Disposition In Favour Of Distant Relatives While Disinheriting Widow Unnatural And Raises Suspicion Over Will: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the disposition of property in favour of distant non-relatives to the complete exclusion of a surviving widow is inherently unnatural and casts a grave suspicion on the genuineness of a will.

It was observed that a widow is a natural Class I legal heir, and depriving her of her late husband's estate without any plausible or justified reason demands high circumspection from courts.

The Bench emphasized that under such suspicious circumstances, a heavy burden of proof lies upon the propounders to satisfy the judicial conscience of the court that the testamentary instrument was executed by the testator with free will and a full understanding of its contents.

Consequently, when the final court of fact refuses to validate a will due to genuine and germane suspicious elements—such as the complete disinheritance of a widow, the testator's illiteracy, and material uninitialed alterations on the registration page—no substantial question of law arises to justify an intervention in a second appeal.

The Court allowed a civil appeal against a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment that had erroneously reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a dispute over property inheritance.

The Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice KV Viswanathan held, "Disposition in favour of the respondents, who were not close relatives, while disinheriting the widow i.e., the sole Class I heir of the testator, was unnatural and raised suspicion and, therefore, the Court had to be circumspect while testing the evidence led by the propounder of the Will to satisfy its conscience as to whether the Will was executed by the testator with free will and full understanding of the nature and effect of the dispositions made therein."

AOR Radhika Gautam appeared for the Appellant, while AOR Sumit R. Sharma appeared for the Respondents.

Brief Facts

The original owner of the suit-scheduled property was Chhajju Ram, an illiterate agriculturist who died intestate and issueless. The original plaintiff, Bhambo Devi, being his widow and sole surviving Class I legal heir, instituted a civil suit for declaration of sole ownership and possession of the property left by her late husband. She also sought a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants, who had mutated the revenue records in their favor based on an alleged registered will. The plaintiff contended that her husband never executed any will and that the document was forged, bogus, and an outcome of fraud or undue influence.

Conversely, the defendants asserted that the deceased executed a valid registered will out of love and affection as a reward for the services they rendered to the couple. During the pendency of the first appeal, the original plaintiff passed away, and the appellant was subsequently brought on record as her legal representative.

Findings of the Lower Courts

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff after finding that the will was surrounded by multiple unexplained suspicious circumstances, such as the unjustified exclusion of the wife and material uninitialed cuttings in the Sub-Registrar's endorsement at the back of the will. It also held that the defendants failed to establish their possession over the suit property.

The First Appellate Court dismissed the defendants' appeal and affirmed the decree of the Trial Court. It summarized several suspicious circumstances, noting that the wife was disinherited without any plausible reason, the claimed uncle-nephew relationship between the testator and the legatees was not established, and the extensive uninitialed alterations changing the presenter's name from "Laxmi Kant" to "Chhajju" on the registration endorsement created a serious doubt regarding its valid execution.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in the second appeal, reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the suit. It held that once an attesting witness proved the execution of the will under the law, the presence of uninitialed cuttings on the reverse page or the choice of witnesses from outside the village could not invalidate an otherwise registered testamentary document.

Contentions of the Parties

For the Appellant: It was contended that the status of the plaintiff as the sole surviving Class I heir and the original ownership of the deceased were undisputed facts. It was further argued that the burden of proving a genuine testamentary disposition lay entirely on the propounders. The appellant maintained that the will was heavily shrouded in suspicious circumstances, including incorrect statements about relationships and the highly dubious uninitialed alterations made on the registration endorsement. Crucially, it was urged that the existence of suspicious circumstances was a pure question of fact, and the High Court exceeded its second appellate jurisdiction by overturning well-reasoned concurrent findings.

For the Respondents: It was countered that the plaint contained self-contradictory pleas by alleging the will to be bogus while simultaneously pleading fraud and undue influence without leading any evidence to substantiate such allegations. They argued that the execution of the will was duly proved by an attesting witness, shifting the onus onto the plaintiff. They further submitted that since the will was printed on the front page without any alterations, the uninitialed corrections on the back page relating to registration details were immaterial, making the High Court's intervention entirely justified.

Issues before the Court

1. Whether the pleadings of the plaintiff were deficient and self-contradictory as to lay a proper challenge to the Will? If so, its consequence?

