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Writ Petition Filed Before Karnataka High Court Challenging State's Order To Sing Only First Two Stanzas Of Vande Mataram

Aastha Kaushik — Tue, 15 Sep 2026 11:30:41 GMT

The Karnataka High Court will hear a petition challenging the Government Order by which the State of Karnataka has directed that at all State Government programmes, except those attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister or the Governor, only the first two stanzas of the National Song "Vande Mataram" shall be sung.

The Ministry of Home Affairs on July 09, 2026, circulated to every State "for strict compliance" the Orders relating to the National Song of India, which prescribe the official version of the National Song as the complete composition in six stanzas and provide that "on all occasions, when the National Song is sung, the official version only shall be recited in mass singing."

The Parliament thereafter enacted the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026, extending to the National Song the statutory protection given since 1971 to the National Anthem. The Petitioner says that the National Song is not a matter enumerated in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule; it is within the exclusive competence of Parliament under Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248, and the executive power of the State under Article 162 does not reach it.

The Petition, filed by Advocate Girish Bharadwaj through Advocate Angad Kamath, raises the issue of whether a State Government may, by executive order, prescribe the form and content of a national symbol.

It is averred that the impugned Order is further in breach of Articles 256 and 257(1), which require the State to exercise its executive power to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and so as not to impede the executive power of the Union; it is contrary to the policy of a Parliamentary enactment in an occupied field; and it is an unreasoned order taken without application of mind.

The Petitioner has also filed a representation to the Chief Secretary seeking withdrawal of the impugned order, but no reply has been received.

The plea avers, "The impugned Order does not regulate whether, when or by whom the National Song is sung at State functions; those are matters of ceremonial arrangement within the State's ordinary executive control, and the Union's Orders leave the State latitude in them. The impugned Order does something different. It prescribes what the National Song shall consist of when it is sung: it declares that, at State functions, the National Song is the first two stanzas of the composition and no more. That is a prescription of the content of a national symbol."

It is stated that the Legislature of the State of Karnataka could not enact a law declaring that the National Song consists of two stanzas; therefore, what the State Legislature cannot do by statute, the State Government cannot do by executive order.

"The impugned Order itself acknowledges that a different rule governs. It exempts functions attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister and the Governor, at which the official version is evidently to be sung. A rule about the content of the National Song that yields whenever certain constitutional functionaries are present is not a rule the State is competent to make; it is a recognition that another authority's rule governs, coupled with a decision to depart from it in that authority's absence. If the State may define the version of the Song sung at its functions, the exception has no rationale; if it may not, the exception does not cure the excess", it says.

It is also argued that the impugned order is in direct violation of Articles 256 and 257(1) of the Constitution.

"Each Article extends the executive power of the Union to the giving of directions to a State for that purpose. These are the constitutional terms on which a State exercises executive power. A standing Order that the official version of the National Song shall not be sung at any State function is not a failure to assist the Union; it is an act of State executive power in direct opposition to an act of Union executive power, in a field that belongs to the Union", it submits.

The Plea also argues that the impugned order is contrary to the policy of a Parliamentary enactment in an occupied field. It says that a standing executive direction of the State that the National Song shall be sung in part only, at every State function, is executive action pulling against the policy of a Parliamentary enactment on a subject within Parliament's exclusive domain.

The Plea submits, "The impugned Order forbids that expression at every State Government function, and forbids it by executive order alone. Citizens who perform at, participate in or attend State functions, including the officers and employees of the State who conduct them, are thereby restrained by executive fiat from singing the official version of the National Song. An executive order is not "law" capable of imposing a restriction under Article 19(2), and the impugned Order is, to that extent, void under Article 13(2)."

The Plea seeks quashing of the impugned government order. It further prays, "Issue a writ of certiorari, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the decision of the Council of Ministers of Respondent No. 1 recorded at Item No. 37, Subject No. C.506/2026, of the proceedings of the 19th meeting of the Cabinet held on 03.09.2026 (Annexure-B), insofar as it resolves that only the first two stanzas of the National Song "Vande Mataram" shall be sung at State Government functions"

It also seeks a declaration that the prescription of the form, content and version of the National Song of India is a matter within the exclusive competence of the Union under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 248 of the Constitution of India.

