Pakistan Needs To Smell The Indus Coffee: India’s Suspension Of The IWT Was In The Reckoning

India’s recent decision on 24 April 2025 to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in “abeyance” is not an act of political theatrics or impulsive retaliation. It is a calculated move grounded in customary international law, long-standing strategic considerations, and recurring treaty abuse by Pakistan. Triggered by the ghastly Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April 2025 and compounded by decades of Pakistan’s bad-faith engagement, India’s action signals that the IWT’s immunity from geopolitical realities can no longer be taken for granted.

Abeyance or Suspension?

Intriguingly, the Government of India’s communication to Pakistan—both the letter issued by the Ministry of Jal Shakti and statements made by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri—uses the term “abeyance”, rather than “suspension”, the latter being a term recognized under international treaty law. While legal commentators have pointed out that abeyance lacks a precise definition in international law, both terms suggest a temporary cessation of treaty obligations.

This article analyses India's invocation of abeyance as equivalent to suspension, a concept acknowledged in customary international law. The form of the act will be pertinent in assessing whether India has effectively suspended the IWT by placing it in "abeyance."Although India is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and Article 4 of the VCLT specifies that it applies only to treaties concluded after the VCLT's entry into force, the VCLT has been referred to here for guidance to the extent that it codifies customary international law.

Treaty Abuse and Legal Impasse

India’s current posture is the culmination of a protracted diplomatic effort. Under Article XII(3) of the IWT, India formally requested a review and renegotiation of the Treaty through four notices since 2023—an option envisioned by the Treaty itself, which provides for modification or termination through mutual consent via a duly ratified agreement. Pakistan, however, stonewalled these overtures, thereby frustrating the treaty’s object and purpose. More egregiously, Pakistan has systematically misused the IWT’s dispute resolution mechanisms to stall India’s hydroelectric projects such as Kishanganga and Ratle.

The disagreement between India and Pakistan concerns the design features of the Kishenganga (330 megawatts) and Ratle (850 megawatts) hydroelectric power plants. Pakistan approached the World Bank in 2015, to appoint a Neutral Expert to resolve the differences about the design of the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power plants, but subsequently changed its stand in 2016, when Pakistan sought the constitution of a Court of Arbitration instead of a Neutral Expert. India opposed this change in Pakistan’s stand and was steadfast in demanding that the World Bank appoint a Neutral Expert to decide the differences relating to the Treaty. On 12 December 2016, the then World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim announced that the World Bank would pause before taking further steps in each of the two processes requested by the Parties. However, the World Bank in October 2022 decided to allow parallel proceedings, the simultaneous use of two dispute settlement mechanisms—the neutral expert and the Court of Arbitration—under the Treaty goes against several fundamental principles of international law.

The World Bank’s actions to permit the unprecedented act of simultaneously invoking the Neutral Expert mechanism and constituting a Court of Arbitration violates the Treaty’s procedural sequence, the principle of lis pendens, the principle of abus de droit—an abuse of procedural rights under international law and paragraph 6 of Article IX of the IWT which requires that other dispute resolution processes, including the establishment of the Court of Arbitration, shall not apply to a difference while it is being dealt with by the neutral expert. Pakistan insisted on the constitution of the Court of Arbitration despite the Neutral Expert having the necessary jurisdiction in deciding the differences between the two sides.

India’s position was ultimately upheld by the Neutral Expert in his Decision on Certain Issues Pertaining to the Competence of the Neutral Expert in January 2025 wherein he upheld his competence to decide on the differences before him despite the constitution of the Court of Arbitration.

Legal Justification for Suspension of the IWT under Customary International Law

India’s action is consistent with well-established grounds under customary international law for suspension of a treaty:

1. Material Breach (codified as Article 60, VCLT): A fundamental breach, such as Pakistan’s weaponization of dispute resolution procedures. Pakistan’s conduct constitutes a violation of provisions essential to the object and purpose of the IWT. The principle of
   pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) is at the heart of international law, mandating that treaties must be honoured. However, this principle also requires States to act in good faith. Pakistan’s mala fide refusal to engage in discussions for the modification of the IWT or adhere to its established process for dispute resolution constitutes a material breach and is a violation of pacta sunt servanda. India could not have foreseen at the time of entering into the IWT without a termination clause that Pakistan would act deliberately and consistently to defeat the raison d’être of Article XII (3). India has cited Pakistan’s refusal to engage in discussions as also a breach justifying suspension in Ministry of Jal Shakti’s letter.

