

**RESERVED**

**Case :-** CONTEMPT APPLICATION (CRIMINAL) No. - 1493 of 2021

**Applicant :-** State of U.P.

**Opposite Party :-** Asok Pande

**Counsel for Applicant :-** Govt. Advocate

**Counsel for Opposite Party :-** Ashok Pandey In person

**Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary,J.**

**Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh,J.**

1. This contempt application is delinked from rest of the connected matters and is being decided separately.
2. This *Suo Moto* Criminal Contempt has been registered pursuant to order of Division Bench dated 18.08.2021, against Sri Asok Pande, Advocate (hereinafter referred to as 'the contemnor').
3. Facts which led to the initiation of contempt proceedings are that on 18.08.2021, when Court assembled in the morning, contemnor appeared before the Court in improper attire i.e., in civil dress with his unbuttoned shirt. When the Court advised to appear in decent dress, he defied the Court's direction and refused to wear the advocate's uniform, further questioning Court the definition of "decent dress". He created disturbance, used abusive language, claiming that the Judges were "behaving like goondas," thereby scandalizing the Court and attempting to diminish its authority before the advocates and those present.
4. The Court also noted that earlier too on 16.08.2021, during the hearing of PIL bearing Civil No. 18055 of 2021, he had similarly barged into the Court without uniform, shouted at the top of his voice, and disrupted proceedings, claiming his right to address the Court out of turn as a member of the Awadh Bar Association.

5. Upon this behavior, the Court had no option but to direct the Court Officer and security to remove contemnor from the courtroom to maintain the serenity and decorum of the proceedings. He was ordered to be kept in custody until 3:00 PM to give him time to reflect upon his conduct and possibly tender an unconditional apology to the Court.

6. Upon release from custody at 3:00 PM, Contemnor once again entered the court room and, instead of expressing remorse or offering any apology, resumed his disruptive behavior. His repeated contemptuous conduct left no room for leniency. Despite being given an opportunity to express remorse, he continued to behave contemptuously, prompting the initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings.

7. Thus, the Division Bench vide order dated 18.08.2021, initiated suo motu contempt proceedings, issuing notice to the contemnor and framing the following charges:

*"(a) "You Mr. Asok Pande, Advocate on 18.08.2021 as soon as the Court assembled in the morning, came to the podium in civil dress with unbuttoned shirt. When the Court asked you, why you were not in uniform, you said that since you had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code in PIL Civil No. 14907 of 2021 therefore, you would not put on the uniform. You informed the court that you were appearing in-person and therefore, it was not required for him to don Lawyers' Uniform. When the court asked you that you should at least appear in 'decent dress' if you were appearing in person. On this, you started questioning the Court that 'what is decent dress'. The Court asked you to button your shirt, which you did not do. You created ruckus in the Court in the morning and atmosphere of the Court got completely vitiated. You used intemperate language, indulged in indecent behaviour amounting to gross misconduct and challenged the authority of the Court. Your conduct was unbecoming a member of the legal profession. When Court warned that if you would not behave properly, the Court would have no option except to remove you from the Court, you challenged the Court and said that if the Court had power; it could remove him from the Court. You used abusive language against the judges and said that the Judges were behaving like 'goondas'.*

*(b) Two days back on 16.8.2021, when this Court took suo motu cognizance in PIL Civil No. 18055 of 2021 in respect of Bar Association Election which was scheduled to be held on 14.8.2021, the Court was hearing the Returning Officer and Chairman of the Elders' Committee of Awadh Bar Association, You, Mr Asok Pande barged in the Court and came to podium without uniform and started shouting on top of your voice. When the Court asked you that in what capacity, you were addressing the Court, you said that being a Member of the Avadh Bar Association, you had every right to address the Court. When the Court asked that why you were not in uniform, you said that would not don the advocate's uniform as he had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code for Lawyers and insisted on addressing the court without donning Advocate's uniform.*

