The Court was hearing a civil first appeal against a judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Pokhran, by which the appellant-plaintiff’s suit for declaration of rights, permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deeds over agricultural land was dismissed at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

A Bench of Justice Farjand Ali, while holding that succession under Section 8 operates in favour of heirs in their individual capacities, observed: “The appellant is not an heir who succeeded directly to the estate of Chutra Ram; rather, he is the son of one of the heirs who inherited a one-third share under Section 8. Consequently, the appellant cannot claim that a coparcenary interest accrued in his favour by birth in the share which had already devolved upon his father under the statutory scheme."

The Bench added: "In the absence of a specific plea and material establishing that the property was held as HUF/coparcenary property independently of such statutory succession, the appellant's mere relationship as grandson of Chutra Ram does not confer upon him a present right to seek partition or to challenge an alienation made by his father on the footing of an alleged pre-existing coparcenary interest.”

Advocate D.K. Godara appeared for the appellant. Advocate H.R. Soni appeared for the respondents.

Background

The Court was hearing a civil first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, against a judgment by which the appellant’s suit for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of registered sale deeds was dismissed on an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The dispute concerned agricultural land in Jaisalmer. The appellant claimed that the land, originally allotted to his grandfather under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, retained the character of ancestral/coparcenary property and that he had acquired an undivided share in it by birth.

The respondents opposed the appeal, contending that the grandfather died intestate and that his three sons, including the appellant’s father, inherited the property in equal shares under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They also argued that no declaration of khatedari rights had been obtained from the competent revenue court.

Court’s Observations

The Court noted that the plaint did not contain the necessary foundation for claiming coparcenary rights.

The Court observed: “The appellant himself traces the title to the allotment made in favour of his grandfather, Chutra Ram. However, the plaint does not contain any specific averment that the allotment was made in favour of a Hindu Undivided Family or that Chutra Ram held the land as karta or on behalf of a joint Hindu family. There is also no pleading disclosing the existence of an HUF, its constitution or the manner in which the suit property allegedly formed part of such joint family estate.”

It added that a coparcenary claim cannot arise merely from genealogy.

The Court held: “A claim of coparcenary right is founded upon the existence of coparcenary property, and such a claim cannot be sustained merely from the genealogical relationship between the parties. The fact that the property originally belonged to a grandfather does not, by itself, establish that the property continued to retain the character of HUF or coparcenary property in the hands of his descendants.”

The Bench further held: “In the absence of any specific pleading or material establishing that the property, either at the time of its acquisition or thereafter, formed part of a pre-existing Hindu Undivided Family or constituted a subsisting coparcenary estate, the property inherited by the appellant's father cannot be treated as joint Hindu family property merely because it had originally belonged to his father, Chutra Ram. The appellant, therefore, merely by virtue of being the son of one of the successors, could not claim an independent 1/9th coparcenary share therein by birth. For the aforesaid reasons, the appellant had no legally enforceable right to seek partition of the said property during the lifetime of his father.”

Relying on Uttam v. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016), the Court said the distinction between property inherited under Section 8 and property already forming part of a coparcenary was significant.

The Court observed: “Where the property devolves upon a son under Section 8, he succeeds to it in his individual capacity unless some independent legal foundation exists for treating the property as part of a subsisting joint family estate. The mere fact that the property came to him from his father does not, in itself, confer a birthright upon his son.”

The Court also held that the appellant’s minority when succession opened did not alter the position.

The Court observed: “Minority neither changes the class of heirs nor postpones the vesting of the estate in the heirs entitled thereto. The one-third share inherited by the appellant's father accordingly vested in him under the statutory scheme.”

On maintainability, the Court held that the appellant’s challenge to the sale deeds depended on first establishing his own legal entitlement in the agricultural land.

The Court referred to Pyarelal v. Shubhendra Pilania & Ors. (2019) and observed that where khatedari entitlement itself required determination by the competent revenue court, consequential relief before the civil court could not be sustained without such foundational declaration.

The Court held: “The appellant has not obtained any declaration from the competent revenue court recognising him as a khatedar or declaring an independent share in the suit land. His alleged khatedari right is itself unestablished. The civil court cannot assume the existence of such right merely to examine the validity of the sale deeds executed by the recorded khatedars.”

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, and directed that the record be transmitted to the trial court. The stay petition and all pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Devaram v. Khetaram & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:40614)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocate D.K. Godara

Respondents: Advocates H.R. Soni, Harish Joshi, Tripti Soni, Narootam Soni and Jitendra Soni

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Accordingly, the High Court issued directions for a structured transfer grievance mechanism, including departmental committees, time-bound consideration of representations, and the formulation of a comprehensive State transfer policy.

The Court was hearing a batch of writ petitions challenging transfer orders issued by different Government Departments, Boards, Nigams, Discoms, local authorities, financial institutions, non-governmental educational institutions and other establishments.

A Bench of Justice Sameer Jain observed: “This Court is further of the considered view that the recurring nature of the present litigation cannot be ignored. While exercising the roster in service matters, this Court has repeatedly noticed a substantial number of writ petitions challenging transfer orders issued by different Departments, Boards, Nigams, Discoms, local authorities and other establishments. The repetitive invocation of the writ jurisdiction in matters which, ordinarily, ought to be capable of resolution within the administrative hierarchy, is indicative of a systemic deficiency requiring remedial attention.”

Senior Advocate R.P. Singh appeared for the petitioners. Advocate General Rajendra Prasad appeared for the respondents. Advocate Ashish Saxena assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae.