The Petitioner also sought interim directions seeking a stay of the impugned order.

Previously, the Union Home Ministry issued a set of guidelines on the occasions on which the National Song Vande Mataram is to be played or sung, and its proper observance. The Ministry clarified that the full version of the song is to be played, and whenever the official version is sung or played, the audience shall stand to attention. However, it is not expected of the audience to stand when the Song is played as a part of the film in the course of a newsreel or documentary.

The Supreme Court had refused to entertain a plea against a Home Ministry circular on singing the national song Vande Mataram at official events, saying that a directive was not mandatory.

Cause Title: Sri Girish Bharadwaj v. The State of Karnataka and others

Statutory Process For Forming Waqf Managing Committee Cannot Be Replaced With Ad-Hoc Panel: Karnataka High Court

Muhib Makhdoomi — Tue, 15 Sep 2026 08:00:15 GMT

Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum, Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench

The Karnataka High Court has held that the statutory process prescribed for forming a succeeding Waqf managing committee cannot be replaced with an ad-hoc panel.

The Court accordingly quashed the Karnataka State Board of Auqaf’s decision constituting an eleven-member ad-hoc committee for eleven months and directed the District Waqf Officer to undertake the prescribed process for forming the succeeding committee.

The Court was hearing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging an official memorandum issued by the Karnataka State Board of Auqaf constituting an eleven-member ad-hoc committee to manage the Wakf institution after the earlier committee’s tenure had expired.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum observed: “The question is not whether the Board possesses general supervisory powers over auqaf. Section 32 undoubtedly vests general superintendence of auqaf in the Board and enables it to take measures for their proper maintenance, control and administration. However, the exercise of a general power must necessarily yield to a specific statutory procedure governing a particular field. Where the Rules framed under the Act prescribe the manner in which the succeeding managing committee has to be constituted and specifically provide for the consequence of failure to constitute such committee, the Board cannot bypass that mechanism by resorting to an ad-hoc arrangement.”

Advocate Shriharsh A. Neelopant appeared for the petitioners; Advocate D.L. Ladkhan appeared for the Board and the District Waqf Officer; Advocate Chetan T. Limbikai appeared for the third respondent.

Background

The petitioners claimed to be the President and Secretary of the Wakf institution’s managing committee. After the committee’s tenure expired, they submitted proposals for constituting a succeeding committee.

Instead of processing the proposals under Rule 54 of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017, the Board appointed an Administrator. The petitioners challenged that action, and the High Court initially granted interim protection before directing the parties to maintain status quo.

When the Board subsequently appointed another Administrator, the petitioners again approached the High Court. That appointment was quashed, and the Board was directed to redo the exercise in accordance with law and the observations made in the earlier proceedings.

The Board thereafter constituted an eleven-member ad-hoc committee for eleven months. The official memorandum recorded that the proposal was accompanied by the recommendation of the Minister for Wakf and had been considered as a “special case”.

The petitioners contended that Rule 54 contained a complete mechanism for constituting a succeeding managing committee. They argued that where no succeeding committee was constituted, management automatically vested in the District Waqf Officer under Rule 54(5), leaving no authority with the Board to create an ad-hoc arrangement.

The Board raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners had an effective alternative remedy before the Wakf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. On merits, the respondents relied upon Section 32(2)(o) and argued that the Board’s general powers of control, maintenance and administration authorised the ad-hoc arrangement.

Court’s Observations

The Court examined Sections 6, 7 and 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and held that the present dispute did not concern the institution’s character as a Wakf, its property, title or possession. The challenge was confined to the legality of the Board’s exercise of statutory power.

The Court distinguished Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum (2010), observing that it did not establish an absolute bar against the exercise of writ jurisdiction in every matter connected with a Wakf.

Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh (now State of Telangana) v. A.P. State Waqf Board (2022), the Court observed: “The principle emerging from State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.P. State Waqf Board (supra) is that the Court must first examine the nature and substance of the challenge and ascertain whether the dispute is one which is required by or under the Wakf Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The mere fact that the subject matter relates to a Wakf or Wakf property is not, by itself, sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. Where the challenge is directed against the legality, validity or competence of the action of the Wakf Board itself, particularly where the grievance is that the Board has acted contrary to the statutory provisions governing the exercise of its power, the existence of an alternative remedy before the Tribunal does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226.”

