

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA**

Cr.M.P.(M) No.1647 of 2025

Reserved on: 12.08.2025

Decided on: 19.08.2025

Suleman

..... Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh

.....Respondent

Coram**The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.*****Whether approved for reporting?¹No*****For the Petitioner:****Mr. Anubhav Chopra, Advocate.****For the Respondent:****Mr. Lokinder Kutlheria, Additional Advocate General, with Mr. Prashant Sen, Mr Ajit Sharma and Ms. Sunena Chandhari, Deputy Advocates General.**

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 119 of 2025, dated 27.5.2025, registered at Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 152 of Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).



2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated. He surrendered before the police on 08.06.2025 and was arrested on the same day. As per the prosecution, the petitioner shared an AI-generated image of the Hon'ble Prime Minister with the words "Pakistan Zindabad". This post was treated as inflammatory and against the interest of the nation. The petitioner is a poor, illiterate street vendor who is running a small fruit cart outside the informant's shop. He is unable to operate a social media platform. His Facebook account was created by his son. The informant had access to his mobile phone and shared the controversial reel. There was a monetary transaction between the petitioner and the informant. The petitioner has been residing at Paonta Sahib for the past 24 years with his family. The police have seized the mobile phone, and custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required. The petitioner has been in custody since 08.06.2025, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining him in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by a filing status report asserting that a complaint was made to the police that the petitioner wrote in favour of Pakistan and against the Hon'ble



Prime Minister of India. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police arrested the petitioner and seized his mobile phone. The mobile phone was sent to SFSL, Junga, and the result is awaited. A charge sheet was filed before the court on 06.08.2025. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard Mr. Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokinder Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State.

5. Mr. Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The allegations in the F.I.R. do not satisfy the ingredients of Section 152 of BNS. There is no averment in the application that the petitioner had incited hatred amongst the members of two groups, or that his act was likely to provoke disharmony or feelings of enmity. Writing 'Pakistan Zindabad' by itself does not amount to inciting hatred. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment



of this Court in **Farooq Ahmad versus State of H.P., 2025 HHC 23619**, in support of his submission.

6. Mr. Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the relationship between India and Pakistan was strained at the time when the post was shared and writing Pakistan Zindabad was anti-national. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974***, wherein it was observed at page 783: -

“Relevant parameters for granting bail

26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the



possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: *Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.* [*Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.*, (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan* [*Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan*, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; *Masroor v. State of U.P.* [*Masroor v. State of U.P.*, (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee* [*Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee*, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; *Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.* [*Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.*, (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; *Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)* [*Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; *Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar* [*Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar*, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558].]

9. This position was reiterated in *Ramratan v. State of M.P.*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:-

“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in *Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra* (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below:

“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition ... otherwise in the interest of justice” has been



construed in several decisions of this Court. *Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice.* Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)

13. In ***Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570***, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: —

“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. *Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail.* We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)

14. This Court, in ***Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779***, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed:

“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for



anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. *The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.*” (Emphasis supplied)

10. This position was reiterated in ***Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.***

11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

12. The F.I.R. was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 152 of the BNS, which corresponds to Section 124A of the IPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 286: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414*** that Section 124A applies to



such activities which are intended or tend to create disorder or disturbance of the public peace. It was observed at page 339:

45. These passages elucidate what was accepted by this Court in preference to the decisions of the Privy Council in *Gangadhar Tilak [Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress, 1897 SCC OnLine PC 23: (1897-98) 25 IA 1]* and in *King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao [King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 1947 SCC OnLine PC 9: (1946-47) 74 IA 89]*. The statements of law deducible from the decision in *Kedar Nath Singh [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]* are as follows:

45.1. “The expression ‘the Government established by law’ has to be distinguished from the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration. “Government established by law” is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]*, SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.2. “Any acts within the meaning of Section 124-A which have the effect of subverting the Government by bringing that Government into contempt or hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by the use of actual violence or incitement to violence.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]*, SCC OnLine SC para 24)



45.3. “Comments, however strongly worded, expressing disapprobation of actions of the Government, without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by acts of violence, would not be penal.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]*, SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.4. “A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]*, SCC OnLine SC para 25)

45.5. “The provisions of the sections [The reference was to Sections 124-A and 505IPC.] read as a whole, along with the Explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]*, SCC OnLine SC para 26)

45.6. “It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc., which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order, that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order.” (*Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC*



