Dismissal Of SLP Or Writ Appeal Cannot Be Used As A Ground To Enlarge Ratio Of Earlier Judgment Beyond Its Facts: Chhattisgarh High Court
The Court held that where an earlier decision expressly states that relief was granted as an exceptional measure and not as a precedent, similarly placed persons cannot claim identical relief under a different statutory and factual framework.
Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, Chhattisgarh High Court
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that dismissal of a writ appeal or refusal of special leave by the Supreme Court does not have the effect of expanding the ratio of an earlier judgment beyond the facts in which it was rendered.
The Court observed that where an earlier judgment itself records that relief was granted only as an exceptional measure and not to be treated as a precedent, subsequent litigants cannot seek extension of the same relief despite a changed statutory framework.
The Court was hearing a batch of writ petitions filed by Assistant Veterinary Field Officers seeking permission to pursue the Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry (B.V.Sc. & A.H.) course as departmental candidates for the Academic Session 2025–26 and claiming parity with beneficiaries of an earlier decision in Tosh Kumar Sinha v. State of Chhattisgarh.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Bibhu Datta Guru observed: "Much emphasis was laid by the petitioners upon the fact that the judgment rendered in Tosh Kumar Sinha (supra) was affirmed in writ appeal and the challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not entertained. However, the dismissal of a writ appeal or refusal of special leave does not have the effect of enlarging the ratio of a judgment beyond the facts in which it was rendered. Since the earlier judgment itself expressly records that the relief was granted as an exceptional measure and was not to be treated as a precedent, the petitioners cannot claim extension of the said relief irrespective of the subsequently prevailing admission framework."
Advocate Manish Nigam represented the petitioners, while Y.S. Thakur, Additional Advocate General, represented the respondents.
Background
The petitioners, working as Assistant Veterinary Field Officers in the State of Chhattisgarh, challenged communications declining permission to pursue the B.V.Sc. & A.H. course as departmental candidates. They also sought directions to relieve them for admission to the course pursuant to the NEET-UG 2025 examination.
The petitioners contended that the acquisition of the B.V.Sc. An A.H. qualification was essential for promotion to the post of Veterinary Assistant Surgeon under the Recruitment Rules, 2011. They relied heavily upon the earlier decision in Tosh Kumar Sinha, which had granted similar relief to departmental candidates, arguing that the judgment had attained finality after dismissal of the writ appeal and refusal of special leave by the Supreme Court.
The State and the University opposed the petitions, submitting that admissions for Academic Session 2025–26 were governed by the Admission Rules, 2025, which did not provide any quota or reservation for departmental candidates. They further argued that Tosh Kumar Sinha itself had clarified that the relief granted therein was exceptional and not intended to operate as a precedent.
Court's Observations
The Court first examined the Recruitment Rules, 2011 and held that they merely prescribe eligibility conditions for appointment and promotion. They neither confer upon serving employees an enforceable right to admission into a professional course nor cast any obligation upon the State Government or the University to reserve seats for departmental candidates.
The Bench further found that admissions for Academic Session 2025–26 were governed exclusively by the Admission Rules, 2025, which had already been approved by the Executive Council before commencement of the admission process. Since neither the Admission Rules, 2025 nor the admission notification recognised any quota for departmental candidates, no mandamus could be issued directing creation of a category not contemplated by the governing rules.
Rejecting the petitioners' contention that they had acquired a vested right under the earlier admission regime, the Court observed that any such right has to be examined with reference to the admission framework prevailing when the admission process actually commences.
The Court held: "The right, if any, is required to be tested on the basis of the admission framework prevailing on the date when the admission process commences and admissions are actually undertaken... Consequently, on the date the admission process commenced, the field stood occupied by the Admission Rules, 2025 and not by the earlier admission regime. Therefore, no vested or accrued right can be claimed by the petitioners on the basis of any superseded admission arrangement."
Turning to the reliance placed on Tosh Kumar Sinha, the Court observed that a careful reading of the earlier judgment demonstrated that the relief had been granted on peculiar facts and special circumstances obtaining during the Academic Session 2024–25.
Referring to the earlier judgment, the Bench noted that it had expressly directed admission of those petitioners "…as an exceptional case without treating it as a precedent…" while directing the authorities to accommodate them in the next academic session.
The Court therefore held that the earlier decision could not be treated as laying down a binding principle applicable irrespective of the subsequently altered statutory and regulatory framework.
The Bench observed: "The aforesaid extracts leave no manner of doubt that the relief granted in the earlier batch of petitions was expressly confined to the special circumstances prevailing therein and was not intended to operate as a precedent. In the present cases, the governing field is occupied by the Admission Rules, 2025 and the admission notification issued thereunder... Consequently, no enforceable legal right survives in favour of the petitioners so as to warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus."
The Court also rejected the challenge based on Section 41(5) of the Chhattisgarh Kamdhenu Vishwavidyalaya Act, holding that the petitioners had failed to establish that the admission framework constituted a "Statute" requiring the Chancellor's assent. The Court held that policy decisions, Executive Council resolutions and admission notifications regulating admissions for a particular academic session do not automatically acquire statutory character.
The Court further held that although denial of admission might adversely affect the petitioners' promotional prospects, existence of a promotional avenue by itself cannot create an enforceable right to admission in a professional course. Such a right must flow from the governing admission rules, which admittedly contained no provision for departmental candidates.
The Court also observed that interference at that stage would unsettle an admission process already substantially completed in accordance with the prevailing admission framework.
Summarising its conclusions, the Bench held that the Recruitment Rules merely prescribe promotional eligibility, the Admission Rules, 2025 govern admissions for the relevant academic session, and none of the grounds urged by the petitioners established infringement of any statutory right warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The Court further observed: "It is trite law that a writ of mandamus can be issued only where the petitioner establishes a subsisting legal right and a corresponding public duty on the part of the respondent authority. In the facts of the present case, neither requirement stands satisfied. The relief sought by the petitioners would effectively require this Court to rewrite the admission framework governing Academic Session 2025-26, which is impermissible in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution."
Conclusion
Holding that the petitioners had failed to establish any enforceable legal right to claim admission as departmental candidates under the Admission Rules, 2025, the High Court dismissed all the writ petitions.
The Court held that the impugned action did not suffer from arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any statutory provision and refused to issue a writ directing the authorities either to create a category not contemplated under the governing admission rules or to grant admission dehors the applicable admission framework.
Cause Title: Kanchan Rahul @ Kanchan Kaur Rajput v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:CGHC:25983.)
Appearances
Petitioners: Manish Nigam, Advocate.
Respondents: Y.S. Thakur, Additional Advocate General, along with Sakshi Bajpai, Panel Lawyer, for the State; Shashank Thakur, Advocate, for Chhattisgarh Kamdhenu University, Gagan Tiwari, Advocate.