The Court held that requiring the petitioners to approach the Tribunal despite allegations that the Board had disregarded statutory rules and binding judicial directions would effectively immunise the statutory authority from judicial review.

The Court found that Rule 54 of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017 creates a structured mechanism for constituting a succeeding managing committee. The existing committee must initiate the process before its term expires, while the District Waqf Officer is responsible for supervising it.

Where the existing committee fails to act, the District Waqf Officer must initiate and complete the process. If the succeeding committee is still not constituted, Rule 54(5) provides that management and supervision automatically vest in the District Waqf Officer, who must act to constitute the succeeding committee within three months.

The Court held: “The language employed in sub-rule (5) is significant. The Rule does not confer an unfettered discretion upon the Board to devise any alternative arrangement of its choice upon expiry of the tenure of the existing committee. It specifically identifies the authority who is to assume management and supervision in the interregnum and further casts a duty upon that authority to secure constitution of the succeeding committee.”

Accordingly, the Board was required to follow the statutory arrangement instead of repeatedly appointing an Administrator and later constituting an ad-hoc committee.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 32(2)(o) of the Wakf Act, 1995 authorised the Board to constitute the ad-hoc committee. It held that the provision’s general language could not displace the specific mechanism prescribed under Rule 54.

The Court observed: “The submission that Section 32(2)(o) confers wide residuary power upon the Board also cannot be accepted in the manner canvassed by the respondents. Clause (o) enables the Board to generally do all such acts as may be necessary for the control, maintenance and administration of auqaf. The expression ‘necessary’ cannot be construed as conferring an independent and unrestricted power to disregard a specific statutory Rule. A general enabling provision cannot be invoked to defeat an express procedure prescribed by Rules framed under the very enactment.”

The Court reasoned that accepting the Board’s interpretation would render Rule 54(5) redundant because the Board could constitute an ad-hoc committee whenever a regular committee was not formed.

The Court also relied upon Managing Committee, Masjid-E-Idgah, Mysore v. State of Karnataka (1997) to reiterate that the Board’s power over the management of Wakf institutions must be traced to and exercised in accordance with the Act and the Rules.

The Court noted that the earlier judicial proceedings had already required the Board to undertake the exercise in accordance with law. The subsequent official memorandum nevertheless constituted another management structure without demonstrating compliance with Rule 54.

It held that the arrangement was not merely intended to facilitate daily administration but displaced the statutory mechanism for eleven months.

The Court emphasised: “The material on record further demonstrates that the issue has remained unresolved for several years. The existence of an ad-hoc committee cannot be permitted to become a substitute for the statutory scheme contemplated under the Rules. An interim arrangement, if permissible in law, must remain genuinely interim and cannot be employed to defeat the prescribed mechanism for constitution of the regular managing committee.”

The Court found that the proper course was for the District Waqf Officer to assume charge under Rule 54(5) and initiate the process for constituting the succeeding committee.

The Court clarified that it had not adjudicated the competing claims of the petitioners or any other interested persons regarding membership of the succeeding managing committee.

It observed: “Before parting with the matter, it is necessary to clarify that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the petitioners or any other interested person to be appointed or elected as members of the succeeding managing committee. The District Waqf Officer shall undertake the exercise strictly in accordance with the Rules, after giving due opportunity to all persons legitimately interested in the management of the Wakf institution.”

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and quashed the official memorandum constituting the ad-hoc committee.

The District Waqf Officer was directed to take immediate charge of the institution’s management and convene a General Body Meeting after giving wide notice to all interested persons. The meeting must be conducted under the officer’s supervision, and the scheme must be formulated in accordance with Form 42 and Rule 48 of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017.

The newly formulated scheme must be forwarded to the Karnataka State Board of Auqaf, and the entire exercise must be completed within four months. Until then, the District Waqf Officer alone will control and supervise the institution without interference from the petitioners, the previous committee, the ad-hoc committee or any other person.

The District Waqf Officer was also directed to secure and preserve the institution’s records, documents, registers, accounts and other materials.

Cause Title: Bazme Tohid Tanzeem Committee, Mudalagi & Anr. v. Chief Executive Officer, Karnataka State Board of Auqaf & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC-D:13086)

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