6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC para 26)

45.7. (g) “We propose to limit its operation only to such activities as come within the ambit of the observations of the Federal Court, that is to say, activities involving incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public disorder or cause disturbance of public peace.” (***Kedar Nath Singh case [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955]***, SCC OnLine SC para 27)

As the statement of law at para 45.5 above indicates, it applies to cases under Sections 124-A and 505IPC. According to this Court, only such activities which would be intended or have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence are rendered penal.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Balwant Singh v. State of H.P. (1995) 3 SCC 124***, that the written or spoken words should have the tendency or intention of causing public disorder or disobedience of law and order. The intention of causing disorder or inciting people to violence is the *sine qua non* of the offence. It was observed:-

9. Insofar as the offence under Section 153-A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities. In our opinion, only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention



of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affect public tranquillity, that the law need to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order, or public order or peace and tranquillity in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while raising slogans on account of the activities of the appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC, and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their casually raising the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under Section 153-A IPC is, therefore, not made out.

14. This position was reiterated in *Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1*, wherein it was observed:-

16. Section 153-A IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC, and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within



the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.

17. In ***Ramesh v. Union of India [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775]***, this Court held that TV serial *Tamas* did not depict communal tension and violence and the provisions of Section 153-A IPC would not apply to it. It was also not prejudicial to national integration, falling under Section 153-B IPC. Approving the observations of Vivian Bose, J., in *Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt.* [AIR 1947 Nag 1] The Court observed that

“the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of an ordinary, reasonable man, or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’.” (***Ramesh case [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775]***, SCC p. 676, para 13)

18. Again, in ***Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [(1997) 7 SCC 431: 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094]***, it is held that the common feature in both the sections, viz. Sections 153-A and 505(2), being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will “between different” religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Further, it was observed that merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections.



15. A similar view was taken in *Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra*, (2024) 4 SCC 156: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 249(supra), wherein it was observed at page 161: -

7. In *Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417]*, while interpreting Section 153-A, in para 16, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 9)

“16. Section 153A IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. *The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC, and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.*” (emphasis supplied)

8. This Court in *Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2*



SCC (Cri) 417] referred to the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in *Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt. [Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5: AIR 1947 Nag 1]* A Division Bench of the High Court dealt with the offence of sedition under Section 124-A IPC and Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was whether a particular article in the press tends, directly or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt to the Government established in law. This Court has approved this view in its decision in *Ramesh v. Union of India [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]*. In the said case, this Court dealt with the issue of the applicability of Section 153-AIPC. In para 13, it was held thus : (*Ramesh case [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]*, SCC p. 676)

“13. ... the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of an ordinary, reasonable man or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’. (Bhagwati Charan Shukla case [Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5: AIR 1947 Nag 1], SCC OnLine MP para 67)” (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian Bose, J., will have to be applied while judging the effect of the words, spoken or written, in the context of Section 153-AIPC.

9. We may also make a useful reference to a decision of this Court in *Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya [Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, (2021) 15 SCC 35]*. Paras 8 to 10 of the said decision read thus : (SCC pp. 41-43)

“8. ‘It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society.’— Thomas Jefferson.



Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very valuable fundamental right. However, the right is not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the right of free speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity between different groups on the grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with a fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is made out against the appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions, which are as follows:

9. Only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. *The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC, and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed.* [**Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214: 1995 SCC (Cri) 432**]

10. *The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people.* The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the circumstances in which it was written and



published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning [*Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 41s*].”

(emphasis in original and supplied)

10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC is attracted when by words, either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, an attempt is made to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. The promotion of disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be on the grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community or any other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply only when an act is committed which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity.

16. There is no averment in the complaint that hatred or discontent was brought towards the government established by law in India. The averments show that the words 'Pakistan Zindabad' were mentioned in the post. Hailing a country without denouncing the motherland does not constitute an offence of sedition because it does not incite armed rebellion, subversive activities, or encourage feelings of separatist



activities. Therefore, *prima facie*, there is insufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime.

17. The police have already seized the electronic device and sent it to SFSL, Junga for analysis. The police have filed the chargesheet, and there is nothing to show that the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary. Therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.

18. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -

- (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;
- (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;
- (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;
- (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and



(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

19. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

20. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Central Model Jail at Nahan, and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits.

22. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge

19 August 2025.
(yogesh)