*(c) Your conduct in the court and outside the court clearly intended to defile the image of the Court, cast insinuations and personally insult judges in open Court. It is clearly intended to bring the Court into disrepute by making scandalous allegations and using abusive language against the judges. Your ex-facie contemptuous behaviour as envisaged under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defining criminal contempt that makes you liable to be punished and to be debarred from practicing in this Court in view of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and, therefore, you are hereby called upon to answer the aforesaid charge in person or through counsel and present yourself to be tried on 31-08-2021 before the Bench concerned”*

8. Thereafter show cause notice was issued to the contemnor on 24.08.2021 calling upon him to appear before this Court either in person or through counsel and file his reply as to why he should not be punished for criminal contempt of Court.

9. On 31.08.2021, when the matter was listed before another Bench, the contemnor, appearing in person referred to Section 14(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1971”). He submitted that since he had neither made any request to transfer the case to a different Bench nor had the original Bench expressed any opinion that it was impracticable for it to try the charge, the matter should have been placed before the same Bench which passed the order dated 18.08.2021.

10. Considering the submission, the Court directed that the matter be placed before the Bench which passed the order dated 18.08.2021 for trial of the charges. However, matter was never heard before the said Bench.

11. Today, a preliminary objection is raised by the contemnor that in view of Section 14(2) of the Act of 1971, the matter can only be heard by the same Bench, which had initiated the contempt proceedings. In case such a Bench is not available, no other Bench can hear the matter.

12. Learned A.G.A. for the State strongly opposes the said submission. He submits that this is absolutely an incorrect interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act of 1971 and now, since both the Hon'ble Judges are not available, the regular Bench hearing criminal contempt matters can and ought to hear the case.

Sections 14(2) and 14(3) of the Act of 1971 read as under:

*“14(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by some judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the trial thereof.*

*(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a person charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under sub-section (2), by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in the case.”*

13. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that no doubt the contemnor can move an application to be tried by another Judge.

However, it does not put any restriction upon the power of the Bench which has initiated the contempt proceedings to release the criminal contempt application. Such a Bench is always having an inherent power to release the case, in case it so feels.

14. Even otherwise, now none of the Judge of the Bench which had initiated the contempt proceedings is available, as both of them were transferred to different High Courts. Hence, the matter is to be heard by another Bench. This Bench is having the regular roster of hearing all criminal contempt applications and thus, this Bench is competent to hear the present criminal contempt application also. We do not find any force in the preliminary objection of the contemnor.

#### **PERSISTENT PATTERN OF CONTEMPTUOUS CONDUCT**

15. Before proceeding to the merit of the case, we find it necessary to advert upon the past conduct of the contemnor. This is not the first occasion where the contemnor has exhibited a pattern of disrespect towards the judiciary:-

i). In the year 2003 a PIL bearing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5849 (M/B) of 2002 filed by contemnor was dismissed by the Court with costs, it was found that contemnor filed frivolous petitions only to remain in the limelight.

ii). In the year 2006 during the Court proceedings, the contemnor started misbehaving and made derogatory remarks towards the Court. This misconduct during proceedings led to three separate Criminal Contempt Application (Nos. 309, 310, and 311 of 2006) vide order dated 01.02.2006, which are pending.

iii). In the year 2011, contemnor filed a Writ (PIL) No. 129 of 2011 before the Gujarat High Court challenging the appointment of a Governor which was dismissed vide order dated 14.04.2011 with strong findings about his lack of restraint.

iv). In the year 2012, contemnor filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.9767 of 2012 before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment of Gujarat High Court which was dismissed vide order dated 22.03.2012 with costs of Rs.1,00,000/-.

v). In the year 2013, contemnor while arguing in Misc. Bench No.11280 of 2013 before a Division Bench of this Court started making abusive remarks towards the Court calling the judges “rotten” and questioning their legal knowledge. The Court vide order dated 04.12.2013, initiated the Criminal Contempt Application No. 2745 of 2013 against the contemnor, which remains pending.