2. Whether the non-examination of the plaintiff, or any witness of fact on its behalf, was sufficient to dismiss the suit?

3. Whether there were suspicious circumstances shrouding the execution of the Will? If so, whether those suspicious circumstances were explained, and doubts dispelled, to the satisfaction of the Court’s conscience?

4. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the two courts that the Will was shrouded in suspicious circumstances which its propounder failed to explain so as to dispel the doubts about its valid execution to the satisfaction of the Court’s judicial conscience?

Observations of the Court

The Court considered Issue Nos. 1 and 2 together to determine whether the plaintiff's alternative pleadings were self-contradictory and if her non-examination was fatal to the suit.

The Court observed that the suit was primarily for a declaration of ownership based on intestate succession, as the plaintiff was the sole surviving Class I heir of the exclusive owner. The Bench rejected the respondents' contention that the alternative plea of fraud and undue influence amounted to an admission of the execution of the will. It held that the Code of Civil Procedure permitted a plaintiff to rely on inconsistent allegations in the alternative. The Court emphasized that a legal admission must be clear, unequivocal, and unconditional, and pleadings must be read in their entirety rather than isolating an alternative plea.

The Court further held that the non-examination of the plaintiff or any witness of fact did not warrant the dismissal of the suit. Since the defendants did not traverse the plaintiff's assertions regarding her marriage and status as the sole Class I heir, these foundational facts stood admitted under the 'doctrine of non-traverse' enshrined in Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court held that the primary burden to prove the due execution of the testamentary disposition rested entirely upon its propounders. Therefore, the plaintiff's failure to lead evidence on fraud or undue influence could not defeat her claim, as she remained entitled to the reliefs based on the admitted facts of intestate succession. Accordingly, both issues were decided in favor of the appellant.

As regards Issue No. 3, the Supreme Court observed that since the testator was an illiterate person, a heavy burden lay upon the propounders to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that the will was executed with free will and full understanding of its contents. The Court found that the disposition in favor of non-relatives, coupled with the complete disinheritance of the widow and sole Class I heir, was highly unnatural and raised a grave suspicion, thereby demanding a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court further noted that the explanation offered in the will to disinherit the wife was factually incorrect, which, when coupled with the testator's illiteracy, raised serious doubts regarding the document's authenticity. These doubts could not be dispelled by registration due to multiple uninitialed cuttings on the reverse page that clouded the identity of the presenter.

The Court held, "In a nutshell, there were suspicious circumstances shrouding the execution of the Will which remained unexplained by its propounder to dispel the doubts regarding its valid execution by the testator. Once that is the position, the finding of the first appellate court discarding the Will as one which fails to satisfy its judicial conscience, is a finding which cannot be said to be perverse or irrational."

For Issue No. 4, the Court observed that whether circumstances were suspicious was inevitably a question of fact, which could not be converted into a question of law by time-honored judicial phrases like "the conscience of the Court being satisfied".

The Court noted that a second appellate court could only interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the lower court's findings were based on imaginary suspicions or vitiated by an erroneous approach in law.

The Court held, "All these circumstances put together raised a serious doubt that the Will was executed by the testator with free will and full understanding of the nature and effect of the dispositions made therein. In that context, if the judicial conscience of a final court of fact is not satisfied about the valid execution of the Will, it raises no substantial question of law for the second appellate court to interfere with the findings returned by the first appellate court. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the first appellate court."

In this case, since the final court of fact was not satisfied due to real and germane factors—such as the testator's illiteracy, the complete disinheritance of his sole Class I heir, and patently incorrect recitals in the instrument—no substantial question of law arose. The Bench, therefore, held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with a well-reasoned order.

Conclusion

In its final conclusion, the Court held that the propounded will was rightly discarded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. Taking into consideration that the lower courts' concurrent findings regarding the plaintiff's possession remained undisturbed by the High Court, the Bench ruled that the original decree was not liable to be interfered with under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and restored the original decree affirming the plaintiff's ownership and possession, with no order as to costs.

Cause Title: Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass and Ors. [Neutral Citation:2026 INSC 669]

Appearances:

Appellants: AOR Radhika Gautam

Respondents: AOR Sumit R. Sharma, Advocate Rajesh Gupta, Advocate Harpreet Singh

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