The Court held that insurance companies cannot take advantage of the fact that accident victims or their dependents, who typically have no personal knowledge of the insurance policy taken by the vehicle owner, are unable to furnish full particulars of that policy before MACT. The Court held that allowing an insurer to exploit this informational gap to deprive claimants of compensation under welfare legislation would be contrary to the very character of proceedings before the Tribunal, which the Court described as not being "strictly adversarial as in other jurisdiction".

Advocate Sishir Mothay appeared for the appellant and Advocate Rahul Rathi appeared for the respondent.

“I am also of the view that when a claim is made before the learned Tribunal by a claimant under an insurance certificate/policy and the insurance company appears after notice is issued, it is incumbent upon the insurance company to: (i) first verify whether the insurance certificate/policy policy through which the claim is made is a valid insurance certificate/policy issued by them; (ii) once it is clear to the insurance company that in fact it is a valid insurance certificate/policy issued by them then it is incumbent upon them to file the insurance policy with all its terms and conditions and inform the learned Tribunal what exactly the insurance policy covers and the extent of their indemnification; (iii) the insurance company should also inform the learned Tribunal whether they are bound to follow certain directions issued by the IRDA from time to time relevant to the insurance certificate issued by them”, the Bench noted.

The claimants, heirs of the deceased who died in a motor accident on November 12, 2019, filed the underlying certificate of insurance before the Tribunal despite having no personal knowledge of its terms; it had been filed by the vehicle owner, who merely stated he possessed the relevant documents.

The insurer, Tata AIG General Insurance Company, did not appear before the Tribunal despite publication of summons and was proceeded against ex parte, leaving the Tribunal without any clarification on the policy's actual terms.

The Tribunal dismissed the claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the ground that the accident was caused by brake failure rather than rash or negligent driving. The claimants appealed, and the insurer, having remained absent before the Tribunal, chose to appear for the first time in the appeal.

Examining the certificate of insurance, the Court explained the rationale for imposing this burden on insurers rather than the claimants.

“I say so because it is noticed that in every claim for compensation made by the victims or their dependents the claimants are the ones who are usually placing the insurance certificate issued by the insurance company to the owner of the vehicle although they may not have any personal information about it. In some cases, the claimants may not have the necessary particulars of the insurance policy taken by the insured. In such situations, it may not behove of the insurance company to hide behind the lack of information of the claimants and deprive them of the benefit of the benevolent legislation…”, the Bench said.

“…In that sense the adjudication before the learned Tribunal may not be strictly adversarial as in other jurisdiction. Therefore, the insurance company who has issued the insurance certificate/policy providing the requisite information as above to the learned Tribunal would definitely clear doubts in the mind of the learned Tribunal to pass necessary effective orders as required without delay”, the Bench noted.

Having found, on a "deeper probe" into the insurer's website, that Respondent No. 1 had in fact undertaken to indemnify the vehicle owner for third-party liability, the Court went on to hold that the Tribunal could have granted no-fault compensation under Section 140 of the MV Act notwithstanding its rejection of the negligence-based claim, and directed the insurer to pay Rs. 5,00,000 with 7% interest from the date of the claim petition.

Cause Title: Rekha Chettri & Ors. v. Tata AIG General Insurance Company & Ors., MAC App. No. 20 of 2024.

Appearances:

Appellants: Sishir Mothay, Advocate.

Respondents: Rahul Rathi, Khushboo Rathi, Bhim Shankar Pradhan, Advocates.

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The Bench further held that a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC is not maintainable against an interlocutory order refusing recusal, as allowing the plea would merely change the presiding judge rather than finally dispose of the suit or proceedings.

A Single Bench of Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan observed, “…the learned Judge who decided the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act does not have to automatically recuse from subsequently hearing the appeal under section 34 arising from the same arbitration unless the State of Sikkim is able to demonstrate a real and reasonable apprehension of bias. If an application for recusal is permitted on the mere asking on the ground that the learned Judge had decided one way or the other earlier on an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it would lead to the party choosing their Judge which would not be proper for administration of justice. An application under Section 9 and an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act involves different inquiries. Section 9 deals with interim and protective measures while Section 34 is an appeal to set aside the award under limited statutory grounds”.

Zangpo Sherpa, Additional Advocate General appeared for the petitioner and Advocate K.D. Bhutia appeared for the respondent.

The dispute stems from a lease agreement concerning the Hotel Norkhil campus in Gangtok. In May 2021, the respondent, Nimmi Oberoi, filed an application under Section 9(ii) of the Arbitration Act before the Commercial Court, East Sikkim at Gangtok, seeking interim protection. On May 31, 2021, the Commercial Court granted an injunction restraining the State of Sikkim from disturbing the respondent's possession until the commencement of arbitration.

Though the High Court initially set aside the injunction on appeal, the Supreme Court subsequently intervened, set aside the High Court's ruling, and appointed a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator passed an award on December 5, 2022, against the State of Sikkim. The State then filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the award before the Commercial Court at Gangtok.