vi). In the year 2016, contemnor filed writ petition, Misc Bench No. 8216 of 2013 targeting sesquicentennial celebrations of the High Court, attempting to scandalize judges by alleging religious conspiracies and attempt to sow the seed of hatred and to divide the institution on communal lines. Court vide order dated 19.04.2016, initiated the Criminal Contempt Application No. 795 of 2016 against the contemnor, which is pending.

vii). In the year 2017 in PIL Civil No. 383 of 2017, contemnor once again made scandalous allegations led to Contempt Application (Criminal) No.103 of 2017 in which the Court sentenced him to three months’ simple imprisonment, fined him Rs.25,000/-, and also restrained the Contemnor from entering premises of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Lucknow for a period of two years. Contemnor challenged the aforesaid judgment before the Supreme Court by means of Criminal Appeal No.1746/2017 in which Supreme Court vide order dated 27.10.2017 suspended the imprisonment but did not stay the portion of order debarring the contemnor from entering the High Court premises.

16. Such repeated misconduct shows that the contemnor is not merely misguided but is intentionally engaged in a pattern of

behaviour aimed at undermining the authority of this Court. He continues to disregard orders of the Court, refuses to acknowledge the error of his ways, and shows no signs of reform.

17. Upon perusal of record, it is evident that despite due service of show cause notice and multiple adjournments afforded to the contemnor, he failed to file any reply to the charges. Neither any affidavit is submitted, nor any explanation is provided by the contemnor to justify or retract the charges. His persistent non-cooperation with the Court, coupled with his silence in response to the specific charges framed, leads us to infer that he has no defense to offer and remains recalcitrant and unrepentant.

18. In the absence of any reply by the contemnor against the charges framed against him, the Court proceeds to render its findings based on the charges framed, the record of proceedings, and the judicial record of the contemnor's previous conduct.

19. The conduct of the contemnor stands duly recorded in the order dated 18.08.2021. Such record forms part of the judicial proceedings and is conclusive in nature. It is well settled that the record of the proceedings made by the Court is sacrosanct; the correctness thereof cannot be doubted merely for asking and such proceedings are not required to be proved afresh like an ordinary document under the Indian Evidence Act. In ***State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463]***, the concession recorded in the judgment was sought to be disputed. The Supreme Court held to the following effect:

*“4.....We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation”. We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what*

*transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the every fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.”*

20. The Court, vide its order dated 18.08.2021, *prima facie*, found the contemnor guilty of committing criminal contempt on the following grounds:-

(A): On 18.08.2021, Mr. Asok Pande entered the courtroom in improper attire, with an unbuttoned shirt, and refused to follow the Court’s instruction to Advocate uniform or dress decently, justifying his conduct on the ground that he had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code in PIL Civil No. 14907 of 2021. When questioned, he used abusive language, challenged the authority of the Court, and stated that the Judges were behaving like “goondas.”

(B): On 16.08.2021, during proceedings in a PIL concerning Bar Association elections, Mr. Pande barged into the courtroom without being summoned, shouted at the top of his voice, and insisted on addressing the Court without the prescribed advocate’s uniform. Thus, he knowingly and willfully disturbed the Court proceedings.

**CHARGE –A**

21. Upon careful perusal of the charges framed, it is clearly established that on 18.08.2021, the contemnor, entered the courtroom in a most indecorous and inappropriate manner. He appeared before the Court dressed in civil attire with an unbuttoned shirt, in blatant disregard of the dress code mandated for Advocates. When questioned by the Bench regarding his improper appearance and lack of uniform, the contemnor defiantly refused to comply with the Court's instructions, citing pendency of a challenge to the Bar Council Rules in a Public Interest Litigation filed by him.

22. The matter did not rest there. The contemnor escalated his misconduct by using abusive and scandalous language in open Court, including the highly offensive and derogatory remark that “the Judges are behaving like goondas”. This statement was made in the presence of other members of the Bar, litigants, and Court staff, thereby seriously undermining the authority and dignity of the Court. In the case of *Ajay Kumar Pandey(in re:), (1996) SCC (Cri) 1391*, Supreme Court while dealing with a case where the contemnor Advocate questioned the conduct of Supreme Court Judges demanding apology and compensation from them. Contemnor also branded the conduct of Judges as “goondaim”. Court held that the contemnor was guilty of criminal contempt and was sentenced to six months imprisonment.

