3(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act were invoked.

Court’s Observation

The Court examined the scope and applicability of Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, which penalises acts of “spying” that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State.

The Court observed: “On perusal of Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, which provides penalties for spying. In the context of the definition given under Section 2(8) of the Official Secrets Act, ‘prohibited place’. Admittedly, the spot of the incident is not a prohibited place. The said definition does not specifically include the place, i.e. office of the complainant company, as a prohibited place.

It further held that “the invocation of Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act prima facie appears to have been invoked under the misconception, … by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the recording of the said calls as stated aforesaid be an act constituting an offence of spying”.

On examining the facts, the Court found that the allegations pertained to internal communication within a corporate office and did not involve any sensitive or classified information affecting national security.

Accordingly, it held that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3 were not satisfied, and the provision had been invoked under a misconception.

However, the Court separately examined the applicability of provisions under the Information Technology Act and found that recording and sharing communication without authorisation could attract liability under Sections 43 and 66 of the Act, particularly when done with dishonest intention.

It noted that the conduct of the applicant amounted to unauthorised communication and misuse of information in violation of internal rules and could not be brushed aside as mere misconduct.

Conclusion

The High Court held that no offence under Section 3(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act was made out and accordingly quashed the FIR and charge-sheet to that extent.

However, it permitted the continuation of prosecution under the provisions of the Information Technology Act.

The application was thus partly allowed, and proceedings were directed to continue for offences under Sections 66 and 66(B) of the Information Technology Act.

Cause Title: Pravin Shyamrao Samarth v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-NAG:5513-DB)

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