The Court was hearing a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a first appellate judgment affirming the trial court’s decree in favour of the purchaser/plaintiff and rejecting the defendants’ counterclaim seeking declaration that the registered sale deed was illegal, inoperative and liable to be cancelled.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Kalyan Rai Surana, while relying on the Telangana High Court’s ruling in Naseeruddin Ahmed Khan v. Mohd. Muzefferuddin Mahmood Khan (2024), highlighted: “Mohammedan Law does not recognise theory of representation. Interest of each heir is separate and distinct. There is nothing contrary to law for Mohammedan adult male members of a family carrying on trade for the benefit of all the interested members, including minors and females. When the adult male member holds assets for carrying on business on behalf of all the persons interested, then he stands in fiduciary relationship to such other persons.”

The Court, accordingly held: “Therefore, it is seen that the finding of the learned Trial Court, as modified by the finding by the learned first appellate court that the sale deed was void in respect of 4/5th share is the correct appreciation of Mohammedan Law, which does not recognize Nagar Ali, son of Yad Ali, who is also the elder brother of other four minor siblings, to act as their guardian so as to validly sell-off the land covered by the registered sale deed no. 2913/75 dated 18.02.1975.”

Advocate R. Ali appeared for the appellants; Advocate A.R. Sikdar appeared for respondents.

Background

The original plaintiff had filed a title suit claiming that she had purchased the suit land by a registered sale deed executed by one of the heirs of the original pattadar, for himself and as guardian of four minor siblings. She pleaded that she had remained in possession after the purchase, paid land revenue, and was later illegally dispossessed by the defendants.

The defendants filed a written statement with a counterclaim, asserting that the sale deed was illegal, fraudulent and void ab initio. Their case was that the elder brother was not the legal guardian of the minors, no guardianship certificate had been obtained, and therefore title could not pass to the plaintiff under the deed. They also claimed possession over the suit land and sought cancellation of the sale deed.

The trial court partly decreed the suit by declaring the plaintiff’s title and granting recovery of vacant possession by evicting the defendants, while dismissing the counterclaim as barred by limitation. The first appellate court dismissed the defendants’ appeal and affirmed the trial decree, holding that though the sale deed was void in respect of the minors’ shares, the defendants’ challenge was barred and the purchaser had established possession for decades.

The High Court admitted the second appeal on the substantial question whether the lower appellate court committed a grave error of law in holding that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land although the sale deed by which she purchased the land was void.

Court’s Observations

The Court noted that Sir Dinshaw Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law did not contain anything to suggest the existence of a concept of joint family under Mohammedan law, though fiduciary relationships may exist.

The Court treated the interests of heirs under Mohammedan law as separate, while recognising that a fiduciary relationship may arise where an adult male member holds assets or carries on business on behalf of all interested persons.

The Court accepted the first appellate court’s approach that, under Mohammedan law, the father and grandfather are guardians of minors, while other relatives such as the mother or brother are only de facto guardians and cannot sell minor property without appointment by a court.

The Court noted that the first appellate court had relied on Mohammad Amin v. Vakil Ahmed (1952), followed in Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin v. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul Quadri (1971), to hold that such a transaction was void and not merely voidable.

The Court held: “Thus, the learned trial court is found to have correctly decided the issue no. 10 in the negative, meaning thereby that the sale deed no. 2913/75 dated 18.02.1975 (Ext.1) is valid. The said decision of the learned Trial Court has been affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, by explaining that the said sale deed was valid so far as it relates to one-fifth share of Nagar Ali.”

The Court agreed with the concurrent findings that the plaintiff had proved possession over the suit land from the time of purchase and cultivation through adhiars. It noted that the first appellate court had found that the defendants’ own witnesses supported the plaintiff’s case regarding cultivation and possession.

The Court observed: “However, as the plaintiff was found to be in possession of the suit land since last 30-33 years from the date of judgment and decree, passed by the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff has been able to perfect her right, title and interest over the suit land and thus, the concurrent finding by both the learned courts that the plaintiff (now the substituted plaintiffs) was entitled to recovery of the suit land, stands on sound legal footing.”

The Court also referred to Article 59 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It noted that the plaintiff’s suit for recovery of possession was filed within limitation after dispossession, while the defendants’ challenge to the sale deed was disbelieved and held barred by limitation.

The Court found that the appellants failed to show any incorrect or perverse appreciation of pleadings or evidence by the trial court or the first appellate court.

The Court held: “The appellants have not been able to demonstrate that the learned trial court or the learned first appellate court had committed any error in appreciating the pleadings and evidence on record or that any part of their respective finding on any issue was incorrect or perverse, for not considering the pleadings and evidence or for taking into consideration any extraneous materials on record.”

Answering the substantial question of law against the appellants, the Court held: “Accordingly, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered by holding that the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court are not found to have committed any grave error of law in holding that the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land.”