Further, the Supreme Court in the contempt case of *Arundhati Roy, In Re, (2002) 3 SCC 343* held as under:-

*“2. No person can flout the mandate of law of respecting the courts for establishment of rule of law under the cloak of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Such a freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by any law. Where a provision, in the law, relating to contempt imposes reasonable restrictions, no citizen can take the liberty of scandalising the authority of the institution of judiciary. Freedom of*

*speech and expression, so far as they do not contravene the statutory limits as contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, are to prevail without any hindrance. However, it must be remembered that the maintenance of dignity of courts is one of the cardinal principles of rule of law in a democratic set-up and any criticism of the judicial institution couched in language that apparently appears to be mere criticism but ultimately results in undermining the dignity of the courts cannot be permitted when found having crossed the limits and has to be punished. This Court in Harijai Singh, In re [(1996) 6 SCC 466] has pointed out that a free and healthy press is indispensable for the functioning of a true democracy but, at the same time, cautioned that the freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in all circumstances. Lord Denning in his book Road to Justice observed that press is the watchdog to see that every trial is conducted fairly, openly and above board but the watchdog may sometimes break loose and has to be punished for misbehaviour. Frankfurter, J. In Pennekamp v. Florida [90 L Ed 1295 : 328 US 331 (1946)] (L Ed at p. 1314) observed:*

*“If men, including Judges and journalists, were angels, there would be no problems of contempt of court. Angelic Judges would be undisturbed by extraneous influences and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for contempt, as a means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the community as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide, is not a privilege accorded to Judges. The power to punish for contempt of court is a safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the function which they exercise.”*

*3.The law of contempt has been enacted to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic set-up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous for the society itself.”*

*In D.C. Saxena (Dr) v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India [(1996) 5 SCC 216], the Supreme Court held, in Para nos. 35 and 40, as under:-*

*“35. Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech.... Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights. ... Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic*

*conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. [But] they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary.*

.....

*40. Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slander. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the majesty of justice. It would, therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a judge is scandalisation of the court and would be contempt of the court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to the majesty of justice. When the contemner challenges the authority of the court, he interferes with the performance of duties of judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into contempt."*

23. Contemnor, being a senior member of the Awadh Bar Association, was fully aware that he was required to be properly dressed in Court with his shirt properly buttoned, which he refused to do even on being asked by the Court and used abusive language against the Judges. His deliberate breach thereof, coupled with his offensive outburst, constitutes a direct and deliberate affront to the dignity and decorum of this Court.

### **CHARGE –B**

24. Record of proceedings further reveals that on 16.08.2021, during the hearing of a pending Public Interest Litigation concerning Bar Association elections, the contemnor, without being a party to the proceedings, forcefully entered the courtroom and reached podium without uniform and started shouting without leave of Court.

25. This unprofessionalism and forceful intrusion into judicial proceedings, especially by a practicing Advocate, is an egregious violation of courtroom protocol and discipline. It demonstrates not only disrespect towards the Bench but also an intention to disrupt and derail the course of justice.

26. The Court cannot be expected to function under such disruptive circumstances. Such conduct, especially from an Advocate, not only violates Court discipline but also affects public perception of judicial functioning.

