Adjudicating Officer Can Exercise Delegated Powers Of Refund Under RERA: Bombay High Court

The Court further held that once an order has attained finality, it cannot be reopened in writ jurisdiction on belated reliance upon a subsequent judgment.

The Court was hearing a writ petition seeking to quash an order passed by the Adjudicating Officer directing a refund to a flat purchaser, along with a recovery order, on the ground that such power could not have been exercised by the Adjudicating Officer.

Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan observed: “...the adjudication of compensation is something that an Adjudicating Officer alone can deal with, while other powers, save and except the power to make subordinate legislation, may be exercised by any officer to whom such power is assigned by RERA, … The matter in hand involves the Impugned Order having been passed for issuance of a refund, and such power having been exercised by an Adjudicating Officer, … This is not a case of an officer who is not a judicial Adjudicating Officer having granted compensation – something directly contrary to the statutory scheme of the RERA Act”.

Advocate Amit Gharat appeared for the Petitioner, while Advocate Abhishek Kothari represented the respondents.

Background

The dispute arose from an order passed by the Adjudicating Officer directing the refund of ₹1.35 crore along with interest to the flat purchaser. The petitioner did not challenge the order within the statutory period prescribed under the RERA Act, leading to its finality.

Subsequently, recovery proceedings were initiated for the enforcement of the refund order. The petitioner approached the High Court, contending that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP (2021), the Adjudicating Officer lacked jurisdiction to order a refund, rendering the impugned order a nullity.

The respondents opposed the petition on grounds of delay, finality of the order, and misinterpretation of Newtech.

Court’s Observation

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory scheme of the RERA Act, particularly Sections 18, 21, 25, 71, and 81, to delineate the distribution of powers between the Authority and the Adjudicating Officer.

It was observed that RERA is designed as a composite regulatory body combining legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial functions. While the Adjudicating Officer performs a quasi-judicial role in adjudicating compensation, other functions of the Authority, including refund, are capable of delegation.

The Court explained, “the adjudication of compensation is something that an Adjudicating Officer alone can deal with… while other powers… may be exercised by any officer to whom such power is assigned.”

Rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on Newtech, the Court clarified that the Supreme Court was not dealing with the issue of delegation of powers to an Adjudicating Officer. Instead, Newtech addressed whether a Whole Time Member (WTM) could direct a refund.

The Court emphasised, “one must not lose the nuance… the Supreme Court was not dealing with a contention that the Adjudicating Officer could be delegated the power to direct a refund.” It further held that precedents must be read in context and cannot be applied mechanically.

The Court stressed that “a judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided… words, phrases and sentences… cannot be read out of context.”

Interpreting Section 81, the Court held that all powers of RERA, except legislative functions, are delegable, and since the Adjudicating Officer is an officer of RERA, such delegation is legally permissible. It held, “it would follow that there is a power to delegate any of RERA’s powers and functions to the Adjudicating Officer.”

The Court also distinguished between the adjudication of compensation and the grant of a refund. While compensation requires detailed adjudication akin to a trial, refund proceedings are largely summary in nature, based on documentary evidence. Thus, it reasoned that a judicially trained Adjudicating Officer is fully competent to exercise such delegated powers.

The Court further held that even assuming any defect in jurisdiction, the petitioner’s conduct disentitled it to relief under writ jurisdiction. It noted that the impugned order had attained finality as no appeal was filed within the statutory period. The Court also highlighted the significant delay of several years in approaching the Court.

Relying on settled principles, the Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to unsettle crystallised rights, particularly where there is delay and acquiescence.

Conclusion

The High Court held that the Adjudicating Officer’s order directing a refund was not without jurisdiction and could not be invalidated based on Newtech. It further held that the petitioner, having failed to challenge the order within time, cannot reopen the matter in writ jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, and the recovery proceedings were permitted to continue.

Cause Title: Marvel Landmarks Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:16466)

Appearances

Petitioner: Amit Gharat, Advocate

Respondents: Abhishek Kothari; Monish Jain & Gaurav Nashikkar, Advocates; R.S. Pawar, AGP

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