Background

The batch concerned challenges to transfer orders alleged to have been issued without considering individual circumstances, personal grievances, applicable policies and departmental parameters. The lead petition sought quashing of a transfer order and continuation of the petitioner on the post of Senior Veterinary Officer.

The petitioners argued that the transfers were cryptic, arbitrary, mala fide in some cases, and issued without considering spouse grounds, medical conditions, disability, employees nearing retirement, sanctioned posts, repeated transfers, applicable transfer guidelines, alleged political interference, and statutory provisions such as Rule 20 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and Section 89(8)(ii) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

The State opposed the petitions, contending that transfer is an ordinary incident of service, that an employee has no vested right to remain at a particular station, and that judicial review in transfer matters is limited to cases involving mala fides, lack of jurisdiction, violation of mandatory statutory provisions or patent arbitrariness.

Court’s Observations

The Court reiterated that an employee holding a transferable post has no indefeasible right to remain posted at a particular station, and that the employer must retain reasonable latitude in deployment of staff.

The Court observed: “At the outset, this Court is conscious of the settled position that transfer is an incident of service and that an employee holding a transferable post does not possess an indefeasible or vested right to remain posted at a particular place or station.”

The Court clarified that restraint in transfer matters does not mean abdication of judicial review, because the legality of the manner in which transfer power is exercised remains open to scrutiny.

The Court observed: “The distinction, therefore, is between the power to transfer and the manner of exercise of that power. The existence of the power is ordinarily not in dispute. What is amenable to judicial scrutiny is the legality of its exercise.”

It further held: “Conversely, if the order is demonstrably contrary to a mandatory statutory provision, issued by an incompetent authority, actuated by mala fides, founded upon extraneous considerations, or passed in patent disregard of relevant and compelling circumstances in a manner which renders the decision arbitrary, the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court cannot be rendered otiose.”

The Court held that spouse grounds, medical circumstances, disability, proximity to retirement, family hardship and similar circumstances may require sympathetic and reasoned consideration by the competent authority, but do not by themselves create a legally enforceable right to a particular posting.

The Court observed: “They cannot, in the absence of a statutory mandate or binding policy, be converted into an absolute right to a particular posting.”

On the balance required, the Court added: “The appropriate balance, therefore, lies not in judicially prescribing the place at which each employee should be posted, but in ensuring that the competent authority considers the relevant circumstances in a fair, transparent and structured manner.”

The Court noted submissions regarding the functioning of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, including vacancies and non-availability or non-sitting of requisite members, resulting in delay in adjudication.

The Court observed: “The consequence is that employees aggrieved by transfer orders, particularly where such orders operate immediately and are accompanied by relieving directions, are confronted with a practical dilemma: the statutory forum may not provide an expeditious remedy commensurate with the urgency of the grievance, while approaching the writ Court results in a recurring burden upon the constitutional docket.”

It added: “The existence of an alternative forum does not extinguish the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court; equally, the writ jurisdiction cannot be transformed into a routine appellate forum for every transfer dispute.”

The Court held that the matter did not call for an inflexible judicial code governing every transfer, but required a structured administrative mechanism.

The Court observed: “The Court, finds that the present controversy does not warrant formulation of an inflexible judicial code governing every transfer in the State; what is required is a structured administrative mechanism which preserves the employer's legitimate prerogative while ensuring transparency, consistency, consideration of relevant circumstances and availability of a meaningful remedy.”

The Court further said: “The power of transfer must, therefore, be exercised not merely as an instrument of administrative control, but with due regard to the human element underlying public administration.”

Conclusion

The High Court disposed of the entire batch of writ petitions with directions.

It permitted each petitioner to submit a comprehensive representation before the competent authority within fifteen days. The authority or committee, the Court directed, must decide the representation within an upper limit of fifteen days, after considering relevant factors and passing a brief but intelligible reasoned order.

As a transitional arrangement, the impugned transfer orders concerning the petitioners were kept in abeyance till disposal of their representations or for thirty days from the judgment, whichever was earlier, subject to the caveat that where a petitioner had already joined at the transferred place, the posting would remain subject to the outcome of the representation.

The Court further directed that where a representation was filed within the stipulated period, the interim protection would continue until it was considered and an appropriate order was passed.

The highest authority of each concerned Department, Board, Nigam, Discom, financial institution, non-governmental educational institution or other establishment was directed to constitute a Departmental Transfer Grievance Committee within seven working days.

The Court also proposed a State-Level Committee comprising former Judge Justice Alok Sharma, the Advocate General for Rajasthan and the Chief Secretary to formulate and place before the competent Government a comprehensive transfer policy within two months.

The State Government was directed to take immediate steps for appointment or nomination of a retired High Court judge as supervisory head, chairman or supervisory authority of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, subject to the statutory framework, and to take consequential steps including filling vacancies and ensuring availability of requisite judicial members.

For disciplinary proceedings initiated solely due to non-joining pursuant to transfer orders, the competent disciplinary authority was directed to consider the employee’s representation and the decision rendered on it before proceeding further.

Cause Title: Dr Mahesh Meena v. State of Rajasthan

Appearances

Petitioners: Senior Advocate R.P. Singh, Advocate Sandeep Kalwaniya, Amicus Curiae Ashish Saxena and other counsel

Respondents: Advocate General Rajendra Prasad, Additional Advocate General Mahi Yadav, Additional Advocate General S.S. Naruka, Additional Advocate General Bhuwnesh Sharma and other counsel

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