27. In Contempt Application (Criminal) No.103 of 2017, the contemnor was sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment and restrained from entering the High Court premises for a period of two years. Paragraphs 59 to 61 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:-

*“59. We find also no sense of remorse, repentance or apologetic attitude on the part of Contemnor at any point of time. We, therefore, find that act of Contemnor of committing criminal contempt, in view of our finding with regard to charge, that it stands proved, is quite serious and deserves an appropriate stringent punishment.*

*60. In these facts and circumstances, holding Contemnor guilty of charge levelled against him, we sentence him three months simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- In case of failure of payment of fine within one month from today, Contemnor shall undergo further simple imprisonment of three months.*

*61. Besides, we also restrain Contemnor from entering premises of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Lucknow, for a period of two years. In computing above period, the period he has*

*already undergone pursuant to our order dated 01.03.2017 shall be adjusted. In other words, period of two years shall be treated to commence from 02.03.2017.”*

28. Contemnor challenged the aforesaid judgment before the Supreme Court by means of Criminal Appeal No. 1746/2017 in which Supreme Court vide order dated 27.10.2017 made the following observation :-

*“Sentence of imprisonment awarded by the High Court shall remain suspended until further orders. We make it clear that the directions of the High Court in paragraph 61 of the order dated 25th August, 2017 passed in Contempt No.103 of 2017 shall continue to remain in force.”*

29. Even after being debarred from entering the High Court premises for two years, the contemnor has shown no inclination to reform or express any remorse. On the contrary, his conduct demonstrates a continuing pattern of deliberate defiance and misconduct. The above conduct of contemnor clearly shows that he treats the judicial process with utter disdain and continues to undermine the dignity and integrity of the institution with impunity. As held by Supreme Court in the matter of **Mr ‘G’, A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court [(1955) 1 SCR 490]**, the Court, dealing with cases of professional misconduct, held in Para 7 as under:-

*“.....we are not concerned with ordinary rights of contract, nor with ordinary legal rights, but with the special and rigid rules of professional conduct expected of and applied to a specially privileged class of persons who, because of their privileged status, are subject to certain disabilities which do not attach to other men and which do not attach even to them in a non-professional character. ... He [a legal practitioner] is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action”.*

In ***Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa [1957 SCR 167]*** , this Court observed:

*“A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open Court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury, because the Munsif had merely upheld an order of his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the Court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.”*

30. From the findings made above, we have no hesitation in holding that conduct of contemnor on all charges clearly falls within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i) (scandalizing or lowering the authority of the Court) and Section 2(c)(ii) (interference with judicial proceedings) of the Act of 1971. The primary object of the contempt jurisdiction is not to protect the dignity of individual Judges but to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. When such confidence is shaken, the administration of justice suffers. We are mindful of the caution that contempt powers must be exercised sparingly and with great care. However, we also recognize that failure to act decisively in clear cases of repeated, unrepentant, and aggravated contempt would encourage others to follow suit. In light of the gravity of the charges, the contemnor’s previous conduct, and

his deliberate failure to participate in the present proceedings, we are of the view that exemplary punishment is warranted.

31. Accordingly, we impose the following punishment on the contemnor:

"The contemnor is sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2000/-. In case of failure to pay the fine within one month from today, the contemnor shall undergo further imprisonment of one month."

32. Contemnor is directed to surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow within four weeks from the date of this judgment to serve the sentence imposed herein.

33. We also find it a fit case where the contemnor should be restrained from practicing in the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow for a period of three years. Hence, a notice is given to the contemnor under Chapter XXIV Rule 11(3) of the Allahabad High Court Rules, as to why he should not be debarred from practicing before the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow for the aforementioned period.

34. Reply may be filed by the contemnor by 1.5.2025.

35. List this case on 1.5.2025.

36. The contemnor shall remain present on the date fixed.

37. A copy of this order shall be communicated to the Registrar General as well as the Senior Registrar at Allahabad and Lucknow respectively for communication and compliance.

**(Brij Raj Singh ,J.) (Vivek Chaudhary,J.)**

**Dated :-April 10,2025**

Praveen/Sachin

After pronouncement of the judgment in Court, the contemnor makes an oral request for permission/certificate for leave to appeal under Article 134(A) of the Constitution of India.

The prayer is rejected.

**(Brij Raj Singh ,J.) (Vivek Chaudhary,J.)**

**Dated :-**April 10,2025  
Praveen/Sachin