2. Fundamental Change of Circumstances (codified as Article 62, VCLT): The regional security climate has drastically changed since 1960. Population growth, ecological stress, and an altered geopolitical landscape constitute unforeseen and fundamental changes that radically affect the obligations undertaken by India under the Treaty. India had been consistently citing these fundamental changes for seeking negotiations for a modification of the IWT. Additionally, Pakistan’s continued state sponsorship of terrorism, is a fundamental change in circumstances from 1960 when the IWT was entered into. This cross-border terrorism has interfered with India’s ability to fully utilize its rights under the IWT. In a recent televised interview, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif admitted that Pakistan had engaged in decades of terrorism as part of “
   dirty work” for the West, revealing the depth of Pakistan’s complicity in destabilizing the region and India, in particular. While India is not a party to the VCLT, both Articles 60 and 62 are largely reflective of customary international law. Some Pakistani commentators have argued that India could not have suspended the IWT as the Treaty lacks a suspension clause. However, this reflects the Even in the absence of an explicit suspension clause in the IWT, the broader framework of international treaty law supports India’s position.

Proportionality and Continued Obligations

Importantly, India has not terminated the IWT. It has suspended it—a critical distinction that underscores India’s commitment to the principle of proportionality in countermeasures. The suspension is reversible and signals openness to renegotiation under more realistic terms. This proportional response underscores India’s adherence to international norms. Even in the absence of the IWT, India will continue to be bound by customary international law including principles of international law governing transboundary watercourses, including equitable and reasonable utilisation.

However, Pakistan will no longer enjoy the special rights, such as advance data sharing and priority access to the Western rivers, granted exclusively under the IWT. Keep in mind that the equitable and reasonable standard is subjective and arguably reduces the waters that can be utilized by Pakistan in comparison with the IWT that disproportionately allowed Pakistan a greater share of the waters. Thus, the suspension of the IWT does not imply carte blanche control over the Indus system. Nor has India permanently diverted any water unilaterally from the Indus, Jhelum, or Chenab rivers.

There are reports that India has commenced temporarily restricting the flow of the Chenab via the Jammu’s Baglihar and Salal hydroelectric dams. What matters under international law is whether the measure is proportionate and reasonable—an inherently subjective test. Diversion of shared waters is not prohibited per se under international law. India's actions thus far demonstrate a deliberate and strategic approach, leaving the door open for future calibrated responses. The facts are clearly distinguishable from the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) where Slovakia diverted 80-90% of the Danube River waters leading to the dispute being adjudicated in the favour of Hungary by the ICJ.

Strategic Miscalculations by Pakistan

Rather than seize the opportunity for re-engagement, Pakistan has threatened to suspend the 1972 Shimla Agreement—an ill-conceived move. The Shimla Agreement underpins the Line of Control (LoC) and bilateral conflict resolution mechanisms. Abandoning it could backfire strategically, removing the last vestiges of mutual restraint and undermining Pakistan’s own position on Kashmir. Additionally, Pakistan’s international image continues to erode. In a candid televised interview, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif openly admitted Pakistan’s historical role in transnational terrorism as part of “dirty work” for Western allies. This candid confession only reinforces India’s long-standing position on Pakistan’s duplicity. Legally, Pakistan’s options are limited. Reports suggest Islamabad is exploring dispute resolution via the World Bank, PCA, or even the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging violation of the VCLT. However, India is not a party to the VCLT, and in any case, no compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ exists over India without its express consent. These efforts are more political theatre than substantive legal strategy.

Conclusion

India’s decision to suspend the IWT is a legally defensible, proportionate, and strategically calibrated response to decades of provocation. It marks a decisive shift from inertia to assertiveness, recognizing that agreements based on outdated assumptions and persistent bad faith are unsustainable.

As argued in my previous piece for Hindustan Times, “The Indus Waters Treaty: Adapt or Perish,” the IWT cannot remain frozen in 1960. Either Pakistan comes to the table in good faith to renegotiate a treaty fit for 21st-century realities—or it risks watching the last vestiges of regional cooperation wash away.

The ball is in Pakistan’s court. And for once, the Indus clock may not be ticking in its favour.