The Court also referred to Deva v. Sajjan Kumar (2003) on the scope of interference with concurrent findings in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the second appeal with costs. It directed the Registry to draw up a decree of dismissal of the appeal, send it to the trial court for record, and return the records of the trial court and first appellate court along with a copy of the judgment and order.

Cause Title: On The Death Of Nur Mohammad All His Legal Heirs And 7 Ors. v. Legal Heirs Of Late Tarubala Saha, On The Death Of Jagadish Ch. Saha, His Legal Heirs And Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:GAU-AS:12126)

Appearances

Appellants: Advocates R. Ali, S. Hussain and M.Z. Shah

Respondents: Advocates A.R. Sikdar, M.H. Talukdar, N. Ahmed, A. Hussain and A. Kalam

Click here to read/download Judgment

Allowing a writ petition filed by United Drilling Tools Limited, the Court quashed Oil India Limited's order placing the company on its two-year Holiday List, holding that OIL could not disregard the company's substantive show-cause reply merely because it was filed two days after a court-granted deadline, particularly when the competent authority took no decision until five days later and a supplementary charge sheet had since found no irregularity in the very tender at issue.

A Bench of Justice Devashis Baruah in a matter arising out of a challenge to Oil India's blacklisting order dated October 10, 2025 and the appellate order dated December 15, 2025 affirming it, observed, “…The filing of an FIR, submission of the Charge Sheet as well as cognizance taken by the Court, in the opinion of this Court cannot be the basis without there being an independent assessment on the basis of the materials available”.

“This Court also finds it relevant to observe that a banning policy has to be in consonance with the settled principles of law. A drastic measure of blacklisting which entails the consequence of a civil death to a contractor cannot be based upon a prima facie satisfaction. It has to be determinative to arrive at a satisfaction that the existent facts calls for drastic action against the contractor. It may not be out of place to observe that the term ‘prima facie’ is latin term meaning ‘at first sight’ or ‘on the face of it’. Therefore, the term ‘prima facie established’ would mean a established on a cursory glance. If this Court accepts that blacklisting/debarment can be carried out merely on being prima facie established, it would result in drastic consequences being taken without a proper assessment on available material facts…”, the Bench said.

Senior Advocate G. Goswami appeared for the petitioner and Senior Advocate D. Saikia appeared for the respondent.

United Drilling Tools, a long-standing supplier of wireline winches and related equipment to Oil India, was awarded a contract worth over Rs. 13.7 crore in March 2025. In May 2025, the CBI registered an FIR against a Deputy General Manager of Oil India and two officials of the company alleging bribery in connection with the tender, leading to their arrest and, subsequently, a chargesheet naming the individuals and the company itself. Oil India suspended the contract and issued a show-cause notice proposing blacklisting.

The company sought certain internal documents before replying, which Oil India declined to furnish, and after an intervening writ petition before the same Court, was granted seven days to file its final reply, which it submitted two days beyond that deadline. Oil India nonetheless proceeded to blacklist the company for two years based on its earlier preliminary reply, subsequently cancelled the contract and forfeited the performance security, and dismissed the company's appeal. Notably, a supplementary charge sheet filed by the CBI in December 2025 recorded that no irregularity was found in the allotment of the tender in question, and that all materials supplied had been duly received and recorded.

The petitioner contended that ignoring its final reply on a technical ground violated natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and that the Banning Policy and Rule 175 of the General Financial Rules required a definitive conclusion of a Code of Integrity violation, not mere reliance on a pending criminal case, relying on the terms of the Integrity Pact and the debarment provisions of the 2023 Banning Policy. Oil India argued that a prima facie violation of the Integrity Pact, evident from the FIR and chargesheet, was sufficient to justify debarment without awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial, and that adequate opportunities had already been afforded to the petitioner.

The Court held that natural justice required not merely the issuance of a show-cause notice but genuine consideration of the reply filed pursuant to it, and found no justification for disregarding a reply filed only two days late when the Final Committee's recommendation was made five days later still.

The Court clarified, however, that debarment proceedings need not await the culmination of the criminal trial, being governed by the distinct standard of preponderance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the Court quashed both the blacklisting order and the appellate order, remanded the show-cause proceedings for a fresh decision within sixty days after considering the petitioner's final reply and subsequent representations and granting a personal hearing, directed that the petitioner's suspension would continue until such fresh decision, and granted the petitioner liberty to separately challenge the contract termination and forfeiture of security in appropriate proceedings.

Cause Title: United Drilling Tools Limited v. Oil India Limited & Ors., WP(C)/1487/2026

Appearances:

Petitioner: G. Goswami, Senior Advocate, A. Neog, Advocate.

Respondents: D. Saikia, Senior Advocate, A. Sharma, Advocate.

Click here to read/download the Judgment