Due to the initial presiding judge recusing himself because his spouse was representing the respondent, the High Court administratively transferred the case to the Commercial Court at Mangan.

However, the State of Sikkim sought the recusal of the Presiding Officer at Mangan on the ground that he was the same judge who had passed the interim injunction against the State under Section 9 in May 2021. After the Commercial Court at Mangan rejected the recusal plea on April 13, 2026, the State approached the High Court in revision under Section 115 CPC.

On the Supreme Court's precedents including DLF Housing & Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Sarup Singh (1972) SCR 368 and Tek Singh v. Shashi Verma & Anr. Civil Appeal No.1416 of 2019, the High Court emphasized that the 1999 Amendment to Section 115 CPC bars revisions against interlocutory orders.

“The impugned order of refusal to recuse from the case even if it was decided in favour of the State of Sikkim would not have disposed of the suit or other proceedings. All that it would result in would be a change of the Presiding Officer or the Court. However, neither the suit nor other proceeding would be disposed of. Therefore, I am in agreement with the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent that this is not a case in which the revisional powers under Section 115 of the CPC ought to be exercised”, it noted.

The Bench noted that while Section 9 involves interim protective measures based on prima facie observations, Section 34 deals with setting aside awards on limited statutory grounds. Citing Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar (dead) through Legal Representatives (2021) 3 SCC 727, the Bench held that prior adverse orders do not constitute grounds for recusal, and litigants cannot be permitted to seek a bench of their choice.

Observing that the judge had explicitly limited his earlier Section 9 analysis to a prima facie view without making conclusive findings on the arbitral award's validity, the Court dismissed the revision petition.

Cause Title: State of Sikkim v. Nimmi Oberoi (CRP No. 6 of 2026)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Zangpo Sherpa, Additional Advocate General.

Respondent: Debarshi Dutta (through V.C.) with K.D. Bhutia, Advocates.

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Dismissing a petition filed under Section 528 of the BNSS, the Court held that inherent powers cannot be exercised to quash prosecutions for aggravated penetrative sexual assault under POCSO or rape under the IPC based on a compromise, even where the survivor has attained majority and the relationship was romantic.

A Single Bench of Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan observed, “Thus, in view of the clear and unequivocal pronouncement of the Supreme Court that it is a settled position of law that even if the accused and the survivor who has now attained majority were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is so, even if the learned Counsel for the petitioners has been able to impress upon me that the punishment which may be meted out to the accused who indulged in voluntary sexual intercourse with the survivor with whom he was having a romantic relationship when she was almost seventeen and he nineteen is very harsh and may relegate his entire life in prison”.

Advocate Safal Sharma appeared for the petitioner and Thinlay Dorjee Bhutia, Public Prosecutor appeared for the respondent.

The case originated from an FIR registered in June 2023 alleging that in November 2022, a 19-year-old accused engaged in sexual intercourse with the 17-year-old survivor, leading to her pregnancy. The survivor subsequently gave birth to a child, who was placed for adoption through the Child Welfare Committee.

During the pendency of the trial before the Special Judge (POCSO), Gangtok, and after the prosecution concluded its evidence, the parents of both parties executed a deed of compromise in August 2025.

The compromise recorded that the parties were high school classmates involved in a romantic relationship who acted out of "youthful spirit" without realizing the legal ramifications. Seeking to protect the 22-year-old accused from serving a lengthy prison sentence, all six individuals, the accused, the survivor (now 20 years old), and their parents, jointly approached the High Court under Section 528 BNSS (pari materia to Section 482 CrPC) to quash the FIR and proceedings.

While the Court acknowledged that the filing of joint affidavits demonstrated a clear intention among all parties to settle, it held that judicial precedent firmly prohibits the quashing of POCSO prosecutions on the basis of a compromise:

Citing binding Supreme Court decisions including Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2024) and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), Justice Pradhan observed that statutory rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are severe offences against society rather than private disputes. The Bench emphasized the Supreme Court's ruling that even if a survivor attains majority and consents to a settlement, High Courts cannot quash the prosecution under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS.

The Court pointed out that under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, any person below 18 years of age is defined as a child, and factual consent in adolescent romantic relationships is immaterial under the statutory scheme.

Addressing the plea regarding the severity of statutory minimum sentences (20 years for aggravated penetrative sexual assault), the Bench noted that personal sympathy or concerns over the accused spending his youth in prison cannot supersede explicit statutory mandates and Apex Court directives.

Dismissing the quashing petition, the Court granted liberty to the parties to approach the Supreme Court for relief if so advised.

Cause Title: Rxxx Rxx & Ors. v. State of Sikkim (CRL. M.C. No. 2 of 2026)

Appearances:

Petitioners: Safal Sharma, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel).

Respondent: Thinlay Dorjee Bhutia, Public Prosecutor, Yadev Sharma, Additional Public Prosecutor.

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